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This thesis is an inquiry into the inherent divergence and emerging convergence of ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration. Based on the argument that investor-State arbitration is an 
intricate interplay of diverse actors with compatible or disparate interests, this study 
investigates the substantial divergences between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration by 
evaluating the jurisdiction of tribunals, the role of institutions, post-awards remedies and 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It also examines the consequential, but 
discrepant, impact of the divergences on the safeguarding of State sovereignty, the 
protection of foreign investors’ rights, the enhancement of legitimacy of investment 
arbitration and the endorsement of public interests. It further puts forward fair, efficient, 
accountable and legitimate ways that would tentatively or constructively improve the entire 
dispute resolution system in the realm of international investment. In scrutinizing the 
interplay and interaction between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, the thesis argues that 
the symbiosis of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration creates and maintains a relatively stable 
environment where a number of factors serve as engines for promoting directly or 
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1 Research Question 
 
In order to minimize risks related to policy and institutional determinants of capital-
importing States, a network of international instruments, which comprise bilateral 
investment treaties (hereinafter ‘BIT’), free trade agreements (hereinafter ‘FTA’) and other 
investment treaties, provides foreign investors with essential protections. These 
instruments not only constrain host States’ incentive to expropriate or nationalize through 
an explicit commitment that expropriation or nationalization would be accompanied by a 
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, and further make such 
commitment more credible and realistic by coercively subjecting host States to 
international investment arbitration. As compared to the traditional recourse to diplomatic 
protection or national courts, international investment arbitration is depoliticized and 
external, and seems to be more independent and neutral. Among arbitration, national courts, 
international courts or tribunals and diplomatic protection, international investment 
arbitration has been a major method for the settlement of investment disputes between 
foreign investors and host States at the present time.1
 
 
While the World Trade Organization (hereinafter ‘WTO’) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
continues to respect the traditional State-State dispute resolution method, the mechanism in 
the international investment regime has undergone a fundamental change in which foreign 
investors are conferred a benefit on the use of a relatively depoliticized method, namely 
investor-State arbitration. The development of investor-State arbitration results greatly 
from the creation of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(hereinafter ‘ICSID’) and a significant number of investment treaties that contain 
extraordinarily broad dispute settlement clauses referring to ICSID arbitration. In addition 
to ICSID arbitration, a number of arbitration institutions and ad hoc tribunals also play an 
increasing important role in resolving international investment disputes. 
 
As different arbitral fora provide disparate levels of procedural protections and substantive 
benefits, the choice of an appropriate forum is highly essential, and can have considerable 
                                                          
1 Following 62 cases initiated in 2102 which constitutes the highest number of known treaty-based investor-
State arbitration ever filed in one year, at least 57 new cases are commenced in 2013. See UNCTAD, ‘Latest 






consequences. In particular, notwithstanding the commonly accepted designation of 
‘investor-State arbitration’,2
 
 international investment arbitration is by no means merely 
tackling the complicated relationships between foreign investors and host States; rather, 
participants who can claim their legitimate interests in investment arbitration and who 
might influence an investment arbitration case are far more than claimants and respondent 
States. International investment arbitration is an intricate interplay of diverse actors, which 
can be likened to an epic voyage to justice that is, by and large, initiated by the 
protagonists - investors and States (and their legal counsels), carried by arbitration 
institutions or secretariats, steered by arbitral tribunals, assisted and inspected by national 
courts and participated in by third-parties, experts and even home States and international 
organisations (see Figure I). The significance of making a choice among different fora is 
similar to that concerning the selection of a forwarding agent, a freight agent and a 
shipping agent for a sailing adventure, but reflects much more far-reaching implications of 
political, economic and social interests. In fact, the divergences of different fora have the 
potential to make a considerable impact on prospective legitimate interests of various 
participants in investment disputes cases, especially those related directly to damages and 
compensation. 
                                                          
2 In contemporary arbitration theory, ‘international investment arbitration’ is conceptualized as recourse to 
international tribunals of last resort, which refers to a variety of arbitration genres, including ‘State-State 
arbitration’ and mere ‘investment treaty-based arbitration’. The terminology of ‘international investment 
arbitration’ in this thesis, however, indicates sensu stricto ‘investor-State arbitration’, regardless of its (treaty 







Figure I: Participants in Investor-State Arbitration 
 
In view of the consequential but different impacts resulting from arbitral proceedings under 
a variety of arbitration rules, essential scrutiny of the specific divergences of different 
arbitral fora and an inspection of their relation, interplay and interaction on the basis of the 
criteria that have been acknowledged in constructing a fair, efficient and legitimate dispute 
resolution system become not only crucial, but also necessary to adapt arbitration rules to a 
rapidly changing world. This thesis attempts to examine whether different genres of 
international investment arbitration intrinsically implicate stark divergences of 
characteristic traits in essence and whether such discrepancies matter in real practice. An 
inquiry into the divergence of distinct arbitration genres cannot but be based on scrutiny of 
the characteristic traits of each genre, an examination of their practical advantages and 
drawbacks in specific contexts, and an analysis of potential areas of concern that stem from 
a range of arbitration rules. To this end, international investment dispute resolution 
methods can conveniently be classified into two genres, namely ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration. These two genres appear to be optimal classifications, categorically 





of their approaches to delivering justice in a different way that brings in a disparate degree 
of fairness, efficiency, accountability and legitimacy. While ICSID arbitration apparently 
refers to sui generis arbitration under the aegis of the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (hereinafter ‘ICSID 
Convention’), non-ICSID arbitration commonly comprises arbitration under the auspices 
of the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(hereinafter ‘UNCITRAL’), the Arbitration Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (hereinafter ‘SCC’), the Arbitration Rule of International Chamber of 
Commerce (hereinafter ‘ICC’) and the Arbitration Rule of London Court of International 
Arbitration (hereinafter ‘LCIA’).  
 
The ICSID Additional Facility Rules, consisting of a principal set of rules governing the 
additional facility proceedings and three schedules, were created to facilitate the use of the 
extensive Secretariat’s services. 3 Nonetheless, arbitration under the Additional Facility 
Rules sets it apart from ICSID arbitration in numerous ways, despite its procedural 
similarities to ICSID arbitration, in particular those related to the ICSID Secretariat’s 
administrative support. It is conspicuous that disputing parties eligible for proceedings 
under the Additional Facility Rules are distinctive, and the subject matters qualified for the 
proceedings are more comprehensive since the Rules are applicable to the settlement of 
disputes arising indirectly out of an investment on condition that the underlying transaction 
is not an ordinary commercial transaction. 4  Furthermore, the additional facility 
proceedings are not governed by the ICSID Convention, though certain provisions of the 
ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulations apply mutatis mutandis in the 
proceedings. 5
                                                          
3 Aron Broches, ‘The ‘Additional Facility’ of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes - 
(ICSID)’ (1979) IV YB Com Arb 373, 379. 
 Unlike the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility Rules do not 
supersede national law at the arbitral situs and other potential treaties in respect of post-
award remedies and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Consequently, it 
4 Introduction and art 2(b) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. It is worth noting that the Rules are not 
designed as a means to avoid the application of the ICSID Convention where access to the ICSID jurisdiction 
is available. ICSID practice also demonstrates that there is no difficulty with regard to the classification of 
disputes arising from investment because it is unlikely that a transaction will not meet the Convention’s 
requirement due to the general acceptance of an extraordinarily broad notion of ‘investment’ (see Christoph 
H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary  (CUP, 2009) 142). 





would not be irrational for ICSID additional facility arbitration to fall more suitably within 




Figure II: Classification of International Investment Arbitration 
 
2 The Divergence of ICSID and Non-ICSID Arbitration 
 
The term ‘divergence’ refers to the state, condition, quality or degree of being unlike or 
dissimilar. However, the divergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration in this thesis will 
not include a variety of distinctions between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration; rather, it 
looks into the differences that are significant and substantive. ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration, when viewed from a macro perspective, have two main divergences of a 
general nature. First, ICSID arbitration remains a public characteristic to some degree. The 
concept of arbitration as a consensual means of resolving investment disputes was a part of 
the landscape of public international law at the time the ICSID Convention was 
concluded.6
                                                          
6 Campbell McLachlan, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Legal Framework’ in Albert Jan van den Berg 
(ed), 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference (Kluwer Law 
International, 2009) 99-100. 





intersection of laws, politics and economics, 7 and the intersection typically implicates 
issues of international magnitude that have essential impacts on public interests. 
Conversely, non-ICSID arbitration is perceived, on the whole, intrinsically to possess a 
private characteristic. It is acknowledged that the UNCITRAL Rules were originally 
designed for use in ad hoc international commercial arbitration which normally deals with 
international trade disputes,8 and that SCC, ICC, LCIA and other mainstream arbitration 
has principally been crafted to apply to international commercial disputes between private 
businessmen. The impact of the private characteristic of non-ICSID arbitration, which 
seems to be more perceptible in cases of non-ICSID institutional arbitration, is that many 
developing countries believe that ICC or other non-ICSID arbitration gives undue weight 
to the preferences and interests of capital-exporting counties. 9 Second, as to the legal 
framework, the conclusion of the ICSID Convention was regarded as a breakthrough that 
actually provided a secure and self-contained system of resolving investment disputes, 
thoroughly autonomous and explicitly independent of any legal system at the national level. 
Though it would possibly no longer be an exaggeration to say that international 
commercial arbitration has become its own legal system,10 a self-contained system of non-
ICISD arbitration is far from taking initial shape. The effectiveness of non-ICSID 
arbitration rests, in principle, on a patchwork of international and national laws.11
                                                          
7 ‘Laws’ refers to applicable procedural and substantive rules of the ICSID Convention and Rules, and 
arbitral tribunals’ implementation of rules; ‘politics’ indicates that ICSID arbitration relates to a broader 
framework of the Developed World/Third World relations; and ‘economics’ focuses on the World Bank 
lending and surveillance, and World Bank’s administration of dispute settlement institution. See Ibironke T. 
Odumosu, ‘The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World’ (2007) 8 San Diego 
Intl L J 345, 350. 
 
8 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2009) 152. 
9 Malcolm D. Rowat, ‘Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment Climate of Developing 
Countries: The Cases of ICSID and MIGA’ (1992) 3 Harv Intl L J 103, 107. 
10 Recently an increasing degree of convergence around common principles has emerged, and such 
convergence particularly occurs through the promulgation of the UNCITRAL Model Law which has in turn 
driven the revision and reform of national arbitration statutes and rules of arbitration institutions. In practice, 
the Supreme Court of Canada had observed that arbitration was part of no State’s judicial system, while the 
French Cour de Cassation accepted that international arbitral awards were international judicial decisions. 
See Campbell McLachlan, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Legal Framework’ 102. 
11 There were three competing visions, philosophies, or more accurately, mental representations of 
international arbitration which structured the way in which scholars and practitioners observed international 
arbitration. Unlike the other two representations, namely, (i) international arbitration which was relegated to 
a component of a single national legal order, and (ii) international arbitration which was anchored in a 
plurality of national legal orders, the third representation where international arbitration was regarded as an 
autonomous legal order contemplated that the juridicity of arbitration was rooted in a distinct, transnational 
legal order, but not in a national legal system of the country of the seat or the place of enforcement. Instead 






The divergences of a general nature between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration give rise to 
significant distinctions between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration in a wide range of 
procedural and substantive respects. Specific distinctions of ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration, which may be a source of ‘procedural confusion or inefficiency’ particularly on 
the part of States,12 can be elucidated in manifold of practical aspects. However, a number 
of distinctions are less essential in evaluating ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. In the first 
place, some differences, such as the process, time limitations and remedies during the 
course of the constitution of a tribunal, are simply the procedural dissimilarities that entail 
less significant implication. In the second place, some divergences, though fundamental in 
themselves, are of impractical consequence in assessing ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. 
For instance, the independence of the arbitrator and the duty of disclosure are found in the 
UNCITRAL and many non-ICSID arbitration rules, whereas the ICSID Convention does 
not provide any indication of the kind of relations that should be disclosed by an arbitrator 
to satisfy the parties of his independence. Admittedly, the rules governing the 
independence of arbitrator, together with the practice of non-ICSID institutions presiding 
over their application, are crucial in ensuring the integrity and neutrality of arbitral 
proceedings. Nevertheless, the absence of relevant rules in the ICSID Convention does not 
detract from the ICSID’s reputation in providing independent, accountable and fair dispute 
settlement since in practice the Chairman of the Administrative Council and the Secretariat 
will take the matter seriously if any disputing party were to challenge the impartiality and 
independence of an arbitrator.13
 
  
In general, the jurisdiction, the arbitral proceedings (eg, transparency, provisional measures, 
role of domestic courts and arbitral costs), the challenge of arbitral awards and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
prepared to recognize and enforce arbitral awards collectively in a global context, thereby removing 
arbitrators from the notion that they were legitimized by a particular State to the normative activity of the 
community of States. The three theories determined different extent to which mandatory laws, principles and 
other rules of the situs would be applied in arbitral proceedings. See Emmanuel Gaillard, Legal Theory of 
International Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) 35-37. 
12 Antonio R. Parra, ‘Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment’ (1997) 12(2) ICSID Rev-Foreign 
Investment LJ 287, 359. 
13 For instance, in November 2013 the Chairman of the Administrative Council disqualified the investor’ 
appointed arbitrator, Mr Jose Maria Alonso, in Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. See ICSID Case No ARB 12/20, Decision on the Parties’ Proposals to 





recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards are the major divergences standing out 
compared with others since they represent and express significant departures that would 
have enormous potential impacts on legitimate, but conflicting, interest demands. In order 
to advance the thesis that ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration possess substantial divergences 
which have, more or less, a bearing on the final outcome of cases submitted to investor-
State arbitration based on different arbitration rules, these areas of divergence will be 
addressed in this thesis. 
 
Chapter I concentrates on the divergence of tribunals’ jurisdiction. It is always a given that 
consent to the jurisdiction of ICSID or non-ICSID arbitral tribunal constitutes a derogation 
from a State’ sovereignty in that the jurisdiction of an international investment case lies, in 
a traditional sense, with the State where the investment in question is located. 14
 
 
Accordingly, State’s consent to international arbitration amounts precisely to a transfer of 
its judicial sovereignty. As consent to jurisdiction of ICSID or non-ICSID arbitration 
constitutes a different degree of derogation of State sovereignty, international arbitral 
tribunal’ jurisdiction, which is backed up by the indispensable State’s consent, is thus a 
delicate matter and an essential factor to measure the extent of sovereign rights that have 
been conceded by State to ICSID or non-ICSID arbitral tribunal. In the meantime, in what 
ways and to what extent would a State transfer sovereignty would affect, by and large, 
investors’ right to obtain the benefit of investor-State arbitration in view of the fact that 
diverse jurisdictional requirements in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration indubitably 
influence the scope of investors’ investment which would be appropriately protected. 
Chapter II looks into the divergence of the role of institutions. It is obvious that disparate 
administrative powers and functions in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration will result in 
distinctive integrity and efficiency of the investment dispute settlement facilities.15
                                                          
14 For example, Latin America countries that insisted on the Calvo doctrine maintained that recognition of the 
international law concept would contradict the fundamental concept of territorial sovereignty. Therefore, host 
States had exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising out of investment. See James C. Baker & Lois J. Yoder, 
‘ICSID and the Calvo Clause a Hindrance to Foreign Direct Investment in LDCs’ (1989-1990) 5 Ohio St J on 
Disp Resol 75. 
 Aside 
15 For example, duties fulfilled by secretariats may, on occasion, be attacked on account of the abuse of 
authority. Lalive published a paper that contained a number of comments that were critical of the Secretariat 
of the ICC Court as a whole. One of the criticisms was that the Secretariat had taken it upon itself to issue a 
directive in 1995, which exemplified an increasing and worrisome tendency of the Secretariat to ‘increase its 
power’. However, the Secretary General of the ICC Court defended the Court by asserting that the paper was 





from administrative powers and functions, arbitration institutions also undertake a variety 
of duties, varying in terms of their rules. Particularly, the ICSID distinguishes itself from 
other arbitration institutions, given that one of the ICSID’s objectives is to foster increased 
flows of transnational investment. The ICSID undertakes enormous duties that a non-
ICSID arbitration institution may be incapable of assuming, but such duties would have 
profound impacts on the coherent investor-State arbitral jurisprudence and the future 
development of an investment dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
Chapter III scrutinizes the divergence of post-award remedies. The finality of international 
arbitral awards can, in consideration of the delivery of a final binding resolution as the 
most fundamental task of arbitration, be in juxtaposition to efficiency and economy which 
are generally appreciated as the foremost virtues of international arbitration.16 Though the 
precise nature of res judicata effect 17  in investor-State arbitration still remains a 
controversial issue,18 the finality of investor-State arbitral awards has been historically 
honoured by both States and investors.19
                                                                                                                                                                                
collective views of the Court and not the whims of its Secretariat, was entirely consistent with the ICC 
Arbitration Rules. See Eric A. Schwartz, ‘On the Subject of “Administrative Secretaries”: A Reply by Mr. 
Eric Schwartz, Secretary General of the ICC Court’ (1996) 14(1) ASA Bulletin 32. 
 However, as a result of the ambiguousness in part 
as well as human fallibility ranging from typographical errors to non sequitur analysis, the 
presumptive finality of arbitral awards might be challenged by a number of instruments 
under both international conventions and national laws, which typically refer to post-award 
remedies available for parties who receive an unfavourable outcome to challenge the 
finality of arbitral awards. Post-award remedies, though obtainable in both ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration, demonstrate one of the most distinguishing features between ICSID and 
16 Christoph Schreuer, ‘From ICSID Annulment to Appeal Half Way Down the Slippery Slope’ (2011) 10 L 
& Prac of Intl Cts & Tribunals 211, 211. 
17 In view of the fact that the rules of preclusion in international arbitration have been, to an enormous extent, 
developed as a matter of national law, international arbitral awards in main legal jurisdictions are accorded 
the same preclusive effects that national court judgments obtain under the national law framework. However, 
common and civil law legal systems adopt divergent rules of preclusion, and the differences are complex and 
vary from one jurisdiction to another. While major common law jurisdictions accept two basic concepts of 
preclusion, namely, claim preclusion and issue preclusion, civil law jurisdiction merely recognizes claim 
preclusion. See Gary B. Born, International Arbitration: Cases and Materials, 1048-52. 
18 In other words, it is ambiguous as to what preclusive effects are mandated by art 53(1) of the ICSID 
Convention and art 3 of the New York Convention. 
19 The historical importance to States of the finality of investor-State awards can be indicated in the 
development of the investor-State arbitration process, in particular in travaux préparatoires and the final text 
of the ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law, and the negotiation of MAI by OECD (see Jason 
Clapham, ‘Finality of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: Has the Tide Turned and is there a Need for Reform?’ 





non-ICSID arbitration. In the light of the alleged risky ICSID annulment which lacks 
finality, certainty and predictability,20 some commentators even advocate a greater use of 
non-ICSID arbitration with judicial review by national courts.21
 
 Hence, scrutiny of the 
divergence of post-award remedies between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is of 
practical consequence. 
Chapter IV elucidates the divergence of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 
The recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards are of vital significance 
since the effectiveness of international arbitration depends, mainly and ultimately, on the 
degree of finality of awards and the presumptive obligation of enforcement. In fact, despite 
the fact that the majority of international arbitral awards have been, in general, voluntarily 
complied with, award creditors might have to seek the recognition and enforcement of 
awards in some cases where award debtors refuse to execute the awards against them. In 
investor-State arbitration, the travaux préparatoires of the ICSID Convention indicated 
that the enforcement of ICSID awards against States was somehow an academic question 
due to the solemn international obligation to comply with awards undertaken in advance by 
States when ratifying the Convention,22
                                                          
20 As to ICSID arbitration, scepticism concerning the annulment had been expressed by Feldman who 
maintained that it was more important for the ICSID to be efficacious that awards be final rather than correct 
since parties valued informality, expeditiousness and economy (see Mark B. Feldman, ‘The Annulment 
Proceedings and the Finality of ICSID Arbitral Awards’ (1987) 2(1) ICSID Rev-Foreign Investment LJ 85, 
87). By contrast, some scholars asserted that given the importance of many of the disputes and the occasional 
errors of arbitrators, the amount of review in annulment proceedings seemed to be desirable (see David D. 
Caron, ‘Reputation and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction Between 
Annulment and Appeal’ (1992) 7(1) ICSID Rev-Foreign Investment LJ 21, 51). More fundamentally, while 
the interests in finality implied that several arbitrary limits for control systems should be established, the 
interest in justice required a fair decision be guaranteed no matter what the cost or how long it took (see W. 
Michael Reisman, ‘The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration (1989) 1989 Duke LJ 
739, 744-45). In general, ICSID annulment was a preferred solution in balancing these two control 
mechanism policies (see Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 903). 
 but the Convention still attempted to provide both 
States and investors with a simplified and effective method of obtaining enforcement. The 
Convention ensures enormously rigorous finality and optimal preconditions for the 
presumptive obligation in a manner that is sufficient to distinguish ICSID arbitration from 
21 See, eg, Bernard Hanotiau & Olivier Caprasse, ‘The Review of Arbitral Awards by Domestic Courts: 
Introductory Report’ in Emmanuel Gaillard (ed), The Review of International Arbitral Awards (Juris, 2010) 
18-19. 
22 ICSID, History of the ICSID Convention: Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the 






non-ICSID arbitration. 23  Recently, post-award remedies and the enforcement of non-
ICSID arbitral awards have been thrust into the limelight as Russia may seek annulment of 
the Hague Arbitration Court’s ruling on the Yukos case and avoid enforcing the highest-
value arbitral award of all time.24
 
 
3 The Convergence of ICSID and Non-ICSID Arbitration 
 
It is unequivocal that the divergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is conspicuous 
and even radical in a number of aspects. However, the relationship between ICSID and 
non-ICSID arbitration dost not simply correspond with disparity and singularity. Chapter V 
argues that as new phenomena emerge and several non-ICSID arbitration rules have been 
amended or are in the works to address more fundamental issues of investor-State 
arbitration, there is currently a new-fangled and more subtle way of looking at the 
relationship of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. More specifically, a trend of 
convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration begins, to some extent, to emerge within 
the framework of investment arbitration in a contemporary perspective. Nonetheless, 
investment arbitral jurisprudence has not developed a general principle for evaluating the 
convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. In this thesis, the convergence is 
conceptualized as two processes converging ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, namely the 
substantive resemblance between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration and the relationship, 
interplay and interaction between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. The convergence of 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is not simply a consequence of competition or rivalry; in 
essence, it is consequentially an evolution towards fairer and more efficient dispute 
resolution. 
 
4 The Implications of the Divergence of ICSID and Non-ICSID Arbitration 
 
4.1 States: A Perspective of Transfer of State Sovereignty 
 
The divergences of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration have theoretical and practical 
implications for contemporary international investment law. In particular, the divergences 
                                                          
23 Lucy Reed, Jan Paulsson, Nigel Blackaby, Guide to ICSID Arbitration (Kluwer International Law, 2011) 
179. 
24 ITAR-TASS news, The Hague Court’s Ruling on Yukos Final but Russia May Seek Annulment 





pragmatically play critical parts in pursuit of a successful settlement of an investment 
dispute, and of more primary but less tangible interests underlying the individual dispute 
such as government’s regulatory right for protection of public welfare, health and safety, 
labour rights and the environment.  
 
The roles that States play in investor-State arbitration are not just as claimants, respondents 
or non-disputing parties as amicus curiae in specific cases; instead, they can be multiple 
and tremendously complex, and would profoundly affect the international investment 
regime on the whole.25 In particular, treaty negotiation is a primary role from a macro 
perspective, since State sovereignty would be a focal point in the negotiation process and 
the extent of sovereign rights transferred to international tribunals would substantially 
affect the framework of investor-State arbitration. International tribunals’ discretionary use 
of adjudicative power on regulatory disputes seems to conflict with ‘principles of judicial 
accountability and independence in democratic societies’ and infringe the integrity of a 
legal system by contracting out the judicial functions in public law.26 Nonetheless, most 
legal systems in the modern world have accepted that State sovereignty is not inalienable 
and some sovereign functions can be transferred to supranational or international entities.27 
In the investor-State arbitration context, State sovereignty can be, whether through 
investment concessions or treaties, transferred or surrendered28 by States to international 
tribunals. In fact, when verifying consent to investor-State arbitration jurisdiction, States 
automatically transfer part of their judicial sovereignty in favour of investment protection; 
in other words, international tribunals remove, de facto, a substantial component of 
national courts’ jurisdiction.29
                                                          
25 For example, first, States act as legislators to create statutory frameworks for international arbitration, 
especially when it comes to their functions to legitimate and support non-ICSID arbitration and further 
promote arbitration venues. Second, States as contracting parties negotiate and ratify international or regional 
arbitration conventions and multilateral or bilateral investment treaties, which are of the utmost importance in 
shaping the formulation of international investment law and in setting up the foundation of investor-State 
arbitration. In addition, certain functions of States are undertaken by national courts, including, inter alia, 
issuing arbitration injunction, implementing awards and controlling non-ICSID awards. 
 As more cases have proved that investor-State arbitration is 
not simply about seeking compensation for the damage but rather the challenge of 
26 Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP, 2007) 4. 
27 Guglielmo Verdirame, ‘A Normative Theory of Sovereignty Transfers’ (2013) 49(2) Stanford J Intl L 371. 
28 The diction of ‘transfer’ emphasizes that sovereignty is positively interchanged by States, while the term 
‘surrender’ implies a voluntary but passive attitude towards the loss of some sovereign rights. 
29 Santiago Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and Administrative 







 it can be contended that the element of transferring State sovereignty is 
the linchpin of the whole investment arbitration mechanism.  
Intriguingly, the extent of the sovereignty that States have to transfer to ICSID or non-
ICSID arbitration is different. States have to transfer, by and large, more sovereign rights 
in ICSID arbitration in the light of four concerns. First, consent to ICSID arbitration 
jurisdiction would prevent disputing parties from seeking relief from national courts in the 
course of the arbitral proceedings. Second, the place where ICSID arbitral proceedings take 
place is irrelevant to the validity of awards. Third, national courts charged with the 
enforcement of ICSID arbitral awards have no power to review awards for procedural 
irregularities or substantive correctness. Fourth, respondent States in ICSID arbitration 
may be confronted with a threat of impliedly waiving its sovereign immunity. 31 The 
divergence concerning the extent of alienable State sovereignty in ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration has potentially great implications not only because of the exclusion of any other 
remedy and any national court’s scrutiny of ICSID award since such sovereign rights have 
been transferred to ICSID arbitration, but also owing to the considerable impact of 
decisions rendered by international arbitral tribunals. In exercising their authority 
conferred by States and investors over investment disputes, international tribunals 
increasingly function as a mechanism of global governance, impacting on domestic 
administrative, legislative and judicial decision-making and policy-making.32
                                                          
30 For example, in July 2014 Newmont Nusa Tenggara and its majority Dutch shareholder Nusa Tenggara 
Partnership BV filed an ICSID arbitration request against the Indonesian government over its mineral-export 
ban policy, seeking interim and injunctive relief to resume exports. See Nusa Tenggara Partnership B.V. and 
PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No ARB/14/15. 
 Apparently, 
the more sovereign rights are transferred, the more significant impacts would be imposed 
on general foreign investors, host States and civil society.  
31 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Blue Ridge Invs., L.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina that 
Argentina had waived its foreign sovereign immunity pursuant to the implied waiver exception under art 
1605(a)(1) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by becoming a party to the ICSID Convention, and the 
arbitral award exception under 1605(a)(6) of the Act by submitting the dispute to the ICSID tribunal. See 
Docket No 12-4139-cv, 2d Cir. 2013.  
32 Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan W. Schill, ‘Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), 
50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference, 5-14. See 
also Stephan W. Schill, ‘System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking’ (2011) 12(5) 






In view of the controversy surrounding the effect of investor-State arbitration contained in 
BITs on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows,33 it has become more essential for 
developing countries to revalue BITs and investment arbitration and further consider to 
what extent they decide to transfer State sovereignty. As developing countries concede 
sovereignty only in the belief that they would benefit from the global capital market since 
the resulting investment inflows will promote economic development, there is a possibility 
that they abandon ICSID or non-ICSID arbitration and resume their regulatory rights if 
such promise could not be achieved. Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have respectively 
denounced the ICSID Convention,34 triggering their withdrawal from the investor-State 
dispute resolution mechanism under the auspices of the Centre.35
                                                          
33 Yackee found only inconsistent evidence that BITs might succeed in attracting additional FDI, and 
emphasized that the effectiveness of BITs in performing such role depended on the particulars of dispute 
settlement mechanism in BITs (see Jason Webb Yackee, ‘Sacrificing Sovereignty: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, International Arbitration, and the Quest for Capital’, USC Centre in Law, Economics and 
Organization Research Paper No C06-15, 8). Berger’s study, however, revealed that investor-State arbitration 
would not increase FDI between developed countries and it might incur serious economic and political costs 
(see Axel Berger, ‘The Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement - The Dispute over Dispute Settlement’, The 
Current Column, 4 March 2014). Generally, simply containing investor-State arbitration in BITs is 
insufficient in particular considering that the impact of investor-State arbitration on the development of host 
States’ economies and institutions is still debatable (see OECD, ‘Government Perspectives on Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: A Progress Report’, Freedom of Investment Roundtable, 14 December 2012, 12-13). 
 Bolivia, the first State to 
34 The World Bank received written notices of denunciation from the Republic of Bolivia on 2 May 2007, 
from the Republic of Ecuador on 6 July 2009 and from the República Bolivariana de Venezuela on 24 
January 2012. In accordance with art 71 of the ICSID Convention, the denunciation took effect six months 
after receipt of the notice. 
35 The impact of the denunciation on the ICSID arbitral claims has been a subject of debate for a couple of 
years, and much of the debate has centred on whether foreign investors would have rights to continue 
initiating new claims against States that have withdrawn from the ICSID Convention on the basis of States’ 
unilateral prior consent contained in a BIT, a FTA or other investment treaty that remains in force. Professor 
Gaillard drew a distinction between State’s ‘unqualified consent’ and ‘agreement to consent’ to ICSID 
arbitration in BITs, and the underlying terminology used in the arbitration clause dictated whether the clause 
was an expression of an unqualified consent or an agreement to consent. Eg, art 8 of the UK-Bolivia BIT 
provided that disputing parties ‘may agree to refer the dispute either’ to ICSID, ICC or ad hoc arbitration, 
which indicated that a further agreement was required to commence ICSID arbitration. By contrast, art 11 of 
Germany-Bolivia BIT stated that after both States had become the contracting parties of the ICSID 
Convention, the dispute ‘shall be submitted’ to ICSID mediation and arbitration, which unequivocally 
expressed State’s consent to ICSID jurisdiction. Where an unqualified consent existed, investors could rely 
on such consent to initiate ICSID arbitration against the State even after it had denounced the Convention 
(see Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘The Denunciation of the ICSID Convention’ (2007) 237(122) NYLJ, 26 June 
2007). Professor Tietje also observed that the most far-reaching understanding of art 72 provided for the 
possibility of accepting State’s consent to ICSID jurisdiction contained in a BIT so long as the BIT remained 
effective, and then the decisive issue was under what conditions the ICSID arbitration clause in a BIT 
remained unaffected by the State’s denunciation of the Convention. Normally, the conditions were that the 





denounce the ICSID Convention, asserted that ICSID arbitration was an infringement of 
national sovereignty. 36  The Foreign Ministry of Venezuela also underlined State 
sovereignty, reiterating that Venezuela acceded to the ICSID Convention in 1993 ‘by order 
of a provisional government weak and lacking popular legitimacy, pressured by 
transnational economic sectors involved in the dismantling of Venezuela’s national 
sovereignty’.37 Furthermore, as a considerable number of BITs in force contemplate, in 
addition to ICSID arbitration, alternative arbitration fora such as arbitration under the aegis 
of ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or other available 
rules,38 foreign investors are entitled to bring their claims against Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela before non-ICSID arbitral tribunals. In fact, several cases have been 
commenced against Bolivia in the non-ICSID arbitral proceedings.39
                                                                                                                                                                                
(see Christian Tietje, et al, Once and Forever? The Legal Effects of a Denunciation of ICSID, Beiträge zum 
Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, Heft 74, 8-9, 28-30). 
 Given that BITs still 
Intriguingly, Oscar M. Garibaldi argued that applying the contract analogy to art 72 became an instance of 
the fallacy of false analogies. He presented observations on the limits of the contract analogy and on the 
inadequacy of other theories that might tempt commentators who attempted to search for an extra-textual 
justification for construing the ‘consent’ in art 72 as an ‘agreement to arbitrate’ (see Oscar M. Garibaldi, ‘On 
the Denunciation of the ICSID Convention, Consent to ICSID Jurisdiction, and the Limits of the Contract 
Analogy’ in Christina Binder, et al (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in 
Honour of Christoph Schreuer (OUP, 2009) 252-77). 
Currently, there is a scarcity of case law concerning the effect of denunciation. Eg, the ICSID tribunal in 
Pan American Energy LLC v. Plurinational State of Bolivia (ICSID Case No ARB/10/8) had refused to 
throw out the claim filed against Bolivia simply on the ground that the investor initiated arbitration more than 
two years after Bolivia’s denunciation of the Convention had taken effect. The tribunal might revisit the issue 
in subsequent arbitral proceedings, thus turning the debate from an academic question into a practical issue. 
However, the predominant academic observation indicates that no new claim should be permitted to file 
before an ICSID arbitral tribunal against a State if the State has withdrawn from the ICSID Convention, 
despite the fact that recourse to ICSID arbitration still retains an option as a dispute resolution forum in the 
text of the BIT or other applicable treaty that remains in force (Christoph Schreuer, ‘Denunciation of the 
ICSID Convention and Consent to Arbitration’ in Michael Waibel, et al (eds), The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law International, 2010) 353-68). 
36 Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, ‘The Effect of Bolivia’s Withdrawal from the Washington Convention: is a 
BIT-Based ICSID Jurisdiction Foreclosed’ (2007) 22(8) Mealy’s Intl Arb Rep 21. 
37 R. Polanco Lazo, ‘Is There a Life for Latin American Countries After Denouncing the ICSID Convention?’ 
(2004) 11(1) Transnatl Disp Management 1, 20. 
38 For instance, only Germany-Venezuela and Chile-Venezuela BITs provide for ICSID arbitration as the 
sole valid forum available for investors to resolve investment disputes, and the other 25 BITs concluded by 
Venezuela in force commonly contain a variety of arbitral venues, in particular the UNCITRAL arbitration. 
39 Guaracachi and Rurelec initiated an UNCITRAL arbitration administrated by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (hereinafter ‘PCA’) against Bolivia under the U.S.-Bolivia and UK-Bolivia BITs, claiming 
compensation resulting from the nationalization in 2010 (Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2011-17, Award, 31 January 2014). Other arbitral 
proceedings are still underway, including South American Silver Limited v. Bolivia (UNCITRAL arbitration 
based on the UK-Bolivia BIT) and Albertis v. The Government of Bolivia (UNCITRAL/PCA arbitration 





contribute to the coherence, predictability and stability of host States’ investment 
framework40
 
 and that the effectiveness of BITs in attracting foreign investment arguably 
depends in part on the commitment of providing foreign investors with direct access to 
investor-State arbitration, developing States should pay more attention to the selection 
between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. Bolivia and Venezuela’s withdrawal from 
ICSID arbitration has showed their moderate resistance to sovereign rulings being 
conceded to international tribunals. Their selection of non-ICSID arbitration in which State 
sovereignty would be transferred in a less drastic way will have a significant implication 
for other developing countries, especially those who have been sceptical of the effect of 
BITs and investor-State arbitration. 
Since BITs are reciprocal, developed countries also give up some sovereign rights to 
conclude BITs that contain investor-State arbitration. Such transfer seems to have been 
inconsequential over the past decades in that as traditional capital-exporting countries, 
developed countries focus more on protection of their nationals’ overseas investment and 
thus guaranteed access for their nationals to international investment arbitration is 
ordinarily in line with their expectation. Be that as it may, developed countries still face 
risks of being sued by investors from developing countries. 41  In addition, given that 
developed economies are also traditional FDI recipients42 and some of them are members 
to international or regional treaties that provide for recourse to investor-State arbitration,43 
there is also a possibility that developed countries are respondents in investment arbitration 
cases brought by investors from other developed countries. In 2013, almost half of the new 
treaty-based investor-State arbitration cases were filed against developed States, most of 
which were initiated by investors from developed countries.44
                                                          
40 UNCTAD, ‘The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to 
Developing Countries’, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5, 2009, 25. 
 The unusually high number 
of cases commenced against developed countries might arouse their concerns about the 
relinquishment of State sovereignty. For instance, Canada’s ratification of the ICSID 
41 For example, Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) 
Company of China, Limited v. Kingdom of Belgium, ICSID Case No ARB/12/29. 
42 For example, U.S. and EU’s combined share of FDI inflows accounted for 50 per cent of global inflows 
before the financial crisis. As their economic recovery strengthened, direct investment to these regions rose 
to 30 per cent of global inflows in 2013. See UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2014 - Investing in the 
SDGs: An Action Plan’, UNCTAD/WIR/2014, 2014, x. 
43 For example, the Energy Charter Treaty (hereinafter ‘ECT’) and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (hereinafter ‘NAFTA’). 





Convention has been criticized for relinquishing more elements of Canada’s judicial 
sovereignty.45
 
 In view of the availability of UNCITRAL arbitration under NAFTA prior to 
Canada’s ratification of the ICSID Convention and commentators’ argument that joining 
ICSID will relinquish more State sovereignty, it can be seen that an emphasis has been put 
upon the disparate extent of sovereignty that may be transferred to ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitral tribunals. 
Currently, there are five attitudes towards the ICSID membership worthy of attention: (i) 
States choose to become contracting members to the ICSID Convention; (ii) States joined 
the ICSID but then withdrew from the Convention; (iii) States, such as Russia and 
Thailand, have signed but not ratified the Convention; (iv) States, including Poland and 
India, opt not to be involved in ICSID; (v) non-State entities cannot be signatories to the 
Convention which is only open to States. For example, as the Treaty of Lisbon confers 
exclusive competence pertinent to FDI on the European Union (hereinafter ‘EU’) over its 
member States, EU as a supranational organization cannot be a party to the ICSID 
Convention, but UNCITRAL or other non-ICSID arbitration may be an option.46 Other 
instances include Palestine and Taiwan which lack the statehood status. Diverse 
approaches towards ICSID arbitration have much to do with sovereignty. For States, the 
transfer or surrender of judicial sovereignty is one of the most essential factors affecting 
their sovereign choices to join or not to join the ICSID. Ultimately, how far they decide to 
transfer State sovereignty has far-reaching implications for their economic policies, public 
welfare and the environment, which are of national importance.47
                                                          
45 Gus Van Harten, Harper Moves to Give up More Canadian Sovereignty, 12 November 2013, < 
 For non-State entities, 
http://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2013/11/12/Harper-Gives-Up-Sovereignty/> accessed 26 June 2014. 
46 The European Parliament considered that UNCITRAL arbitration would not be available to the EU (see 
European Parliament Resolution on the Future European International Investment Policy, 2010/2203 (INI), 6 
April 2011, para 33). The reason given by the European Parliament that the EU was not a member of 
UNCITRAL was, however, not convincing because the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules could be used by 
international organizations (see August Reinisch, ‘The EU on the Investment Path - Quo Vadis Europe? The 
Future of EU BITs and other Investment Agreements’ (2014) 2 Santa Clara J Intl L 111, 134). 
47 Traditionally, challenges to regulations or government’ conducts as regards fiscal and monetary policy (eg, 
tax assessments) or sustainable development (eg, environment protection) ordinarily create risks for general 
community welfare, and the resolution of such challenges remain the prerogative of national courts which are 
authorized by State’ statutes (William W. Park, Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies in 
Law and Practice (OUP, 2012) 697). This is because regulatory powers over foreign investors vest 
exclusively in States. However, in investor-State arbitration the decisions by legislatures and discretionary 
conducts of government are entered into the ambit of the authority of reviewing by external arbitral tribunals; 
thus, investor -State arbitration actually protects foreign investors in the regulatory sphere. As elucidated 
previously, in exercising their authority, international tribunals function as mechanism of global governance, 





research aiming to analyse the tension between the potency of ICSID arbitration as a 
vehicle for exercising certain sovereign authority and States’ comprehensive regulatory 
powers is also conducive to gaining a wider perspective when they deal with non-ICSID 
arbitration. 
 
4.2 Investors and Counsels: A Perspective of Investment Protection in Extraordinary 
Times 
 
4.2.1 Investment Protection 
 
The world has been undergoing rapid development and profound changes, which not only 
introduce unprecedented opportunities but also indubitably bring unexpected challenges 
that has the potential to cause the global economy to be unstable. The 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis, the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis and other economic crises make it 
an extraordinary time for foreign investment, which, in turn, calls for further strengthening 
protection for investors in the global capital market.48 Against this background, foreign 
investors have to be more prudent in gauging the risks to their investments and respond 
properly to possible disputes arising out of investments. The latest Yukos award 49
                                                                                                                                                                                
sovereign rights are transferred to international tribunals, the more significant impacts would be imposed on 
host States and civil society. This is also one of the reasons why the U.S. Congress has enacted trade 
legislation that gives an intention to restrict investor-State arbitration in investment treaties (see ibid, 699). 
 
powerfully proves again how important ECT (or international investment treaties in a 
boarder context) is for foreign investors and how investor-State arbitration functions 
necessarily as the last resort to seek justice. As to investment dispute resolution, it is 
discernible that ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration provide different levels of procedural 
48 For example, as currency devaluation and fiscal policies adopted by Argentina to stabilize the national 
economy and restore political confidence imposed direct and heavy costs on foreign participants in 
Argentina’s economy, the 1998-2002 Argentine great depression saw the rise of international investment 
arbitration. At least 30 financial crisis-related investment treaty claims have been filed against Argentina, the 
majority of which were initiated under the auspices of the ICSID Convention. 
49 Recently, Russia was found in three UNCITRAL cases to be in breach of art 13(1) of the ECT for its 
‘devious and calculated’ expropriation and was ordered to pay over an amount of U.S. $50 billion in damage 
to Yukos shareholders (which was the largest award ever in the history of arbitration), U.S. $60 million in 
fees of legal representation and U.S. $5.6 million in costs of arbitration (see Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of 
Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No AA 227, Final Award, 18 July 2014; Hulley 
Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No AA 226, Final Award, 
18 July 2014; Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case 





protection and substantive benefits for investors, and the selection of ICSID or non-ICSID 
arbitration becomes more crucial in such extraordinary times. 
 
Though in a large number of cases investors’ recourse to ICSID arbitration is subject to 
States’ sovereign choice when concluding investment treaties, it is noteworthy that at the 
present the vast majority of investment treaties provides for both ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration. Ordinarily, it is the investor who has a choice to select the dispute resolution 
mechanism50 since State’ prior consent to international arbitration has been expressed in 
relevant investment treaties. Veeder has observed that over the past few years, it has been 
‘clear that many claimant investors are deliberately not choosing ICSID arbitration, 
preferring non-institutional UNCITRAL arbitration’ and ‘even the SCC and the ICC for 
investor-State disputes’.51
 
 This phenomenon leads to the question as to whether non-ICSID 
arbitration is more conductive to the protection of investors’ interests. Investors’ selection 
of ICSID or non-ICSID arbitration is not a philosophical or theoretical question but an 
intensely practical matter. An inquiry into the underlying motives for foreign investors’ 
choice cannot, but be on the basis of the delineation of characteristic traits of a whole range 
of investment dispute resolution fora that are potentially accessible, and the evaluation of 
appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of different fora and their leading to justice. 
Accordingly, a study aimed at bringing out special features of ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration will assist in assessing which forum is more desirable for a particular dispute. It 
will further shed light on the identification of methods of better understanding various 
relationships in investor-State arbitration, providing direction for States to strike a balance 
between investors’ rights and State sovereignty, and thereby promoting the viability of 
international investment arbitration in the long run. 
4.2.2 Arbitration Industry 
 
                                                          
50 In most cases international investment arbitration is filed by foreign investors against host States. So far 
there only one case has been commenced by a State, namely, Gabon v. Société Serete S.A. (ICSID Case No 
ARB/76/1). The case was based on an investment contract and was settled by the disputing parties. There is 
also one case in which a State initiated a counterclaim. In Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania (ICSID Case No 
ARB/06/1), Romania’s counterclaim was admitted by the tribunal on the ground of the umbrella clause in the 
Romania-Greece BIT. 
51 V. V. Veeder, ‘The Investor’s Choice of ICSID and Non-ICSID Arbitration Under Bilateral and 
Multilateral Treaties’ in Arthur W. Rovine (ed), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and 





In the contemporary world of commerce, the landscape of international arbitration has 
been transformed, while still sustaining the enduring element of its intrinsic and long-
established significance as a dispute settlement means. More precisely, it has been claimed 
that international arbitration is evolving into a veritable industry, 52 and in such lucrative 
industry international arbitration is, to some extent, deemed a money-making machine.53 
As Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter ‘OECD’) 
researchers observe, the international arbitration industry is led by entrepreneurial counsels 
advising potential clients about options for solving investment disputes between investors 
and States through international arbitration that would not have been considered only a few 
years ago. 54  The role of legal counsels in investor-State arbitration is undeniably 
measurable since investor-State arbitration has grown largely from the integral impulse of 
counsels to arbitration. In the light of the important role of counsels and their possible 
misconduct that virtually obstructs the legitimate protection of investment, lex arbitri55 and 
counsels’ professional or disciplinary bar rules 56  have provided legal frameworks for 
counsels’ activities. However, there is still a possibility that counsels redirect their 
conducts in ways that are of no consequence for the efficiency of arbitration (eg, challenge 
of arbitrator or jurisdiction on knowingly unfounded grounds) or even have an overall 
detrimental impact on the arbitral process (eg, engagement in ex parte communications 
with arbitrators without appropriate appointments and knowingly making false statements). 
Furthermore, the different approaches taken by international tribunals in dealing with a 
challenge to counsel 57
                                                          
52 Nicolas C. Ulmer, ‘The Cost Conundrum’ (2010) 26(2) Arb Intl 221, 224 . 
 may cause, exacerbate and prolong the conflicts of divergent 
interests in investment cases. Normally, investors’ choice between ICSID and non-ICSID 
53 Pia Eberhardt and Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice (Corporate Europe Observatory and the 
Transnational Institute, 2012) 15. 
54 David Gaukrodger and Kathryn Gordon, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the 
Investment Policy Community’, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2012/03, 7. 
55 For example, the most notable and original aspect of the 2014 LCIA Arbitration Rules is perhaps the 
Annex A. The Annex, entitled ‘General Guidelines for the Parties’ Legal Representatives’, is intended to 
promote the good and equal conduct of legal representatives. 
56 For example, The International Bar Association (hereinafter ‘IBA’)’s Guidelines on Party Representation 
were inspired by the principle that party representatives should act with integrity and honesty and should not 
engage in activities designed to produce unnecessary delay or expense, including tactics aimed at obstructing 
the arbitration proceedings. See the Preamble of the IBA Guidelines. 
57 The challenge to counsels has occurred in two ICSID cases: Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d. v. Republic of 
Slovenia, ICSID Case No ARB/05/24, Order Concerning the Participation of a Counsel, 6 May 2008, paras 
26-28; The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/06/3, Decision on the Participation of a 





arbitration is reliant mainly on counsels’ opinion, and therefore counsels’ role in fostering 
investment protection in extraordinary times has to be taken into account when critically 
evaluating ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration.  
 
4.3 Institutions: Competition and Legitimacy Crisis 
 
4.3.1 Competing for Market Share of Disputes 
 
The combination of international investment treaties, the ICSID Convention and 
investment treaty arbitration case law as a whole contributes, to a great extent, to the 
progress of investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. Considering that such progress 
leads to far greater certainty for foreign investors in dealing with investment with host 
States, which in turn incentivizes growth in international commerce, 58
 
  It can be seen that 
investor-State arbitration cases will be increasingly initiated under the aegis of the ICSID 
Convention. Hence, it is widely acknowledged that ICSID arbitration is becoming a 
dominant vehicle for resolving international investment claims. 
In addition to ICSID arbitration, the current use of ad hoc arbitration under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in the context of investor-State arbitration has shown that 
the Rules are as viable as they work effectively in international commercial arbitration. 
Apart from UNCITRAL cases in which one of the disputing parties has no access to ICSID 
arbitration, there are a number of BITs that provide exclusively for UNCITRAL 
arbitration.59
                                                          
58 Canada, for instance, has already been a favourable venue for international investors due to a large quantity 
of natural resources, but it will be more attractive since the accessibility of ICSID arbitration reduces foreign 
investors’ risks and thus increases investors’ confidence in investing in Canada. 
 It appears that it would be easier in UNICTRAL arbitration to achieve a 
balance between the interests of third-parties and the public on the one hand, and the 
interests of disputing parties to have efficient dispute resolution by virtue of flexible 
59 For example, art 8 of the Netherlands-Czech and Slovak BIT. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL; Eastern Sugar B.V.(Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No 088/2004 (the 
case was administered by SCC and the 1976 UNCITRAL Rule was applied); Invesmart v. Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL; Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL/PCA.  
    Under the UK-Argentina BIT, disputing parties might agree on ICSID or UNCITRIAL arbitration, but 
failing such agreement after three months the parties shall be bound to bring their claims before UNCITRAL 






interpretations of the rules on the tribunals’ power on the other.60
 
 More importantly, the 
UNCITRAL Secretariat has taken steps to keep the Rules up to date with challenges, 
making the Rules more suitable for solving investment disputes and, accordingly, 
remaining the Rules as an attractive alternative to ICSID arbitration. 
The role of the SCC in investor-State arbitration has been either to manage investment 
cases under the SCC Arbitration Rules and the Rules for Expedited Arbitrations, or for the 
SCC to provide administrative services for cases (such as acting as appointing authority) 
under other arbitration rules. It is noteworthy that SCC arbitration is one of three options 
enumerated by the ECT for the settlement of disputes between investors and States, 
alongside with ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration. At present, the SCC is the second most 
frequently chosen institution in resolving international investment disputes.61 The ICC, 
LCIA and other mainstream arbitration are rarely mentioned as an option in investment 
treaties, probably due to the stereotyping by the treaty drafters that these genres of non-
ICSID arbitration are perceived as traditional commercial dispute resolution methods.62 Be 
that as it may, the ICC also deals with a number of contract-based63 and treaty-based64 
investor-State arbitration cases. The ICC Arbitration Rules (2012) contain several 
provisions that are intended to facilitate and further the participation of States and State 
entities in ICC arbitration,65
                                                          
60 Norbert Horn, ‘Current Use of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in the Context of Investment Arbitration’ 
(2008) 24(4) Arb Intl 587. 
 which may be able to encourage disputing parties to opt for 
61 As of October 2012, 121 known investment treaties incorporate a dispute resolution clause referring to 
arbitration under the SCC Rules or stipulating SCC as appointing authority. As the SCC Rules provide for 
procedures fully in line with efficient arbitration practices, since 1993 the SCC has seen close to 50 
investment arbitration cases. See Nils Eliasson, ‘Stockholm as a Forum for Investment Arbitration’ in Ulf 
Franke, et al (eds), International Arbitration in Sweden: A Practitioner’s Guide (Kluwer Law International, 
2013) 25; Annette Magnusson, ‘The SCC Experience of Investment Arbitration Under UNCITRAL Rules, 
Euro-Arab Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Recent Developments and Future Perspectives’, Cairo, 
October 2012, 3. 
62 Alexandra Diehl, The Core Standard of International Investment Protection (Kluwer Law International, 
2012) 217. 
63 There are at least six published ICC cases. Eg, Capital India Power Mauritius I and Energy Enterprises 
(Mauritius) Company v. Maharashtra Power Development Corporation Limited, Maharashtra State 
Electricity Board and the State of Maharashtra, ICC Case No 12913/MS (Dabhol Power Project), Final 
Award, 27 April 2005. 
64 For example, East Cement for Investment Company v. Poland, ICC Arbitration Case No 16509/JHN (based 
on Jordan-Poland BIT), Partial Award, 26 August 2011; Kaliningrad Region v. Lithuania, ICC (based on 
Lithuania-Russian Federation BIT), Judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal on application to set aside award, 
18 November 2010. 
65 ICC Arbitration Commission Report on Arbitration Involving States and State Entities under the ICC 





the ICC as an alternative institution for investment dispute resolution. In addition, the 
LCIA, the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (hereinafter 




In brief, notwithstanding the prevailing position of ICSID arbitration, it has become 
evident that there will be more competition among different investment fora in the future, 
in particular considering that most investment treaties do not provide for a hierarchy of 
fora and thus claimants dispense with a duty to exhaust a particular forum before they can 
resort to the remaining fora provided in treaties (see Figure III). Besides, as arbitral 
proceedings conducted under the SCC, ICC, LCIA and other comparable institutional 
arbitration rules are more confidential, State aiming at establishing a higher degree of 
confidentiality in resolving contract-based disputes possibly consider opting for non-ICSID 
arbitration. As the number of UNCITRAL, SCC and other non-ICSID investor-State 
arbitration cases is expected to continue to experience a steady growth, an assessment of 
the divergences between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration and their implication for 
arbitration institutions is by no means negligible. 
 
                                                          
66 For example, TS Investment Corp. v. Republic of Armenia, LCIA (based on U.S.-Armenia BIT), Award, 1 
August 2011 (not public).  
    CRCICA’s investor-State arbitration cases include: the first case filed by a Libyan public company for 
foreign investment against the Syrian Ministry (Case No112/1998), the second case filed by an Egyptian 
company against Lebanon (Case No165/2000) and the third case on the basis of Libya-Morocco BIT (Case 
No 816/2012). See Mohamed Abdel Raouf, ‘UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the Settlement of Investment 







Figure III: Forum/Rules Distribution of New Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration Cases 
in 2013 
 
4.4.2 Challenge of Legitimacy 
 
Though international investment law is still in the infancy stage, it has to experience 
growing pains as investor-State arbitration faces a wide array of challenges of legitimacy,67 
which is even perceived as a crisis of legitimacy.68 Some commentators have questioned 
whether a backlash against the current foreign investment regime is underway.69
                                                          
67 See, eg, Charles T. Kotuby Jr and Luke A. Sobota, ‘Practical Suggestions to Promote the Legitimacy and 
Vitality of International Investment Arbitration’ (2013) 28(2) ICSID Rev-Foreign Investment LJ 454; Sergio 
Puig, ‘Recasting ICSID’s Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-Based Empirical Agenda’ (2013) 36 Fordham 
Intl LJ 465. 
 Generally, 
legitimacy is a prerequisite for the existence of international institutions since States can 
withdraw from an institution if it is deemed to be illegitimate and then a considerable 
amount of withdrawals would consequently give rise to the loss of the institution’s public 
acceptance. The widespread absence of the perception of legitimacy not only affects the 
functioning of the institution, but also pushes the institution to the brink of rejection and 
68 See, eg, Charles N. Brower, ‘A Crisis of Legitimacy’ (7 October 2002) NAT’L LJ, B9; Susan D. Franck, 
‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through 
Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 1521. 
69 Michael Waibel, et al, ‘The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality’ in Michael 
Waibel, et al (eds), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law 





failure. 70 Franck defined legitimacy as ‘a property of a rule or rule-making institution 
which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively’. 71  
Following the question ‘why do nations obey rules’, Franck proposed a hypothetical 
answer to the question, namely, ‘because they perceive the rule and its institutional 
penumbra to have a high degree of legitimacy’.72 In developing the hypothesis, Franck 
distilled four objective indicators of legitimacy for international rule-making institutions, 
identified as determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence. 73  
Notwithstanding the criticism,74 Franck’s legitimacy theory was swiftly applied to explain 
modern tribunals’ approaches to the international law of expropriation. 75
 
 The theory 
provides a framework for assessing the legitimacy of investor-State arbitration as an 
international system of rules. The application of the theory to investor-State arbitration will 
assist in identifying the specific ways in which challenges emerging in contemporary 
investment law may actually deplete the legitimacy of invest-State arbitration and further 
in examining the differences between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration in response to the 
challenges. 
Adapting the theory to the context of investor-State arbitration,76
                                                          
70 Charles H. Brower, II, ‘Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’ (2003) 36 Vand J 
Transnatl L 37, 51. 
 above all, as the rule-
making of international arbitral tribunals is taken from their decisions by which investment 
participants can scrutinize the legal rationale and adjust their conducts to conform the 
standards spelt out by the tribunals, it is critically important that investment arbitral 
processes be transparent to some extent. In fact, the scarcity of appropriate transparency is 
one of the main challenges of legitimacy of investor-State arbitration, especially when the 
71 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP, 1990) 24. 
72 Ibid, 25. 
73 Ibid, 49. 
74 Alvarez argued that Franck’s legitimacy theory was not based on mathematical proof or certainty but only 
postulated a hypothesis. The theory had serious shortcomings as an accurate description of reality, a predictor 
of likely compliance, and a prescription for the rule-maker. See Jose E. Alvarez, ‘Quest for Legitimacy: An 
Examination of the Power of Legitimacy Among Nations by Thomas M. Franck’ (1991-1992) 4 NYU J Intl 
L & Pol 199, 228. 
75 Patrick M. Norton, ‘Law of the Future or a Law of the Past - Modern Tribunals and the International Law 
of Expropriation’ (1991) 85 Am J Intl L 474, 499-502. 
76 As to symbolic validation, investor-State arbitration not only appears to be symbolically authoritative but 
also substantially adjudicates States’ actions that cause damages to investors and, as elucidated above, 
influences States’ future policies. As compared to ICSID’s relatively short time, the pedigree of non-ICSID 
arbitration is nobler due to its long history. However, this is quite inconsequential in examining the 





proceedings involve environmental protection and labour standards. 77  The differences 
regarding transparency between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration relate not only to 
discrepant degrees of transparency in arbitral proceedings, but also to different competitive 
strategies adopted by arbitration institutions in response to the challenge of transparency. 
Diverse responses are primarily determined by the demand of major users of arbitration 
rules, but they reflect, by and large, the suitability of institutions’ roles in investor-State 
arbitration. Second, coherence is a focal concern in both ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, 
but arbitral awards rendered under the ICSID Convention can be published with the 
consent of the disputing parties, thereby implying a possibility of developing coherent case 
law on the ICSID arbitration. However, the development of coherent jurisprudence in non-
ICSID arbitration seems to be nearly unachievable due to a variety of practical grounds, 
especially those related to the confidentiality of procedures, unpublished awards and 
diverse contending applicable laws (such as lex mercatoria and mandatory national rules). 
Third, diverse secondary rules as well as occasionally disparate approaches to adherence in 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration generate different levels of severity in challenging the 
legitimacy of ICSID and non-ICISD arbitration. In particular, investor-State arbitration has 
been reproved for failing to ensure the rule of law for the final determination on the basis 
of independent and impartial adjudicative processes due to its asymmetrical structure of 
claims and its perceived systemic bias in favour of foreign investors.78
 
 
A critical evaluation of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration based on the legitimacy analysis 
is of enormous importance since, on the whole, much of the so-called backlash against 
investor-State arbitration has been claimed to be directed against ICSID arbitration79
                                                          
77 Rainer Hofmann and Christian J. Tams, ‘Introduction: The International Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) - Taking Stock after 40 Years’ in Rainer Hofmann, Christian J. Tams (eds), The 
International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Taking Stock after 40 Years 
(Nomos, 2007) 10. 
 and, 
78 See Productivity Commission, ‘Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements’, Research Report, Canberra, 
2010, 273; Susan D. Franck, ‘Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2007-
2008) 86 NCL Rev 1; Susan D. Franck, ‘Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty’ (2009) 50 Harv 
Intl LJ 435; Kevin P. Gallagher & Elen Shrestha, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and Developing Countries: 
A Re-Appraisal’, Global Development and Environment Institute, Working Paper No 11-01, 2011; Thomas 
Schultz & Cédric Dupont, ‘Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-Empowering 
Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study’, King’s College London Law School Research Paper No 2014-16; 
UNCTAD, ‘Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’, IIA Issues Note, N 1, 2014, 10. 
79 Stephen Jagusch & Jeffrey Sullivan, ‘A Comparison of ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration: Areas of 
Divergence and Concern’ in Michael Waibel, et al (eds), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: 
Perceptions and Reality, 80. The contentions of the legitimacy crisis in investor-State arbitration come 





accordingly, the perception of less legitimate ICSID arbitration will push certain foreign 
investors towards non-ICSID arbitration. Although a number of scholars have observed 
that it is ‘an exaggeration to speak of an acute crisis or a backlash’ against investor-State 
arbitration despite several shortcomings that have emerged over the years80 and some even 
argue that investor-State arbitration is generally ‘a legitimate mechanism for structuring 
and stabilizing international investment relations’,81
 
 the critique of legitimacy of investor-
State arbitration and the reforms presented by those commentators shall be seriously 
considered by arbitration institutions in view of the fact that arbitration institutions’ 
reaction and response to the challenges of legitimacy would unequivocally influence their 
public acceptance by States and investors and have the potential to further affect their 
functioning and viability in the future arbitration community. 
4.4 Third-Parties and the Public: A Perspective of Sustainable Development 
 
As public service sectors in host States are more often than not involved in investment 
disputes, critical public interests are basically relevant and possibly applicable to investor-
State arbitration cases. In general, public interests can be moderate factors that tribunals 
take into account in adjudicating investment cases if they are legitimate and especially 
related to human rights, 82  the environment 83  and cultural heritage. 84
                                                                                                                                                                                
regulation. However, given that most non-ICSID arbitral awards are unpublished prior to the implementation 
of the UNCITRAL’s transparency rules, much of the attack of legitimacy of investor-State arbitration is thus 
perceivably targeted at ICSID arbitration. 
 Though public 
interests seem to be peripheral in a particular case, the interplay between investors’ rights 
and public interests in investor-State arbitration can have a profound impact. In fact, public 
interests have aroused concern about a balanced approach between the pursuit of purely 
economic growth objectives and the need for the protection of people and the 
80 Christoph Schreuer, ‘The Future of Investment Arbitration’ in Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, et al (eds), Looking 
to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2010) 803. 
81 Charles N. Brower and Stephan W. Schil, ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boom to the Legitimacy of 
International Investment Law’ (2008-2009) 9 Chi J Intl L 471, 498. 
82 For example, Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija, SA (AdA) & Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Argentina, 
ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, Award, 21 November 2000. 
83 For example, William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and 
Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2009-04, Notice of 
Arbitration, 26 May 2008. 
84 For example, Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 





environment.85 In terms of the divergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, sustainable 
development86
 
 concerns are remarkable. 
In practice, sustainable development issues have been brought before investor-State 
arbitral tribunals87 and make two primary enquires into the potential protection in ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration. The first enquiry relates to the procedural protection. On the 
one hand, it is important that arbitral procedures be transparent and allow for public 
participation in the light of the momentous impact sustainable development can have on 
the public in investor-State arbitration. Normally, non-governmental organizations 
represent a broad spectrum of public interests and thus they have cardinal functions to 
shape the formulation of investment treaties and the development of investment dispute 
resolution.88 On the other hand, third-parties participation involves certain risks, given that 
the need of disputing parties and the protection of sensitive information serve as the 
rationale for the in camera proceedings. Such ambivalence leads to different approaches to 
amicus curiae in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. The ICSID Arbitration Rules were 
amended in 2006 to grant tribunals more authority to determine whether third-parties can 
make written submissions as amicus curiae.89
                                                          
85 UNCTAD, ‘Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development’, 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2012/6, 12 June 2012, 8. 
 The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration go further than the ICSID Rules since they not 
only provide that UNCITRAL tribunals have the discretion to allow third-party 
86 The United Nations (hereinafter ‘UN’) Millennium Declaration emphasizes the three pillars of sustainable 
development: (i) economic development, (ii) social development and (iii) environmental protection. See UN 
General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/2. 
87 Chester Brown, ‘Bringing Sustainable Development Issues before Investment Treaty Tribunals’ in Marie-
Claire Cordonier Segger, et al (eds), Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Kluwer Law 
International, 2011) 175-88. 
88 The first amicus curiae submission under the amended ICSID Arbitration Rules was granted in Biwater 
Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania to five non-government organizations (see ICSID 
Case No ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No 6, 25 April 2007). Four human rights groups were granted 
permission in providing useful information and accompanying submissions to the tribunal in Piero Foresti, 
Laura de Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa (ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/07/1, Procedural Order, 5 
September 2009). This was the first time an ICSID tribunal under the Additional Facility Rules required that 
key legal filings be disclosed to a set of third-parties. However, not all third-party’ applications to 
participation as amicus curiae will be granted. The Spain-U.S. Chamber of Commerce has recently been 
denied permission to file a written submission in an annulment procedure in Iberdrola Energía, S.A. v. 
Republic of Guatemala (ICSID Case No ARB/09/5, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on Non-Disputing 
Party’s Application to File a Written Submission, 12 February 2014). 





submissions90 and that hearings shall be public, 91
 
 but also dispense tribunals’ duty to 
request disputing parties’ consent for third-parties’ participation. Conversely, it appears 
that potentially interested third-parties are less likely to be aware of pending SCC and ICC 
arbitral proceedings due to the traditional opacity of procedures, and will therefore 
probably be unable to make submissions.  
The second enquiry concentrates on the substantive protection. It is worth noting that 
investor-State arbitration is not intrinsically biased towards sustainable development or 
investment protection, and arbitral tribunals shall be essentially neutral and impartial. 
However, the rules on treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969) provide arbitral tribunals with potential to reconcile investment protection 
and sustainable development concerns. 92  Without prejudice to their independence, 
neutrality and impartiality, ICSID arbitral tribunals need to be intensely considerate of one 
of the indispensable components of sustainable development - economic development.93
                                                          
90 Arts 4 & 5 of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. 
 
Since the preamble of the ICSID Convention provides that ‘considering the need for 
international cooperation for economic development and the role of private international 
investment therein’, the Centre was established to provide facilities for arbitration of 
investment disputes. Accordingly, one of the foremost purposes of the ICSID Convention 
is the promotion of private international investment and economic development. ICSID 
arbitration thus inherently possesses a distinguishing feature to foster economic 
development through providing legal certainty and further creating a favourable investment 
91 Ibid, art 6. 
92 First, art 31(1) & (3)(c) of the Vienna Convention stipulates that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty ‘in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose’, and there shall be taken into account any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between parties. Second, though investment treaties primarily aim at investment 
protection, the object and purpose of most investment treaties are not one-dimensional in view of the fact that 
the preamble, substantive provisions or annexes of investment treaties frequently refer to ‘economic 
development’ or other term which may be understood as long-term or sustainable development. Therefore, 
the Vienna Convention has the potential to strike a balance between investment protection and sustainable 
development, and such potential may be used by arbitral tribunals. See Katharina Berner, ‘Reconciling 
Investment Protection and Sustainable Development - A Pledge for an Interpretive U-Turn’, IIAs Conference, 
Berlin, October 2013, 8-14. 
93 In a broader and flexible context, the concept of ‘economic development’, if it were to serve as a yardstick 
for identification of an eligible investment under the ICSID Convention, should not be restricted to 
measurable contributions to GDP but should include development of human potential, political and social 
development and local and global environment protection (see Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID 
Convention: A Commentary, 134). In this sense, the concept of ‘economic development’ is quite similar to 





climate to stimulate larger investment inflows. 94  Aside from the micro impact, the 
economic development consideration is also applied to ICSID tribunals’ adjudication, and 
one notable instance is that pursuant to the so-called ‘Salini test’, a significant contribution 
to the economic development of host States is one of five criteria indicative of the 
existence of a qualified investment under the ICSID Convention.95
 
 On the contrary, the 
concern of economic development is commonly absent in non-ICSID arbitration rules or 
regulations, and thus arbitrators are not necessarily guardians of the economic development 
of host States. Instead, it seems that non-ICSID arbitral tribunals are simply charged with a 
commission to resolve particular disputes inter partes without contemplating the wider 
implication on the economic and even sustainable development. 
Balanced approaches to scrutinizing the relationship between sustainable development and 
investment protection are still insufficiently developed, and it remains arduous to assess 
whether bringing sustainable development issues before investor-State arbitral tribunals 
would advance or impair the international investment regime, in particular considering that 
the antipode of amicus curiae is additional time and cost which may be not what disputing 
parties expect. Be that as it may, the diverse extent to which third-parties can raise 
sustainable development concerns in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, and the possibility 
of ICSID tribunals taking into account sustainable development issues when adjudicating 
investment disputes would, of course, have significant implications for the sovereign 
choice between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration during investment treaty negotiations. 
 
                                                          
94 As the ICSID tribunal in Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia stated, to protect 
investment was to protect the general interest of development and of developing countries. See ICSID Case 
No ARB/81/1, Award, 20 November 1984, para 249. 
95 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 31 July 2001, para 52. 
 
 
Chapter I The Arbitral Jurisdiction of Tribunals 
 
 
The jurisdictional requirements of international arbitration are ordinarily identified as 
ratione personae, ratione materiae and ratione temporis. The ICSID Convention has a 
specific requirement of ratione personae, merely accepting disputes between a contracting 
State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a contracting State designated to the 
Centre by that State) and a national of another contracting State. 96  Such specific 
requirement, however, is insignificant in evaluating ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration 
because all States in question are contracting States to the Convention and the fact that an 
investor is indeed a national of another contracting State may be uncontested between 
disputing parties.97
 
 The requirement of ratione temporis is applied equally to both ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration. Accordingly, only the requirement of ratione materiae will be 
examined in this chapter. Jurisdictional requirements can be satisfied in traditional non-
ICSID arbitration, provided that disputing parties with capacity and powers reach a valid 
arbitration agreement in which the disputes fall within certain categories and, more 
importantly, the disputes are per se arbitrable in nature. Such criteria should, however, be 
additionally subject to certain requirements contained in the ICSID Convention and 
potentially applicable investment treaties when examining whether an investment is 
eligible for ICSID arbitration. In addition to the external jurisdictional limits, the 
incompatibility of ICSID arbitration with other dispute resolution methods and ICSID’s 
exclusion of remedies from national courts seem to be less efficient at first sight as 
compared to the compatibility of non-ICSID arbitration with conciliation and national 
authorities’ support. This notwithstanding, the recent decades have seen an expansion of 
ICSID jurisdiction by virtue of a diversity of techniques where the subject matter is 
deployed as a means to expand the ambit of ICSID jurisdiction to such an extent that the 
interpretation of the terminology of investment is virtually sufficient for ICSID tribunals to 
exercise their jurisdiction over a wide range of assets and activities. Further, the self-
contained system also provides a number of approaches that are conducive to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of arbitral proceedings at the jurisdictional stage. 
                                                          
96 Art 25(1), (2) and (3) of the ICSID Convention. 
97 Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 163). The ICSID Convention does 
not set objective requirements of ratione personae. In case that incorporation has several possible corporate 
nationalities, ICSID tribunals have uniformly adopted the test of incorporation or seat rather than control (see 
ibid, 282). 




1 Subject Matter Covered by Parties’ Consent 
 
1.1 Broad Scope of Subject Matter in Non-ICSID Arbitration 
 
The subject matter that disputing parties are entitled to consent to under the ICSID 
Convention or non-ICSID arbitration rules can be elucidated in two aspects, namely 
contract-based and treaty-based investment arbitration. In contract-based investor-State 
arbitration, the scope of the subject matter qualified in non-ICSID arbitration can be 
extremely broad mainly in that disputing parties are able to reach an arbitration agreement 
in which any dispute related to investment (including a dispute that occurred prior to 
investment or arising indirectly out of the investment) can be practically submitted to non-
ICSID arbitral tribunals on the basis of a acknowledged comprehensive interpretation of 
the notion of ‘commerciality’.98 Notwithstanding the commercial reservation made by a 
number of States under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (hereinafter ‘New York Convention’), 99  national courts are likely to 
interpret the concept of ‘commercial’ broadly in real practice.100
                                                          
98 Non-ICSID arbitration rules ordinarily provide for extraordinarily broad accesses to jurisdiction. An 
UNCITRAL model clause, eg, covers ‘any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this 
contract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof’ (see Model Arbitration Clause, annex of art 1 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules), and the diction has been construed to cover all differences and claims arising 
from a given relationship, regardless of a contractual and tortious or other non-contractual relationship. As 
the most recent worldwide instrument on arbitration, the UNCITRAL Model Law also defines a broad term 
of ‘commercial’ in a footnote, covering matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature which 
apparently include investment. 
 Thus, investors dispense 
with consideration in advance as to whether their claims fall within the notion of 
‘commercial’ if their case has reached the crucial stage of the enforcement proceeding.  
    In addition, when the Working Group II worked on the revision of the UNCITRAL Rules, one of the 
primary goals was to design specific provisions to adapt the Rules to investor-State dispute resolution (See 
Report of the Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation on the work of its forty-fifth session, A/CN 
9/614, paras 17-19). 
99 Art I(3) of the New York Convention. 
100 For example, in United Mexican State v. Metalclad Corp. (89 B.C.L.R.3d 359)  the court stated that the 
term ‘commercial’ should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising from all relations of a 
commercial nature (see Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 271). India used to interpreted the 
term ‘commercial’ narrowly in some cases (see Julian D. M. Lew, et al, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2003) 56). However, in order to keep up with the rise of 
international commercial arbitration as an effective means of dispute resolution, the Supreme Court in Comed 
Chemicals Limited v. C N Ramchand provided expansive scope to the term ‘commercial’ (Gautam Bhatia 
and Venugopal Mahapatra, ‘Supreme Court on the ‘Commercial’ Clause under the Arbitration Act’, available 
at Indiacorplaw blog <http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.co.uk/2009/01/supreme-court-on-commercial-clause.html> 
accessed 15 July 2014). 





Consent expressed in concession agreements concluded by investors and States referring to 
ICSID arbitration, however, is on a conditional basis. Only if the condition precedent is 
validly fulfilled will ICSID arbitral tribunals have jurisdiction over the disputes. The 
condition precedent is commonly known as a ‘dual test’,101 which underpins not only the 
parties’ mutual consent but also the requirements under the ICSID Convention that ICSID 
jurisdiction just extends to legal disputes arising directly out of an investment. 102  In 
addition, the scope of ICSID jurisdiction can be further restricted since contracting State 
can notify the Centre of ‘the class or classes of disputes which it would or would not 
consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre’. 103  Despite the controversy 
surrounding the effect of such notification, it is unambiguous that the subject matters in 
ICSID arbitration are much narrower than those in non-ICSID arbitration. Some observers 
even assert that ICSID arbitration should be somehow considered ‘international 
commercial arbitration’,104
                                                          
101 Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 117. 
 given that it frequently involves commercial disputes arising 
102 Art 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
103 Art 25(4) of the ICSID Convention. China, eg, ratified the Convention with a declaration stating that the 
Chinese government would only consider submitting to the Centre investment disputes over compensation 
resulting from expropriation and nationalization (Notifications Concerning Classes of Disputes Considered 
Suitable or Unsuitable for Submission to the Centre, ICSID/8-D). 
    The effect of the declaration under art 25(4) is still under debate. Commentators denied the effect based on 
the following arguments: (i) A reservation was unnecessary because no State accepted the ICSID jurisdiction 
with the ratification. (ii) Art 25(4) stipulated that a declaration made under art 25(4) and its subsequent 
notification should not constitute the consent required by art 25(1), which underlined the fact that even if 
States declared that they accepted ICSID jurisdiction for certain disputes under art 25(4), such a declaration 
would be without legal effects. By the same token, a contrario (a declaration indicating that a State would not 
accept ICSID jurisdiction was just as well without legal effects) would be tenable (see Monika C. E. 
Heymann, ‘International Law and the Settlement of Investment Disputes Relating to China’ (2008) 11 J Intl 
Econ L 507, 517-18). Certain aspects of the draft history of the ICSID Convention also figured that a 
statement excluding certain classes of disputes from consideration would not constitute a reservation to the 
Convention (See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report of the Executive Directors 
on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States 
(1965) 1 ICSID Rep 25, para 31). Therefore, the notification did not amount to a reservation to the 
Convention, and it was merely for the purposes of information and designed to avoid misunderstandings 
(Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 343-44). 
    Based on the arguments, several scholars pointed out that investors could submit all kinds of disputes 
directly out of investment against China to ICSID (see Stephan W. Schill, ‘Tearing Down the Great Wall: 
The New Generation Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic of China’ (2007) 15 Cardozo J Intl & 
Comp L 73, fn 65; Monika C. E. Heymann, ‘International Law and the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Relating to China’, 518). 
104 Normally, ‘international commercial arbitration’ refers to arbitration conducted under the aegis of a 
number of major arbitration institutions and rule-making bodies such as the UNCITRAL, ICC, SCC and 
LCIA. 




out of international contracts between States and foreign private undertakings,105
 
 despite 
the fact that ICSID arbitration as a mechanism designed for settlement of investment-
related dispute between investors and States is not subject to the ordinary rules of 
international arbitration. 
The other category focuses on treaty-based investor-State arbitration where consent given 
by disputing parties has to satisfy the requirements set forth in relevant treaties. The past 
decades have seen a transition from States’ contractual consent to treaty-based consent.106 
Taking ICSID arbitration for example, the era in which ICSID jurisdiction was almost 
exclusively based on State’s consent manifested in contractual agreements has passed.107 
At present, approximately 60 per cent of cases rely on State’s consent to ICSID jurisdiction 
through BITs, and an additional 11 per cent of cases fall under ICSID jurisdiction by virtue 
of NAFTA. 108
 
 Though consent manifested by parities in both ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration is subject to requirements under applicable investment treaties in the same way, 
there is a possibility that the subject matter in treaty-based non-ICSID arbitration is wider 
than that in ICSID arbitration in the event that the notion of ‘investment’ contained in 
applicable treaties is not narrower than that under the ICSID Convention. 
In a nutshell, it has become evident that the subject matter covered by both contract-based 
and treaty-based non-ICSID arbitration can be remarkably broader. In terms of efficiency 
of the settlement of investment disputes, it appears that the extensive ambit of jurisdiction 
                                                          
105 See Emmanuel Gaillard, et al (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, 42. In the meantime the authors also recognized that ICSID arbitration did contain specific 
features especially as regards questions of jurisdiction and procedure.  
106 It is worth mentioning that the total number of newly negotiated BITs (which are known as ‘one size fits 
all’) has declined in recent years, despite some recently signed BITs (such as the Colombia-Turkey BIT that 
was signed in July 2014). Meanwhile, investment protection is integrated in more comprehensive treaties 
among a number of States or organizations. Eg, the EU is negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (hereinafter ‘TTIP’) with U.S. and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(hereinafter ‘CETA’) with Canada. These treaties present more balanced approaches to recalibrating rights 
and obligations of both investors and States in particular at the post-establishment stage (such as gaining 
better access to public markets). 
107 Undeniably, dispute settlement clause referring to ICSID arbitration could be found in a number of 
concession agreements during the first few decades of ICSID, but claims arising out of such direct agreement 
just generated a relative trickle of ICSID cases from 1965 to 1995 (see Timothy G. Nelson, ‘“History Ain’t 
Changed”: Why Investor-State Arbitration Will Survive the “New Revolution”’ in Michael Waibel, et al 
(eds), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, 566-67, 71). 
108 Kathleen S. McArthur, Pablo A. Ormachea, ‘International Investor-State Arbitration: An Empirical 
Analysis of ICSID Decisions on Jurisdiction’ (2009) 28 Rev Litig 559, 573. 




in non-ICSID arbitration is more favourable, especially when dealing with cases involving 
a variety of interrelated claims. It is noteworthy that transnational investments in natural 
resources and large infrastructure projects in developing countries are tremendously 
complex, and parts of disputes such as financing, banking, insurance, consulting or any 
industrial or business cooperation might occur prior to the investment or arise indirectly 
out of the investment. Apparently, it would indubitably save time and cost if all relevant 
disputes related to the whole transaction could be resolved within a proper, single 
instrument.  
 
1.2 Expansionary Trend in ICSID Jurisdiction 
 
1.2.1 Expansion in Investment Treaties 
 
In the most recent decades an expansionary trend in ICSID jurisdiction has been gradually 
identified in which ICSID jurisdiction expands by virtue of a diversity of techniques such 
as an expansive interpretation of the concept ‘foreign investors’ and a reference to the 
most-favoured-nation clause or umbrella clause. 109
 
 The subject matter is also being 
deployed as a means to expand the ambit of ICSID jurisdiction. It is notable that 
contracting States to investment treaties, more often than not, seek to liberalize investment 
regulations for the purpose of investment protection and, consequently, conclude in treaties 
a rather broad and comprehensive definition of ‘investment’. Furthermore, it seems that 
ICSID tribunals expand, more or less, the scope of jurisdictions in practice, albeit with 
different approaches to interpreting the notion of ‘investment’ under article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention. 
As compared to early international investment treaties which simplistically adopted either 
an asset-based definition of ‘investment’ in case of a capital movement-oriented instrument 
or a generally broad definition in case of a protection-oriented instrument, 110
                                                          
109 M. Sornarajah, ‘A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Karl P. 
Sauvant, et al (eds), Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (OUP, 2008) 40. 
 the 
distinction between the two methods becomes increasingly blurred in the era of investment 
liberalization. The recent BITs between developed and developing States, which have 
110 UNCTAD, ‘Scope and Definition’, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 (vol II), 1999, 15. 




become essential components of the move towards liberalization,111 appear to move in the 
direction of greater investment promotion so as to protect various types of cross-border 
activities related to investment by virtue of a wide and comprehensive definition of 
‘investment’. Such expansionary definition of ‘investment’ in investment treaties can be 
identified in at least three aspects. First, as to the approach followed in defining investment, 
textual techniques have been employed to provide an open-ended and all-inclusive 
definition: (i) the traditional asset-based definition stipulated in BITs almost presents a 
concept ample enough to cover ‘every kind of asset’ owned or controlled by investors, 
virtually without limitation. A number of BITs even adopt the wording ‘every kind of 
economic interest’, which is likely wider. 112 (ii) In order to cover emerging types of 
investment, rather than conceptualizing an investment, a number of treaties take a 
‘tautological’ or ‘circular’ method to emphasize the features of investment. 113  (iii) 
Numerous treaties opt for an open-ended definition by adopting flexible languages such as 
‘includes, but it is not limited to’, and ‘includes, in particular, though not exclusively’,114
 
 
thereby leaving a considerable degree of discretion in interpreting the diction of investment. 
Second, as to the form of investment, the definition of ‘investment’ has been expanded to 
cover a significantly widespread range of forms that investment could take, including, inter 
alia, (i) indirect investment: at present, indirect investment such as bonds, debentures and 
long-term notes has been encompassed by the U.S. Model BIT (2012);115
                                                          
111 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ (1998) 36 Colum J Transnatl L 501, 502-03. 
 (ii) certain types 
of contractual claims: several contractual rights (eg, those stemming from service 
agreements) are also regarded as investment, though the inclusion of contractual rights in 
the concept of investment seems to enter into the gray area between investment and 
112 UNCTAD, ‘Scope and Definition’, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/2, 2011, 24. 
113 UNCTAD, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking’, 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, 2007, 10. One example is the definition in U.S.-Panama BIT which provides that 
investment means ‘every kind of investment, owned or controlled directly or indirectly, including equity, 
debt, and service and investment contracts, and includes’ (see art 1(d) of the U.S.-Panama BIT (2000)). 
Although the definition has been revised since 2004, it still focuses on the characteristics of the investment, 
including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or 
profit or the assumption of risk (see art 1 of the U.S. Model BIT (2004), the U.S.-Uruguay BIT (2005), and 
the U.S.-Rwanda BIT (2008)). 
114 For example, art 1 of China-Germany BIT (2003). 
115 Art 1 of the U.S. Model BIT(2012). 




trade;116 (iii) transactions having economic value: indirectly controlled investments have 
been covered by numerous BITs,117 by virtue of which transnational corporations are able 
to manipulate the common corporate devices of intermediate holding companies or special 
investment holding companies organized under the laws of a third State.118
 
 
Third, as to the scope of protection, an increasing number of treaties not only protect actual 
investment and greenfield investment in the traditional sense, but also cover ‘activities 
associated with investments’ and ‘pre-existing investment’. As far as activities associated 
with investments are concerned, the China-Australia BIT stipulates that activities 
associated with investments include a variety of business operations,119 which practically 
cover every activity related to investment. Pre-existing investment is protected under the 
U.S. Model BIT since it provides that a contracting State, State enterprise, or a national or 
an enterprise of a contracting State that attempts to make an investment can be deemed  an 
‘investor of a party’.120
 
 
1.2.2 Expansion in ICSID Arbitration Practice 
 
The travaux préparatoires of the ICSID Convention has indicated that in exchange for 
wide-open jurisdiction over any plausible asset or activity, a definition of ‘investment’ was 
absent in the Convention and relevant rights had been granted to contracting States to 
unilaterally tailor the definition of ‘investment’ eligible for protection through notification 
                                                          
116 Given that the distinction between transactions which might be regarded as ‘trade in services’ and those 
that might be considered as ‘investment in services’ is hardly obvious, there is a danger of extending the 
investment disputes to contractual claims. The inclusion of contractual claims in the BITs could convert, to a 
large extent, the government regulatory action affecting the validity of private contracts into an expropriation. 
It would therefore depart from the principle of exclusion of ordinary commercial transactions from investor-
State disputes settlement mechanism.  See UNCTAD, ‘Scope and Definition’, 2011, 9-10. 
117 It can be achieved through two approaches: the first approach which is adopted in French and Dutch BITs 
uses a special definition of ‘investor’ or ‘national’ that contains companies controlled by their citizens or by 
companies organized; the other approach achieves the same result by defining ‘investment’ as ‘every asset 
that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly’. See Barton Legum, ‘Defining Investment and 
Investor: Who is Entitled to Claim?’ (2006) 22(4) Arb Intl 521, 523-24. 
118 Ibid. 
119 According to the China-Australia BIT, activities associated with investments include the ‘organisation, 
control, operation, maintenance and disposition of companies, branches, agencies, offices, factories or other 
facilities for the conduct of business; the making, performance and enforcement of contracts; the acquisition, 
use, protection and disposition of property of all kinds including industrial and intellectual property rights; 
and the borrowing of funds, the purchase and issuance of equity shares, and the purchase and sale of foreign 
exchange’ (see art I.1(f) of the China-Australia BIT (1988). 
120 Art 1 of the U.S. Model BIT (2012). 




under article 25(4).121 The lack of attempt made to define the concept ‘investment’ also 
leaves considerable discretion to ICSID arbitral tribunals. It is entirely possible that a 
liberal definition is adopted by tribunals so as to open the door of the Centre’s jurisdiction 
to a wide range of investment.122
 
 Though tribunals should be neutral, they can embrace a 
liberal principle favouring investment protection on the basis of the expansion of 
investment in relevant investment treaties and the importance of private international 
investment in the cooperation for economic development which is recognized in the 
Preamble of the Convention. Most ICSID tribunals, if not all, are de facto in favour of 
broad investment protection in practice. 
In the first three decades ICSID jurisdiction was seldom objected to on the ground that a 
dispute arose indirectly out of investment. Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela was the 
critical turning point where Venezuela argued that promissory notes held by Fedax N.V. 
failed to qualify as an ‘investment’ because the transaction did not amount to a direct 
foreign investment involving ‘a long term transfer of financial resources - capital flow - 
from one country to another in order to acquire interests in a corporation, a transaction 
which normally entailed certain risks to the potential investor’.123 After examining the 
negotiating history of the Convention, the tribunal adopted a broad approach to the 
interpretation of ‘investment’ and accordingly characterized transnational loans as 
investments by determining that unlike the rapidly concluded commercial financial 
facilities, loans involving a certain duration were within the framework for the concept of 
investment in the light of the origin of the Convention. Furthermore, the parties had 
already taken the precaution of stating explicitly in the loan contract that the loan was 
eligible for investment for the purpose of the Convention.124
 
 
Though the doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable in ICSID arbitration, two competing 
methods pertaining to the interpretation of investment under article 25 have been refined 
based on ICSID jurisprudence. The liberal intuitive method merely identifies the features 
                                                          
121 Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 114-17. 
122 Michael M. Moore, ‘International Arbitration between States and Foreign Investors - The World Bank 
Convention’ (1965-1966) 18 Stan L Rev 1359, 1362. 
123 Venezuela further contended that neither would the transaction qualify as a portfolio investment under the 
Venezuelan laws. As Venezuela observed, investment in an economic context meant ‘the laying out of 
money or property in business ventures, so that it may produce a revenue or income’. See ICSID Case No 
ARB/96/3, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 11 July 1997, para 19. 
124 Ibid, paras 22-23. 




of investment, but the features are not indispensable in assessing the existence of an 
investment and might vary on a case-by-case basis. The deductive method endeavours to 
give investment a true definition prior to its application in a specific case. 125  The 
dichotomy is similar to the two basic approaches regarding interpretation of ‘investment’, 
namely the subjective approach which asserts that the undefined definition of investment in 
the ICSID Convention permits, to a certain extent, the disputing parties to determine the 
concept of investment, and the objective approach which maintains that investment has a 
discernible meaning under the Convention, typically described as the ‘Salini Test’.126 In 
general, even though the parties are of the same mind that their transaction is an eligible 
investment for an ICSID arbitration case, tribunals can still decline jurisdiction provided 
that the investment in question fails to satisfy the objective requirements (such as the 
‘Salini Test’) set forth in article 25. Admittedly, these criteria explicitly exclude certain 
types of assets from the investment that is eligible for protection under the Convention. 
However, it is hardly to reach the outer limits of ICSID jurisdiction, despite the ‘Salini 
Test’ which has been applied in a number of cases. A review of ICSID case law has 
demonstrated that rights of all kinds (including loans, contracts for the sale of services, 
claims to money, claims to performance having an economic value, pre-investment 
expenditures and legitimate expectations) granted by instruments of all kinds (such as 




1.2.3 Gordian Knot in ICSID Arbitration 
 
Considering that capital-exporting States may have doubts about the quality of host States’ 
domestic institutions in protecting property rights, 128
                                                          
125 Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Identify or Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the Concept of Investment in 
ICSID Practice’ in Christina Binder, et al (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in 
Honour of Christoph Schreuer, 408-11. 
 international investment treaties 
126 The so-called ‘Salini test’ has been identified as emblematic jurisdictional requirements under the ICSID 
Convention, which consists of four elements as indicative of an investment: (i) a contribution in money or 
other assets, (ii) a certain duration, (iii) a sharing of operational risks, and (iv) a contribution to the host 
State’s economic development. See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, 
ICSID Case No ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 July 2001, paras 52-58. 
127 Farouk Yala, ‘The Notion of “Investment” in ICSID Case Law: A Drifting Jurisdictional Requirement?’ 
(2005) 22(2) J Intl Arb 105. 
128 UNCTAD studies had indicated that policy and institutional determinants were especially important in 
developing countries but they were often characterized by weaker institutions and less consistent policies 




routinely place dispute settlement outside host States’ domestic systems, and seek to 
provide adequate protection and security so as to mitigate the damages resulting from the 
legal and policy system which might lack coherence, predictability and stability. Moreover, 
investment treaties generally provide for a broad and open-ended definition of ‘investment’, 
which covers almost every kind of asset or activity associated with investment to 
demonstrate how developing countries are committed to the protection of foreign 
investment. Nonetheless, in the event that States defend as respondents in ICSID 
arbitration cases, they constantly insist on a restrictive method to interpret the notion of 
‘investment’ under the ICSID Convention since a restrictive method is not only of great 
consequence to safeguard judicial sovereignty but also an essential way to provide strong 
defenses. As a consequence, the first Gordian knot arises: States, by and large, adopt an 
extensive definition of investment in investment treaties aimed at attracting foreign 
investment, but insist on a restrictive method to interpret the concept of investment in 
arbitral proceedings. 
 
The second Gordian knot relates to the criteria on which ICSID tribunals rely to interpret 
the term ‘investment’. In view of the facts that treaty-based ICSID arbitration cases balloon 
as BITs proliferate exponentially and that respondent States are usually unfamiliar with 
jurisdictional foundations, objections to ICSID jurisdiction are almost routinely raised 
under BITs.129 The modern world of arbitration has recognized the authority of arbitral 
tribunals to determine their own jurisdiction or competence.130
                                                                                                                                                                                
(see UNCTAD, ‘The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment 
to Developing Countries’, 12-13, 16-17). 
 However, in practice no 
uniform criteria are imposing on the exercise of such authority and, accordingly, tribunals 
virtually have absolute sole discretion in rendering decisions on jurisdiction. Intriguingly, 
while respondent States ordinarily insist on a restrictive method, ICSID tribunals typically 
tend to affirm claimants’ argument that an interpretation shall respect the fundamental 
principles pacta sunt servanda and ut res magis valeat quam pereat, eventually following a 
liberal method to expand the scope of investment. The extra-jurisdictional hurdle under the 
ICSID Convention may leave foreign investors financially exhausted with insufficient 
129 Lucy Reed, et al, Guide to ICSID Arbitration, 143. 
130 According to the doctrine of ‘compétence-compétence’ or ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’, any objection with 
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement falls within the competence of tribunals (see 
William W. Park, ‘The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction, The Limits of Language’ in Albert 
Jan van den Berg (ed), International Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics? (Kluwer International, 2007) 56). 




resources to carry on the proceedings regarding the actual merits of the dispute, 131 in 
particular given that objections to jurisdiction on the ground of unqualified investments 
frequently result in a bifurcation of the proceedings into a phase on jurisdiction, and if 
jurisdiction is proved to exist, a separate phase on the merits.132 Even if objections to 
jurisdiction are finally unapproved by ICSID tribunals, their filing by respondent States has 
caused considerable delay to the proceeding.133
 
 
Practitioners have advocated that ICSID should issue a policy statement to reconcile the 
two competing methods on the interpretation of investment in accordance with article 25, 
under which ICSID can confirm that the definition of investment under the Convention is 
indeed broad and if an investment is eligible under a contract or treaty agreed by host State, 
tribunals shall not be too fastidious; however, as ICSID arbitration is designed for 
substantial investment disputes, it is not suitable for small monetary disputes involving 
claims of no more than U.S. $ 3-5 million.134 Some scholars, in stark contrast to those who 
support the exclusion of small monetary claims, urge ICSID tribunals to protect 
microinvestment under the Convention so as to promote the reality of the international 
community moving towards community values.135
                                                          
131 V. V. Veeder, ‘The Investor’s Choice of ICSID and Non-ICSID Arbitration Under Bilateral and 
Multilateral Treaties’, 7. 
 Such observation is backed up by the ad 
hoc annulment committee in Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia which 
132 Arbitral tribunals are able to deal with objections as a preliminary question or join objections to the merits 
of disputes. The practice of joining preliminary objections to the merits of disputes initiated in 1933 in case 
concerning the Administration of the Prince Von Pless and then in the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case. 
Since questions of jurisdiction and merits are regularly closely intertwined, nowadays ICSID tribunals 
frequently join objections to the merits. However, separate decisions on jurisdiction are also rendered by 
many ICSID tribunals. 
133 In some cases years pass between the date of the tribunal’s first session and the date of decision on 
jurisdiction. Eg, the tribunal in Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/16) constituted in May 2003, but the decision on objections to jurisdiction was rendered in May 
2005. 
134 V. V. Veeder, ‘The Investor’s Choice of ICSID and Non-ICSID Arbitration Under Bilateral and 
Multilateral Treaties’, 8. 
135 Perry S. Bechky, ‘Microinvestment Disputes’ (2012) 45 Vand J Transnatl L 1043. In defending investor-
State arbitration, ICC UK also underpinned the rights of small investor, arguing that small investor would be 
denied access to remedy if investor-State arbitration was unavailable. This was because State was forced to 
weigh the broader political and economic implications of taking a claim against another State if dispute was 
resolved on State-State level (see Peter Gooderham (Director of ICC UK) ‘Small Investors Would be Denied 
Access to Remedy’, Financial Times, Letters, 27 October, 2014). 




determined that the ICSID Convention rejected a minimum requirement. 136
 
 Here, the 
second Gordian knot arises: given that the ICSID Convention is created to provide a 
reliable forum to foster international cooperation for economic development and that the 
Convention does not specifically exclude minor financial claims, a liberal method can be 
adopted by ICSID tribunals in construing the diction of article 25. However, if this 
assumption is not implausible, the possibility exists that more trivial disputes will be 
submitted to ICSID tribunals, plunging the resolution process into the whirlpool of 
contention of jurisdiction and further deteriorating or destructing the utility of investor-
State arbitration. 
In general terms, a similar Gordian knot would not occur in non-ICSID arbitration since 
objections to jurisdiction, though not rare in non-ICSID arbitration, appear to be 
impractical to bring about a significant delay of arbitral proceedings. As the practice of 
investor-State arbitration becomes more sophisticated, objections to the jurisdiction of non-
ICSID arbitral tribunals may delay or even disrupt arbitral proceedings. It happens when 
one of the disputing parties abuse national court proceedings to derail arbitral 
proceedings.137
                                                          
136 The committee held that ‘it was not the intent of the drafters of the ICSID Convention to exclude 
claimants advancing claims of minor financial dimension’ (see ICSID Case No ARB/05/10, Decision on the 
Application for Annulment, 16 April 2009, para 82). 
 However, this is not a common situation. In practice, challenges to the 
jurisdiction of non-ICSID arbitral tribunal occur in two forms, namely partial challenges 
total challenges. A partial challenge, which normally depends on whether part of the 
claims falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement, is insufficient to amount to a 
primary attack on the tribunal’s jurisdiction. In case of a total challenge, where applicants 
commonly question whether an arbitration agreement is valid and seek to overturn the 
basis upon which the tribunal has competency, the doctrine of compétence-compétence 
empowers arbitral tribunals to decide on their own jurisdiction. More importantly, the 
doctrine of separability affects, to a large extent, the outcome of tribunals’ decision. 
According to the doctrine of separability, any challenge to the main agreement does not 
affect the validity of the arbitration agreement; in other words, the arbitration agreement 
shall be treated as an agreement independent of the main agreement, and thus a decision 
137 See Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Water and 
Sewerage Authority, ICC Arbitration No10623/AER/ACS, Award regarding the suspension of the 
proceedings and jurisdiction, 7 December 2001; Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. Indonesia, Interim 
Award (Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Proceeding), 16 October 1999, 25 YB Com Arb 109 (2000). These cases will 
be discussed in section ‘3.3 The Interference of National Courts’. 




rendered by the tribunal that the main agreement is null and void shall not entail ipso jure 
the invalidity of the arbitration agreement.138
 
 In non-ICSID arbitration, these doctrines 
strengthen the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and minimize challenges being employed as 
tactical manoeuvres to delay or derail arbitral proceedings. The doctrines, however, work 
to little avail in ICSID arbitration in that the decision of objection to ICSID jurisdiction 
ordinarily depends on the approach applied to construing article 25 of the Convention. 
Though it is notable that the Gordian knot has caused, and continues to cause, confusion in 
ICSID arbitration, it seems quite impractical to cut the Gordian knot as long as the concept 
of investment under the ICSID Convention remains undefined. However, at the present 
time two measures might be supportive in reducing, or at least mitigating, the risks and 
damages that disputing parties would encounter at the jurisdictional stage. First and 
foremost, if States intend to adopt a more restrictive method in arbitral proceedings, they 
should consider including in investment treaties a less broad definition of investment. In 
this regard, a new approach called ‘closed-list’ definition emerges to avoid an excessively 
wide definition of ‘investment’. Without providing a conceptual stipulation, investment 
treaties adopting the so-called ‘closed-list’ approach merely consist of an ample, but finite, 
list of tangible and intangible assets that are eligible for protection under the treaties. 139
 
 
Such an approach reduces risks to an acceptable level, and dispenses with States’ concern 
whether a relatively narrower notion of investment would lose attraction to foreign 
investors. 
Second, article 25 of the Convention shall not be construed by ICSID tribunals restrictively, 
nor liberally, but in good faith. It appears that the Gordian knot, to some extent, does not 
bring ICSID tribunals between Scylla and Charybdis. Instead, the interests of both 
investors and respondent States can be taken into account jointly and fairly by ICSID 
tribunals in adjudicating the cases. As stated in Amco Asia Corporation and others v. 
Republic of Indonesia, investors had an interest in submitting disputes to international 
arbitration, and such interest was matched by the interest of host States because ‘to protect 
investment is to protect the general interest of development and of developing 
                                                          
138 Julian D. M. Lew, et al, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, 334-35. The doctrines of 
compétence-compétence and separability have been adopted by a number of institutional rules. Eg, art 23(1) 
of the UNCITRAL Rules. 
139 For example, art 1 of Canadian Model BIT (2004). 




countries’. 140  Accordingly, jurisdictional instruments should be interpreted neither 
restrictively nor expansively, but rather objectively and in good faith141 with consequences 
that both parties might be considered as having reasonably and legitimately envisaged.142 
A potential approach to taking into account the expectation of both investors and State can 
be to set an outer limit beyond which ICSID tribunals are not granted the power to expand 
the notion of investment. Given that claimants constantly intend to expand the definition of 
investment, the evaluation of respondent States’ expectation is more essential. When ruling 
on the outer boundaries of the definition in accordance with article 25(1), ICSID tribunals 
are suggested to identify whether the subject matter is a type of transaction that host States 
would like to submit directly to international arbitration, which can be conducted through 
examining the concept of investment in other treaties or agreements concluded by host 
States.143
 
 Such an approach is more than mere temporary expediency as ICSID arbitral 
proceedings shall be neither more intensive nor more extensive than necessary to reconcile 
the interests of investors and States who have an equivalent stake in an orderly, 
constructive and efficient resolution of jurisdictional contention. 
Overall, it has become evident and well-recognized that the current development has 
demonstrated a liberal trend promoting an expansion of ICSID jurisdiction to cover any 
kind of asset or activity in some way related to investment. Considering that one of the 
ICSID’ objectives is to create a reliable forum which empowers States to strike a deal with 
potential sources of foreign capital, and that host States would create a secure legal 
environment in exchange for foreign investment based on BITs that contain a broad 
definition of investment, 144
 
 it is not unacceptable that nearly every asset or activity 
associated with investment can be adjudicated within the competence of ICSID tribunals. 
The concept of investment in modern arbitration, though not comprehensive as compared 
to the diction of ‘commercial’ in non-ICSID arbitration, is sufficient for ICSID tribunals to 
exercise their jurisdiction over a wide range of assets and activities.  
                                                          
140 ICSID Case No ARB/81/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, para 23. 
141 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/84/3, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Dissenting Opinion of 14 April 1988, para 63. 
142 ICSID Case No ARB/81/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, para 14. 
143 Tony Cole, Kumar Vaksha, ‘Power-conferring Treaties: The Meaning of “Investment” in the ICSID 
Convention’ (2011) Leiden J Intl L 305, 327-29. 
144 Julian Davis Mortenson, ‘Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International 
Investment Law’ (2010) 51 Harv Intl LJ 257. 




2 Compatibility with Other Dispute Resolution 
 
2.1 The Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies 
 
As efficiency, which is represented as one of the perceived doctrinal bases in the central 
tenet of international arbitration, has been amplified emphatically in the past few years, the 
growing trend towards investor-State arbitration brings into great importance the 
relationship or compatibility between arbitration and other dispute resolution. Insofar as 
jurisdiction is concerned, the distinguishing features of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration 
have different effects on the art of striking a balance between State sovereignty and 
investment protection, wherein the application of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies, 
the fork-in-the-road clause and conciliation should be given special consideration. 
  
Though investor-State arbitration cases result in part from the surrender of host States’ 
judicial sovereignty for the investment protection purpose, States still retain their 
intrinsically regulatory rights to restrict the extent of judicial sovereignty that would be 
transferred to international tribunals. It has been established that imposing conditions on 
the consent to international arbitration is a general practice endorsed by most States as a 
sound scheme to safeguard State sovereignty. The conditions ordinarily include the 
exhaustion of local judicial and administrative remedies prior to the submission of a 
dispute before international tribunals. Such exhaustion is permitted under the ICSID 
Convention,145 and has been recognized by a large number of BITs.146
                                                          
145 Art 26 of the ICSID Convention. 
 What is intriguing 
about the divergence between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is the implied waiver, 
more precisely, the thoroughly disparate implied waiver rule on exhaustion of local 
remedies applied respectively in ICSID arbitration under the ICSID Convention and in 
non-ICSID arbitration under general international law. Traditionally, an application of the 
rule of exhaustion of local remedies is self-evident and does not rely on a prior agreement. 
There is no presumption generally that the rule of exhaustion of local remedies will not be 
applied in an international arbitration case in which an alien is involved, unless such rule is 
146 For example, German investors having investment in China may submit a dispute for arbitration under the 
following conditions only: (i) the investor has referred the issue to an administrative review procedure in 
accordance with Chinese law; (ii) the dispute still remains three months after investors have brought the issue 
to the review procedure. See art 6 of the Protocol of China-Germany BIT (2003). 




expressly waived or reserved.147 In other words, absence of the rule of exhaustion of local 
remedies in a treaty does not amount to an implied waiver of the rule and the rule shall be 
applicable in the absence of an explicit waiver. 148 This principle had been confirmed by 
the tribunal of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ‘ICJ’) in Case Concerning 
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A.(United States of America v. Italy) where the tribunal found itself 
unable to accept that ‘an important principle of customary international law should be held 




Contrary to the principle that a tacit declaration does not constitute a waiver of a rule of 
international law under customary international law, the ICSID Convention radically 
changes the traditional concept. According to article 26 of the Convention, the contracting 
State is deemed to have waived the right to apply the rule of exhaustion of local remedies, 
provided that the State fails to explicitly require prior exhaustion of local remedies as a 
pre-condition for obtaining access to ICSID arbitration. The rationale of article 26, as 
explained in the Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, is a presumption that when a State and an investor 
mutually consent to submit disputes to ICSID arbitration without reserving the right to 
resort to any other remedy or requiring the prior exhaustion of any other remedy, the 
intention of the parties is thereby to have recourse to ICSID arbitration to the exclusion of 
any other remedy. 150  It is generally submitted that article 26 reverses, de facto, the 
situation under traditional international law.151 However, the ICSID Convention was not 
intended to modify the traditional principle pertinent to the implied waiver of the rule of 
exhaustion of local remedies. 152
                                                          
147 Chittharanjan Félix Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law (CUP, 2004) 250-51. 
 For this purpose, the second sentence of article 26 
explicitly recognizes the right of a State to require exhaustion of local judicial or 
148 The classic treatise International Law: A Treatise stated that ‘waiver will not be implied from silence on 
the matter in a general disputes settlement provision in a treaty’. See Robert Jennings, Arthur Watts (eds), 
International Law: A Treatise (9th edn, Longman, 1992) 526, note16. 
149 ICJ Rep 1989, 42. 
150 ICSID, ‘Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States’, 
18 March 1965, para 32. 
151 Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 403. 
152 ICSID, ‘Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States’, 
para 32. 




administrative remedies prior to bringing the case before an ICSID tribunal, which has 
been reiterated by the first annulment committee in Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of 
Indonesia. In this case, Indonesia contended that the ICSID tribunal manifestly exceeded 
its power by deciding that Amco could bring claims directly to the ICSID tribunal without 
previously seeking redress before Indonesian courts in conformity with the general 
international law on the exhaustion of local remedies and, moreover, the tribunal failed to 
set out any reason for its disregard of this rule. 153  The ad hoc committee declined 
Indonesia’s request, determining that in spite of the absence of reason in the tribunal’s 
award for not requiring Amco to exhaust municipal remedies against the acts of Army and 
Police personnel, this portion of the award could not be annulled in that by virtue of 
acceptance of ICSID jurisdiction without reserving under article 26 of the ICSID 
Convention a right to require exhaustion of local remedies prior to resorting to ICSID 
tribunals, Indonesia must be deemed to have waivered such right.154
 
 The decision of the ad 
hoc committee indicated unequivocally that an implied declaration gave rise to a waiver of 
applying the rule of exhaustion of local remedies in ICSID arbitration.  
The tacit waiver rule on exhaustion of local remedies distinguishes ICSID from non-ICSID 
arbitration, and such difference entails a considerable risk in the midst of the forum 
selection process. It is conceivable that one of the essential objectives of the rule of 
exhaustion of local remedies is the respect to be accorded to State sovereignty. 155 At the 
very least, host States can give no consent to international arbitration and do justice in their 
ways through domestic administrative or judicial procedures. Given that in practice States 
are more likely to neglect the explicit waiver requirement under article 26 of the ICSID 
Convention and therefore lose their chances to regulate disputes under domestic judicial or 
administrative system, the ICSID Convention seems to be a derogation of State 
sovereignty. In consideration of risk avoidance concerning the explicit requirement of 
waiver under the ICSID Convention, recent investment jurisprudence has revealed that the 
local remedy requirement is returning in a number of investment treaties. 156
                                                          
153 ICSID Case No ARB/81/1, Ad Hoc Committee Decision on the Application for Annulment, 16 May 1986, 
para 62. 
 When 
154 Ibid, paras 63-64. 
155 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (CUP, 2003) 730. 
156 The local remedy requirement takes at least three forms in investment arbitration: (i) the requirement to 
use domestic remedies for a certain period of time, (ii) domestic forum selection clauses in contracts, and (iii) 
resort to domestic courts as a substantive requirement of international standards. See Christoph Schreuer, 




conceiving the future EU investment treaties, the Parliament also considers endorsing the 




However, since an administrative and judicial system in a host State has, of necessity, an 
inherent national prejudice to benefit the host State who is one of the disputing parties, or 
at least the domestic system is perceived to harbour such prejudice, article 26, to some 
extent, facilitates the access of foreign investors to the international remedies. Besides, in 
response to such prejudice or perceived prejudice, the so-called fork-in-the-road clause has 
been incorporated into modern BITs to grant claimants a direct right to exclude all local 
remedies.158 The clause is just like a road of no return, conferring the obligation of abiding 
by the final choice between international arbitration and national remedies upon the 
disputing parties. More specifically, parties would be confronted with several possible 
options of fora (such as ICSID arbitration, national arbitration or national courts) due to the 
various contractual and treaty relations. However, once a party choose one forum, the 
choice would be final binding and thus all other options lapse for both parties;159
                                                                                                                                                                                
‘Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration’ (2005) 4 Law & Prac Intl 
Cts & Tribunals 1. 
 in other 
words, in the event that claimants decide to have recourse to ICSID or non-ICSID 
arbitration, the rule of exhaustion of local remedies cannot be required by host States to be 
applied in dispute resolution proceedings. As there will be no room for the application of 
local judicial or administrative remedies, international arbitration becomes, at the stage of 
jurisdiction, an independent procedure without any interference by national courts or other 
national authorities. Accordingly, while it is alleged that article 26 of the ICSID 
Convention may concede State sovereignty, the fork-in-the-road clause derogates 
sovereignty even further. More importantly, if the implied waiver concedes sovereignty in 
ICSID arbitration as compared to the explicit waiver rule in non-ICSID arbitration, the 
fork-in-the-road clause derogates sovereignty in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration in the 
same way. 
157 August Reinisch, ‘The EU on the Investment Path - Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs and other 
Investment Agreements’135. 
158 A typical example can be seen in art 7 of the China-France BIT (2007). 
159 Andrea Schulz, ‘The Future Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements and Arbitration: 
Parallel Proceedings and Possible Treaty Conflicts, in Particular with ICSID and the New York Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards’, Prel Doc No 32, Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, June 2005, 12. 





It is also worth emphasizing that the fork-in-the-road clause does not prevent investors 
from seeking certain legal action taken in domestic courts at the beginning stage of a 
dispute settlement procedure, since a highly stringent approach has been adopted in 
practice to interpret the requirements of triggering the fork-in-the-road clause. As a number 
of BITs contain provisions that guarantee investors effective remedies under domestic laws, 
which include redress through domestic courts or administrative tribunals, it would create 
an unreasonable dilemma for investors if they had to make a choice between the assertion 
of their rights through domestic means or international arbitration. This is because any 
utilization of local remedies, though necessary in some cases where provisional measures 
should be taken promptly, might be regarded as a choice under the fork-in-the-road clause 
and investors might thereby endure any form of injustice passively on pain of losing the 
access to international arbitration. Therefore, the exercise of domestic procedural rights as 
guaranteed in BITs should not be seen as triggering the fork-in-the-road clause. 160
 
  
Nevertheless, the stringent approach also causes bewilderment and even counterproductive 
outcome in practice. It is acknowledged that one of the purposes of the fork-in-the-road 
clause in BITs is to steer clear of parallel proceedings, namely a situation wherein the same 
dispute is brought by the same claimant against the same respondent for resolution before 
different State courts or arbitral tribunals. 161  Under customary international law, the 
inspection as to whether a claim submitted to an international tribunal is the same claim 
that has been resorted to domestic courts or administrative tribunals relies primarily on the 
doctrine of res judicata, which focuses on persona (person), petitum (object) and causa 
petendi (grounds). 162  In investment arbitration, the requirements of the same 
claimant/respondent and the same dispute are commonly construed by ICSID tribunals in a 
narrow and stringent way that is not sufficient to trigger the fork-in-the-road clause.163
                                                          
160 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Travelling the BIT Route of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the 
Road’ (2004) 5 J World Investment & Trade 231, 248-49. 
 As 
161 Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award of 3 September 2001, para 161. 
162 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Stevens, 1953) 
340. 
163 For example, as far as the same claimant is concerned, the ICSID tribunal in Enron v. The Argentine 
Republic observed that it was TGS (which was invested by Enron) that applied to various Argentine courts, 
seeking remedies in respect of the tax affecting it; however, the ICSID case was brought by Enron. Therefore, 
the claimant of actions before Argentine courts was different from that of the ICSID arbitration (see 
ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Decision of Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004, paras 95-98).  




a consequence, although some claims have been submitted to domestic courts or 
administrative tribunals, the choice made by investors between domestic means and 
international arbitration loses the final binding effect and thus international tribunals still 
have discretionary authority to exercise jurisdiction over the same claims. Hence, there is a 
possibility that tricky investors enjoy a double benefit from both domestic instruments and 
international arbitration in that they can first have recourse to domestic instrument, and 
then turn to international tribunals if the domestic means turns out to be unfavourable or 
will deliver unfavourable awards against them. 
 
2.2 Complementary Use of Conciliation in Arbitration 
 
Given that non-ICSID arbitration is based on the agreement concluded by the disputing 
parties, non-ICSID arbitral proceedings can be fixed by the tribunal as well as the parties to 
meet special needs in a particular case. Such a characteristic makes non-ICSID arbitration 
entirely compatible with conciliation, which can be recommended or initiated by tribunals 
upon disputing parties’ request at every stage of the arbitral proceedings. The LCIA Rules 
even encourage disputing parties to agree on the conduct of their arbitral proceedings,164 
and the tribunal can apply the principle deriving from ‘amiable composition’ to the merits 
of the dispute. 165 In view of the uncertainty of an adjudicatory result, some disputing 
parties will turn to a more satisfactory alternative outcome with assistance of neutral 
conciliators. Conciliation, a less adversarial proceeding with fewer emphases on full proofs, 
is capable of avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, thereby producing an acceptable, 
swift and cost-efficient outcome.166
                                                                                                                                                                                
    As to the same respondent, ICSID tribunal in Azurix Corp v. The Argentine Republic held that the 
respondent in Argentine courts proceedings was the Province of Buenos Aires, and Argentina (the respondent 
of the ICSID case) was not a party to any of those proceedings (see ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 8 December 2003, para 90).  
 Furthermore, an amicable settlement reached during 
arbitral proceedings can be salutary in enhancing the economic value of the parties’ 
    On the part of the same investment dispute, the ICSID tribunals determined that contract-based claims 
were different from treaty-based claims (see CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003), and national claims under 
domestic law were different from international claims under international investment treaty (see Middle East 
Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/99/6, Award of 12 
April 2002, para 71). 
164 Art 14.2, 14.3 and 14.4 of the LCIA Rules (2014). 
165 Ibid, art 22.4. 
166 Jack J. Coe, Jr, ‘Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes - A Preliminary 
Sketch’ (2005-2006) 12 UC Davis J Intl L & Poly 7, 16. 




business relationship by working on the optimal solution, in particular in cases where the 
parties engage in ongoing, long-term natural resource investment projects. 
 
On the contrary, conciliation is seldom applied in ICSID arbitral proceedings mainly in the 
light of two considerations. First, conciliation and arbitration are two competing 
procedures provided under the ICSID Convention, and disputing parties should make a 
choice between arbitration and conciliation at the outset of the dispute submitting to the 
Centre. Conciliation as an independent dispute resolution mechanism, however, is 
infrequently used167 because what it can produce is merely a non-binding report,168 which 
may be not sufficient to solve an investor-State dispute and further delay a settlement 
through arbitration. Second, the ICSID Convention contains no provision pertaining to 
conciliation, though a pre-hearing conference can be held under the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules to consider the issues in dispute with a view to reaching an amicable settlement.169
 
 
The ICSID Arbitration Rules do not specify the ways in which the amicable settlement 
would be reached, and therefore conciliation could be one of the options. Nonetheless, the 
pre-hearing conference procedure is rarely ever used, in particular considering that a pre-
hearing conference procedure, which cannot be triggered by ICSID or the arbitral tribunal, 
requires joint consent expressed by both parties. However, if the parties wish to hold a pre-
hearing conference to reach an amicable settlement they would probably have recourse to 
conciliation at the start of their submission of the dispute. 
It is acknowledged that conciliation can provide an effective means of reconciling diverse 
interests and redressing wrongs in arbitral proceedings, 170
                                                          
167 Only seven conciliation cases have been registered under the Convention since the Centre was established. 
See ICSID, ‘ICSID Caseload – Statistics’, 2014-1, 8. 
 which is also appealing to 
168 According to art 30 of the ICSID Conciliation Rule, Conciliation Commissions just draw up a report 
noting the issues in dispute and recording that the parties had reached an agreement. 
169 At the request of the parties, a pre-hearing conference between the tribunal and the parties, duly 
represented by their authorized representatives, may be held to consider the issues in dispute with a view to 
reaching an amicable settlement. See r 21(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
170 Stephen M. Schwebel, ‘Is Mediation of Foreign Investment Disputes Plausible?’ (2007) 22(2) ICSID Rev-
Foreign Investment LJ 237; V. V. Veeder, ‘The Investor’s Choice of ICSID and Non-ICSID Arbitration 
Under Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties’, 10-11; Jack J. Coe, Jr, Toward a Complementary Use of 
Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes - A Preliminary Sketch; Jeswald W Salacuse, ‘Is There A Better Way? 
Alternative Methods of Treaty-based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution’ (2007-2008) 31 Fordham Intl LJ 
138.  




disputing parties in cases where the ICSID Convention governs arbitral procedure.171 In 
this regard, the flexibly complementary use of conciliation in non-ICSID arbitration is 
more desirable or, at least, beneficial to the disputing parties. The drawback of 
incompatibility with conciliation in ICSID arbitration can be avoided once and for all 
through the amendment of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. However, there are more subtle 
but practical and fundamental rationales accounting for the incompatibility. To begin with, 
an increasing number of BITs have made up for the deficiency of incompatibility with 
conciliation by providing a waiting period requirement under which any dispute between 
investors and States shall initially, as far as possible, be settled amicably through 
consultations and negotiations between the parties to the dispute and only in the case where 
the dispute cannot be settled within a certain period (such as six months) will the investors 
bring the dispute to ICSID arbitration.172 The ICSID tribunal in Murphy Exploration and 
Production Company International v. Republic of Ecuador had made it clear that the 
waiting-period requirement constituted a fundamental requirement that must be complied 
with and non-compliance with this compulsory requirement would result in rejection of the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction.173
 
 Normally, if the dispute could not be settled amicably within a 
considerable period up to six months before it was submitted to ICSID tribunal, 
conciliation as an amicable procedure might not be expected to play a vigorous role in the 
arbitral proceedings. 
Furthermore, it is conspicuous that the complementary use of conciliation in non-ICSID 
arbitration can be conducted under private and confidential conditions, while ensuring 
confidentiality in ICSID arbitration would be enormously complex since ICSID arbitration 
is always associated with diverse interests of non-governmental organizations and other 
stakeholders.174
                                                          
171 By now, up to 16 per cent of arbitral proceedings under the ICSID Convention end with awards in which 
settlement agreements were embodied at parties’ request. See ICSID, ‘ICSID Caseload – Statistics’, 2014-1, 
15. 
 In addition, government officials may be unwilling to reach a confidential 
dispute settlement for fear of being accused of weakness in defending national interests or 
even corruption. The requirement and the complexity of approval from multiple 
172 See, eg, art 9(1), (2) of the China-Spain BIT (2005), art 23 of the U.S. Model BIT (2012). 
173 ICSID Case No ARB/08/4, Award, 15 December 2010, para 149. 
174 W. Michael Reisman, ‘International Investment Arbitration and ADR: Married But Best Living Apart’ in 
UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II, 2011, 26. 




government agencies in practice also reduce the possibility of entering into a settlement.175 
Apart from pragmatic considerations, a non-binding decision rendered in confidential 
circumstance, viewed from a more comprehensive perspective, contributes little to the 
development of the jurisprudence of international investment law.176
 
 Therefore, despite the 
potential benefits, the use of conciliation in lieu of arbitration or the complementary use of 
conciliation in ICSID arbitral proceedings may not be appropriate tactics for developing a 
more efficient dispute resolution system. 
3 The Role of National Courts 
 
3.1 Determination of Arbitral Jurisdiction by National Courts 
 
Though one of the noticeable virtues of investor-State arbitration is the depoliticization and 
delocalization of dispute settlement mechanisms, non-ICSID arbitration necessarily has a 
legal seat. The lex arbitri of non-ICSID arbitration is normally the law of the seat of 
arbitration, which has an indication that national courts at the arbitral situs inherently 
possess supervisory powers over the arbitral proceedings. First, although non-ICSID 
arbitral tribunals have authority to determine their own jurisdiction or competence pursuant 
to the doctrine of ‘compétence-compétence’ or ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’, their decisions on 
jurisdiction are subject to a full review by national courts.177 The raison d’être of such 
complete review is that it would contradict with public policy to bind a party to a decision 
made by an arbitral tribunal to which he never agreed.178 On the contrary, there is no 
available application to national courts for the purpose of a review on a jurisdictional 
decision in ICSID arbitration since such authority to review is conferred on internal ad hoc 
committees established under the ICSID Convention. 179
                                                          
175 Barton Legum, ‘The Difficulties of Conciliation in Investment Treaty Cases: A Comment on Professor 
Jack C. Coe’s ‘Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes - A Preliminary 
Sketch’’ (2006) 21(4) Mealey’s Intl Arb Rep 72, 73. 
 In particular, preliminary 
decisions affirming the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals are not subject to possible 
176 Jeswald W Salacuse, Is There A Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State 
Dispute Resolution, 178-79. 
177 For example, s 67(1) of the English Arbitration Act provides that a party to arbitral proceedings may 
apply to national courts, challenging any award of the arbitral tribunal as to its substantive jurisdiction or 
requesting for an order to declare an award rendered by the tribunal on the merits to be of no effect, in whole 
or in part, because the tribunal did not have substantive jurisdiction over the dispute. 
178 Julian D. M. Lew, et al, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, 337-38. 
179 Art 48(3) of the ICSID Convention. 




annulment proceedings, and consequently disputing parties can only request to annul 
negative jurisdictional decisions which dispose of the dispute.180
 
 
Second, in addition to the determination of non-ICSID arbitral jurisdiction by arbitral 
tribunals, national courts may be also asked to determine the jurisdiction of arbitral 
tribunals. Recourse to national courts on the issue of jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals can 
take place at three stages, namely before the arbitral proceedings have even begun, during 
the actual course of the arbitral proceedings or following the making of final awards. 
Under the New York Convention, national court before which an action is brought in a 
manner in respect of which the parties have made an arbitration agreement shall refer the 
parties to arbitration, unless the courts find that the agreement is ‘null and void, inoperative 
or incapable of being performed’.181
 
  
The advantage of the determination of non-ICSID arbitral jurisdiction by national courts at 
an early stage is perceptible. Disputing parties do not have to spend considerable time and 
money proceeding with the whole arbitral proceedings which may eventually prove futile 
in the event that national courts at the post-award stage determine that no basis for the 
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals exists and thus decline the competency of arbitral tribunals 
in adjudicating the disputes. However, there is little settled law on whether national courts 
called upon to determine the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals at the pre-award stage should 
thoroughly review on the merits of the issues, or merely verify the prima facie existence of 
a valid arbitration agreement. 182
                                                          
180 The terminology that the ICSID Secretariat adopts has indicated whether a decision made by arbitral 
tribunals can be annulled. The ICSID Secretariat uses ‘decision on jurisdiction’ where the jurisdictional 
decision is positive, while ‘award on jurisdiction’ will be used if the jurisdictional decision is negative and 
the case is finally dismissed. Only awards on jurisdiction can be challenged before ad hoc committees. 
 Consequently, though the role of national courts in 
determining the jurisdiction of non-ICSID arbitral tribunals is established, the form and 
degree of court intervention is far from certain. This leaves open the possibility that 
disputing parties abuse court proceedings to delay and even obstruct arbitral proceedings. 
181 Art II(3) of the New York Convention. 
182 The U.S. Supreme Court held in First Options v. Kaplan (1 115 S Ct. 1920 (1995)) that if disputing 
parties agreed to submit the arbitrability question to arbitration ‘then the court’s standard for reviewing the 
arbitrator’s decision about the matter should not differ from the standard courts apply when they review any 
other matter that the parties have agreed to arbitrate’. The court should ‘give considerable leeway to the 
arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow circumstances’ (see ibid, 1923-24). In other 
words, if the parties agreed to submit the arbitrability of their disputes to arbitration, national courts should 
apply a cautious standard in reviewing the issue; if not, national courts are required to undertake a full de 
novo hearing. 





In a broader context, the role of national courts is a main divergence between ICSID and 
non-ICSID arbitration. In practice, national courts can play a part before the constitution of 
arbitral tribunal, during arbitral proceedings and after the arbitral adjudication, which relate 
to essential issues ranging from jurisdiction to annulment and enforcement. In order to 
limit and avoid overlapping content with other chapters, the role of national courts would 
not be an independent chapter. Given that a crucial consequence of a choice of ICSID 
jurisdiction is no room for national courts playing a supporting role, this section will also 
analyse interim relief (one of the main roles of national courts) that takes place after the 
jurisdictional stage. 
 
3.2 The Favourable Involvement of National Courts 
 
A request for interim relief (also known as a ‘conservatory measure’ or ‘provisional 
measure’) addressed by any disputing party to national courts is not considered 
incompatible with the jurisdiction of arbitration based on the agreement between the 
parties, nor is it deemed a waiver of that agreement and arbitration jurisdiction. 183  
Conversely, its a-national nature makes ICSID arbitration utterly independent of any legal 
situs, thus depriving disputing parties of rights to seek remedy from national courts. Rather 
than shedding light on the comprehensive distinctions between non-ICSID and ICSID 
arbitration with respect to the role of national courts at the stage of jurisdiction, an analysis 
of the effect of the national courts’ involvement in investor-State arbitration is of more 
practical consequence. It is undeniable that the involvement of national courts can be 
favourable to the disputants in some cases where the supporting role of national courts 
(such as assistance in the taking of evidence, determination of questions of law and 
provisional measures) is beneficial to the arbitral proceedings.184
                                                          
183 For example, art 26(9) of the UNCITRAL Rules, art 28(2) of the ICC Rules, and art 46(4) of the ICSID 
Additional Facility. 
 Ordinarily, the support of 
184 Taking interim measures for example, for one thing the principle of concurrent jurisdiction under which 
arbitrators and national courts have joint jurisdiction to take interim relief has been well-established in 
modern arbitration (eg, art 6 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006) contemplates the court or other authority 
for certain functions of arbitration assistance and supervision and art 17 J focuses on court-ordered interim 
measures). For another, though art 17 H of the UNCITRAL Model Law has confirmed the recognition and 
enforcement of interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunals, the role of national courts with supervisory 
power is still positive since the art 9 stipulates that it is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a 
party to request from national courts interim measures and for national courts to grant such measures. 




national courts is obtainable throughout the whole arbitral process in non-ICSID arbitration, 
without which arbitral proceedings might encounter a number of hurdles. 
 
In the first place, disputing parties in non-ICSID arbitration are entitled to request for 
interim relief from judicial authorities prior to the constitution of arbitral tribunals, wherein 
national courts are able to properly fill the gap until arbitral tribunals are constituted. In 
addition, a number of non-ICSID arbitration rules also create different solutions to resolve 
questions arising out of requests for interim relief prior to the constitution of tribunals.185 
However, the efforts made by the ICC and the American Arbitration Association 
(hereinafter ‘AAA’) virtually seem unsuccessful186
                                                          
185 The ICC Rules for a Pre-arbitral Referee Procedure provides for the immediate appointment of a referee 
who has the power to order any conservatory measures or any measures of restoration that are urgently 
necessary to prevent either immediate damage or irreparable loss, prior to the arbitral tribunal or national 
court competent to deal with the case being seized of it (see arts 1, 2 of the ICC Rules for a Pre-arbitral 
Referee Procedure). It must be clarified that since consent to the ICC Arbitration Rules does not 
automatically amount to consent to the ICC Rules for a Pre-arbitral Referee Procedure, disputing parties have 
to make reference to the ICC Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure in their contracts. By the same token, the ICC 
Rules for Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure are not applicable in the treaty-based arbitration, except as States 
and the investors otherwise agree. 
 in that the special optional rules have to 
be adopted by the disputing parties and in practice the parties generally tend to apply to the 
    The AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures have also developed similar Optional 
Rules for Emergency Measures of Protection, providing that a party can request the appointment of a special 
arbitrator to hear the party’s request for interim measure of protection. Since it is optional and not a part of 
the AAA Rules, both parties have to specify in their arbitration clause that optional rules will be applicable. 
If the parties choose the AAA International Dispute Resolution Procedures (including Mediation and 
Arbitration Rules) as the rules of arbitration, the provision that provides emergency measures of protection is 
incorporated into the AAA International Dispute Resolution Procedures (see art 37 of the AAA International 
Dispute Resolution Procedures). 
    The SCC Rules were amended in 2010 to include a new Appendix II ‘Emergency Arbitrator’ which 
provides that a party may apply for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator until the case has been 
referred to an arbitral tribunal. The power of the emergency arbitration includes the order of interim measures. 
Given that the Appendix is incorporated into the SCC Rules, it is applicable as long as the SCC Rules are 
adopted by disputing parties. Thus a reference in a BIT or multilateral treaty to SCC Rules requires no further 
mutual consent to the emergency arbitrator (see Appendix II Emergency Arbitrator, the SCC Arbitration 
Rules). 
    The LCIA Rules offer an expedited formation of the arbitral tribunal in case of exceptional urgency, and 
the urgency associated with interim and conservatory measures usually justifies the expedited formation of 
the arbitral tribunal. Similar to the SCC Rules, the Rules do not require additional consent to apply the 
expedited formation of the arbitral tribunal (see art 9A of the LCIA Arbitration Rule (2014)). 
186 The ICC Rules for a Pre-arbitral Referee Procedure was in force in 1990, but it took more than 10 years 
for them to be applied in two different cases. See Emmanuel Gaillard and Philippe Pinsolle, ‘The ICC Pre-
Arbitral Referee: First Practical Experiences’ (2004) 20(1) Arb Intl 13, 14. 




judicial authority for speedy and enforceable remedies.187 In contrast, a request for urgent 
interim relief from disputing parties prior to the constitution of ICSID arbitral tribunal has 
to be pending, despite the fact that the request for arbitration has been filed. The Secretary-
General will fix time limits for the parties to present observations on the request, which can 
be considered by the tribunal promptly upon its constitution.188 As can be seen from Tables 
I and II, provisional measures requested by disputing parties before and during the arbitral 
proceedings are ordinarily disposed of with reasonable speed by ICSID tribunals and ad 
hoc committees. It is also necessary to point out that the ICSID Convention and the 
Arbitration Rules do not prevent parties from requesting any judiciary or other authority to 
order provisional measures, prior to or after the institution of the proceeding, provided that 
they have so stipulated in the agreement recording their consent.189 Nevertheless, since 
States’ consent to ICSID jurisdiction is ordinarily given in investment treaties, it is 
impractical for the parties to reach an agreement with respect to resort to domestic courts 
for the protection of their respective rights and interests. Such method thus seems less 
attractive in view of the long period of time typically taken for an ICSID arbitral tribunal to 
be constituted,190
 
 the urgency of interim relief and the unrealistic conclusion of another 
agreement to request for interim relief to national courts.  
In the second place, given the long duration of arbitration procedures,191 interim relief is 
essential to avoid delay of arbitral proceedings in that it has the effect of compelling the 
parties to behave in a way that will ensure successful proceedings. 192
                                                          
187 Raymond J. Werbicki, ‘Arbitral Interim Measures: Fact or Fiction?’ (2003) 57-JAN Disp Resol J 62, 65; 
Gregoire Marchac, ‘Interim Measures in International Commercial Arbitration under the ICC, AAA, LCIA 
and UNCITRAL Rules’ (1999) 10 Am Rev Intl Arb 123, 138. 
 On occasion, interim 
relief would have a considerable influence on the enforcement of the final award. A party 
188 R 39(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
189 Ibid, art 39(6). 
190 On average, there will be 3 months from the registration (and 263 days from filing the request) to the 
constitution of a tribunal. The slowest case took 1,251 days from filing the request for a tribunal to be 
constituted in Funnekotter v Zimbabwe. See Anthony Sinclair, ‘ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does It Take?’ 
(2009) 4(5) Global Arb Rev 18, 19. 
191 In a large majority of arbitration cases an award is issued around two to three years after the initiation of 
arbitral procedure (see Christian Bühring-Uhle, et al, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business 
(Kluwer Law International, 2006) 86). In ICSID arbitration, on average, 3.6 years will elapse from the date 
on which the request for ICSID arbitration is filed to the date of final award (see Anthony Sinclair, ‘ICSID 
Arbitration: How Long Does It Take?’ 18). 
192 Stephen M. Ferguson, ‘Interim Measures of Protection in International Commercial Arbitration: Problems, 
Proposed Solutions, and Anticipated Results’ (2003) 12 Currents: Intl Trade LJ 55, 55. 




who obtains a favourable award may in the end score a Pyrrhic victory if interim measures 
are not ordered or are ordered but not enforceable to prevent the losing party from 
deliberately dissipating and transferring assets or destructing evidence. ICSID tribunals 
also have the power to recommend any provisional measure upon the request of parties or 
at its discretion, but at first sight the diction of ‘recommend’ used in article 47 of the 
Convention and article 39 of the Arbitration Rules appear to lack binding force. The 
tribunal in Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain underpinned the fact that the 
semantic difference between ‘recommend’ and ‘order’ was more apparent than real, and 
deemed the word ‘recommend’ to be of equivalent value as the word ‘order’. 193  
Accordingly, the tribunal’s authority to rule on provisional measures was not less binding 
than that of a final award. 194  However, it seemed that the tribunal in Biwater Gauff 
(Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania intended to distinguish the different 
degrees of legal force of provisional measures, whereby measures ordered by tribunals 
were more binding than those that were merely recommended.195 As the tribunal observed, 
the tribunal’s recommendation was based on ‘a recognition of the need to preserve such 
evidence’ 196  and ‘for reasons of case management’ 197  rather than ‘any finding’ that 
Tanzania had or might act aversely in respect of such documents 198  or ‘a final 
determination’ that any particular documents that were within Tanzania’s possession were 
subject to disclosure. 199 By comparison, what the tribunal ordered was ‘a specifically 
identified, narrow category of documents’ that was ‘of obvious potential relevance and 
materiality to the issues in dispute’.200
 
  
Notwithstanding the different understandings of the term ‘recommend’, the binding nature 
of provisional measures granted by ICSID tribunals is undisputable since the legal 
authority of ICSID tribunals’ decisions on provisional measures should be construed in 
such a way that an obligation rather than a simple moral duty is imposed on the parties to 
comply fully with provisional measures issued by ICSID tribunals. Be that as it may, the 
                                                          
193 ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, Decision on Request for Provisional Measures, 28 October 1999, para 9. 
194 Ibid. 
195 ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No 1, 31 March 2006, paras 88, 98, 106. 
196 Ibid, para 87. 
197 Ibid, para 97. 
198 Ibid, para 87. 
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limits of ICSID tribunals’ authority are by no means negligible or insignificant. First, a 
number of provisional measures, such as attachments and injunctions affecting third-
parties, cannot be issued by ICSID arbitral tribunals. However, compelling attendance of 
witnesses and production of trail evidence, which require the assistance of national courts, 
are indispensable in some cases for the purpose of hearing procedure. Second, ICSID 
tribunals are not entitled with authority to enforce provisional measures in the event of 
non-compliance, and national courts normally do not take a part in implementing measures 
issued by ICSID tribunals. It appears that taking into account disputing parties’ non-
compliance with provisional measures in the decision on the merits201
 
 is a feasible way to 
improve the compliance, which, at any rate, is less advantageous as compared to national 
courts’ assistance in enforcing provisional measures ordered by non-ICSID tribunals. 
All told, consent to ICSID jurisdiction would exclude any remedy from national courts, but 
the ICSID mechanism lacks essential procedures for dealing properly with a request for 
interim relief prior to the constitution of a tribunal. Though the way ICSID tribunals issue 
interim relief is not simply a recommendation, the role of ICSID tribunals is somehow 
restricted in particular given the narrow ambit of their authority to order interim relief and 
their intrinsic defect in relation to the implementation of interim relief. The solutions 
designed in non-ICSID arbitration, in terms of availability, speed and enforceability, are 
more commendable where national courts are able to play a supporting role in an 
appropriate manner, providing necessary assistance but not detracting from the effect of 
arbitration. In practice, as international arbitration has grown expeditiously in recent 
decades, so have requests from disputing parties seeking interim relief. 202
 
 Against the 
background of increasing requests for interim relief, the virtue of the favourable 
involvement of national courts in non-ICSID arbitration would rise to prominence in being 
conceived as a relatively impenetrable bulwark against tricky disputing parties’ deliberated 
disruption or even destruction of arbitral proceedings by intimidating witnesses, 
destructing evidence or dissipating assets. 
                                                          
201 In AGIP S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of the Congo, the respondent failed to comply with provisional 
measures and the tribunal took into account such non-compliance in its final award. See ICSID Case No 
ARB/77/1, Award, 30 November 1979, paras 7-9, 42(c). 
202 The survey targeted at international arbitrators conducted by the Global Centre for Dispute Resolution 
Research demonstrated that 64 respondents identified 50 separate arbitration cases in which interim relief 
was sought either to restrain or stay an activity, order specific performance, or to provide security for costs. 
See Raymond J. Werbicki, ‘Arbitral Interim Measures: Fact or Fiction?’ 64. 




3.3 The Interference of National Courts 
 
Without prejudice to arbitral autonomy, investor-State arbitration indeed interacts, to 
various degrees, with national jurisdictions for its legitimate foundation, effectiveness or, 
at least, the implementation of awards. However, national courts’ support in non-ICSID 
arbitration seems to be not as remarkable as might be expected by disputing parties. As 
regards interim relief, in practice national courts are, more often than not, hesitant to 
exercise their powers to grant interim relief, in particular where interim relief can also be 
ordered by arbitral tribunals. 203 Moreover, the involvement of national courts has the 
potential to generate a tension between national jurisdiction and arbitral jurisdiction, 
further invoking its potential to bring about interference in arbitral proceedings. It is not 
uncommon at the present time for an anti-arbitration injunction to be issued by national 
courts to prevent investors from pursuing remedies before international tribunals, or for a 
request to be filed to challenge and remove arbitrators. Meanwhile, at times States are 
prepared to control international arbitral procedures to their advantage, some of whom may 
be more attracted to adjudication at the national level so as to gain a strategic advantage in 
arbitration with situs in the their territory, especially where the executive power is able to 
pressure the judiciary to favour national interests over those of foreign investors due to the 
ambiguously established division of powers.204
 
 
In investor-State arbitration the potential for national courts to disrupt arbitral proceedings 
can be considerable. In Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. The Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority, Ethiopia instantly objected to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC arbitral tribunal after Salini (an Italian contractor) had recourse to 
the ICC Court.205
                                                          
203 For example, the House of Lords in Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd ([1993] 
AC 334) held that there was ‘the duty of the court to respect the choice of tribunal which both parties have 
made, and not to take out of the hands of the arbitrators (or other decision-makers) a power of decision which 
the parties have entrusted to them alone’. The Hong Kong Court of First Instance in Leviathan Shipping Co 
Ltd v Sky Sailing Overseas Co Ltd ([1998] 4 HKC 347) rejected an application of interim relief because the 
court’s power to intervene arbitral proceedings should be exercised sparingly, and under s 2GC(6) of the 
Arbitration Ordinance the arbitral tribunal should be the first resort since the tribunal had been constituted 
and could have ordered the measures. 
 As the ICC Court rejected its challenge of the qualification of all three 
204 Giulia Carbone, ‘The Interference of the Court of the Seat with International Arbitration’ (2012) 2012 J 
Disp Resol 217, 233. 
205 ICC Arbitration No10623/AER/ACS, Award regarding the suspension of the proceedings and jurisdiction, 
7 December 2001, para 16. 




arbitrators, Ethiopia initiated appeal proceedings before the Addis Ababa Court of Appeal 
in respect of the ICC Court’s decision,206 and further commenced a separate action before 
the Federal First Instance Court, contending that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction 
over the dispute. 207 In addition, the Federal First Instance Court issued an injunction, 
enjoining the claimant from proceeding with the arbitration pending its decision on the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction.208 In Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. Indonesia, Himpurna (a 
Bermudan company owned by a U.S. investor) initiated arbitral proceedings against 
Indonesia under the UNCITRAL Rules after the Indonesian State company had refused to 
pay damages stated in another UNCITRAL arbitral award. Himpurna was subsequently 
served with notice of two law suits in the Jakarta Court: one sought enjoinment of arbitral 
proceedings, while the other was brought by Indonesia seeking an annulment of the first 
UNCITRAL award. Since the injunction issued by the Indonesian court enjoining 
Himpurna from proceeding with arbitration against Indonesia failed to interrupt the arbitral 
hearings, Indonesia further forced the arbitrator appointed by Indonesia return to 
Indonesia.209
 
 These two cases have demonstrated that in some instances national courts are 
liable to delay dispute resolution and undermine the basis of international arbitration even 
further. 
In fact, the abusive interference of national courts (or even States) is a cliché in non-ICSID 
arbitration and how to reduce or avoid potential interference of national courts has been 
and remains a particularly thorny issue in international arbitration. A recent ICSID case has 
made a great contribution to defining the boundaries of the intervention of national courts. 
In Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh, despite the injunction issued by Bangladeshi national 
courts restraining the Italian investor Saipem from proceeding with arbitration, ICC arbitral 
tribunal rendered an award in favour of Saipem. However, upon the losing party’s 
application to set aside the ICC award, the Bangladeshi court determined that the award 
was non-existent such that it could neither be set aside nor enforced. The ICSID tribunal 
acknowledged that national courts of the State where arbitration took place did have 
supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration, but the linchpin of the present case was 
whether the interference of national courts remained within the limits of their supervisory 
                                                          
206 Ibid, para 75. 
207 Ibid, para 77. 
208 Ibid, paras 88-89. 
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jurisdiction and whether such interference amounted to an expropriation.210 At a more 
practical level, though the tribunal firstly accepted that international arbitration was rooted 
in the legal system of the State which was the seat of arbitration, it also recognized that 
arbitral tribunals were entitled with rights to sanction the illegality of the actions of (or the 
actions attributable to) national courts and State if the supervisory power of national courts 
at the arbitral situs was not exercised in good faith, failing to comply with the rule of law 
and generally acknowledge principles of international arbitration.211 Through examining 
the Bangladeshi national courts’ jurisdiction, the ‘merit’ of the courts’ decision to revoke 
the authority of ICC tribunal and the Supreme Court’s decision declaring the ICC award 
non-existent, the ICSID tribunal confirmed that illegal actions of (or the actions 
attributable to) Bangladeshi courts gave rise to a claim of expropriation.212
 
 Accordingly, 
the abusive intervention of national courts may not only be identified as delaying tactics 
for the purpose of impelling arbitration to grind to a halt, but also be regarded as a breach 
of international investment treaties. 
Concluding Observations 
 
Though States transfer automatically and consequentially part of their judicial sovereignty 
in favour of investment protection when verifying consent to both ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitral jurisdiction, it is ordinarily submitted that more sovereign rights have to be 
transferred to ICSID arbitral tribunals. When negotiating investment treaties, States have to 
consider in what way and to what degree foreign investors can rely on investor-State 
arbitration rather than national administrative or juridical authority at the cost of a 
surrender of sovereignty, in particular taking three propositions into account if they attempt 
to strike a balance between State sovereignty and foreign investors’ interests. 
 
First, what kind of disputes can be brought before international tribunals? In general, the 
scope of subject matter in ICSID arbitration is perceptibly narrower since whether the 
subject matter in question is qualified as an investment under the ICSID Convention 
depends on the outcome of a stringent ‘dual test’. However, the recent decades have seen 
an expansionary trend in ICSID jurisdiction by virtue of a broad and open-ended definition 
                                                          
210 ICSID Case No ARB/05/7, Award of 30 June 2009, paras 115-16. 
211 Ibid, para 186. 
212 Ibid, paras 120-173. 




of ‘investment’ in investment treaties which are the direct evidences of States’ consent to 
ICSID jurisdiction, and of the liberal method adopted by a large number of ICSID tribunals 
to interpret the concept of investment under the ICSID Convention, thereby enhancing the 
competency of ICSID tribunals and jurisdiction. The expansive ICSID jurisdiction has 
given rise to the Gordian knot which, of course, needs to be cut in practice, but it also 
reduces the differences of jurisdictional requirements between ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration. Nowadays, even though the diction ‘investment’ in ICSID arbitration is not that 
broad as compared to the comprehensive concept of ‘commercial’ in non-ICSID arbitration, 
the current interpretation of the notion of investment is sufficient for ICSID tribunals to 
exercise their jurisdiction over disputes from a wide range of assets and activities 
associated with investment.  
 
Second, does the compatibility of investor-State arbitration with other dispute resolution 
procedures have substantive effects on the balance of safeguarding State sovereignty and 
protecting foreign investment? The explicit waiver requirement of the application of the 
rule of exhaustion of local remedies, at first glance, seems to be a derogation of State 
sovereignty in that in practice States normally neglect the difference concerning the waiver 
requirement under customary international law and the ICSID Convention, thus losing 
their chance to safeguard sovereign rights through invoking domestic administrative or 
judicial procedures. Nonetheless, it is conspicuous that the explicit waiver requirement 
under the ICSID Convention and the fork-in-the-road clause in BITs, to some extent, 
facilitate foreign investors’ access to international remedies. As to conciliation, there is a 
slightly ambivalent attribute towards the complementary use of conciliation in non-ICSID 
arbitration: while it might be in most investors’ interest, the diverse interests of States and 
other stakeholders are probably undermined in view of the private and confidential 
conditions under which conciliation could be conducted. 
 
Third, is the fact that national courts retain supervisory power over non-ICSID arbitration 
more attractive than the exclusion of any remedy from national courts in ICSID arbitration? 
It is acknowledged that while national courts are able to facilitate arbitral proceedings 
especially by determing the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals at an early stage and providing 
essential interim relief on the one hand, the interference of national courts with 
international arbitration can be abusive and extraordinarily disruptive on the other. The 
roles of national courts constitute two sides of the same coin: the benefit (deference to, and 




assistance of, arbitral proceedings) and the detriment (the hegemony and disruption of 
arbitral proceedings). The self-contained nature of ICSID arbitration, which makes ICSID 
arbitration a system thoroughly detached from the supervisory power of national courts, 
appears to be less effective in ordering and enforcing interim relief but more essential in 
ensuring the integrity of arbitral proceedings. On the whole, insofar as jurisdiction is 
concerned, despite the fact that non-ICSID arbitration has already provided a relatively 
efficient and effective resolution, ICSID also endeavours to pursue similar ends in 
dissimilar ways, acting as a quasi-judicial body on the basis of its sui generis system to 
further the goal of protection of legitimate rights and interests of both sovereign States and 
foreign investors. 
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Unlike the highly bureaucratic WTO system, which stays close to bureaucratic and 
formalized rational legitimacy, the dispute settlement system in the form of international 
investment arbitration with a simple but stable bureau rests principally on the charisma of 
arbitrators and strong tradition.214 Indeed, the bureaucracy of ICSID, for instance, simply 
consists of an Administrative Council and a Secretariat, and only the latter performs the 
function of the administration of dispute settlement facilities. However, the role that an 
arbitration institution 215
 
 takes in investment arbitration can be, to the greatest extent 
possible, essential and fundamental.  
It is noteworthy that aside from administrative powers and functions that aim to ensure the 
continued integrity and efficiency of the arbitration facilities, arbitration institutions can 
undertake a range of duties that would have consequential influences on the entire 
international investment arbitration. As one of the ICSID’s objectives is to promote 
increased flows of transnational investment, it is recognized that the ICSID undertakes  
some duties to foster, inter alia, the coherent development of ICSID jurisprudence and to 
further provide intellectual leadership on international law related to transnational 
investment and arbitration (both ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration). By comparison, as a 
legal body specializing in commercial law, the main mandate that UNCITRAL carries out 
is to modernize and harmonize international trade law.216
                                                          
214 José Augusto Fontoura Costa, ‘Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators: the Creation of 
International Legal Fields’, Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v1, n4 (2011).  
 As ad hoc arbitration where no 
administering facility is readily available, the UNCITRAL Secretariat is virtually not 
215 An arbitration institution is established to resolve disputes, irrespective of the locations of disputing 
parties or the systems of law. An arbitration institution intervenes and takes on the role of administering and 
supervising arbitral proceedings, while individual disputes are determined by arbitral tribunals. Though each 
arbitration institution has its own special characteristics, there are some common features. First, an arbitration 
institution has its own form of administration to assist in the arbitration process. The level of administration 
of an institution is one of essential factors affecting disputing parties’ choice of forum. Eg, the ICC is greatly 
administered with the terms of reference, fixing of times for the making of awards and scrutiny procedures, 
while the LCIA limits its administration to dealing with issues related to arbitrators after the appointment of 
arbitrator (see Julian D. M. Lew, et al, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, 36). Second, an 
arbitration institution has its own set of pre-established arbitration rules to govern arbitral proceedings. 
ICSID, ICC, SCC, LCIA and PCA are the common institutions for the resolution of international investment 
arbitration.  
216 UNCITRAL, ‘A Guide to UNCITRAL: Basic Facts About the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law’, 2013, 1-2. 




involved in administering arbitration cases governed by the UNCITRAL Rules. 217  
Similarly, as the world’s business organization, ICC generally brings together all sectors of 
international business and acts to further the development of an open world economy.218
 
 
Considering that most, if not all, non-ICSID institutions do not concentrate on the law of 
foreign investment (though some of their works are related to investment arbitration), the 
unique position of the ICSID determines its characteristic role in investor-State dispute 
settlement mechanism, and the distinctive role of the ICSID Secretariat will rise to 
prominence not only on the basis of its strengths as primary bureau of the Centre reflecting 
the needs and wants of contracting States and investors, but also in the light of its far-
reaching impact on the development of foreign investment law. Among various 
distinctions between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration in regard to the role of institutions, 
substantive administrative functions, arbitral costs and consistency are the most 
intrinsically discriminative features. 
1 The Independence of Institutions 
 
1.1 The Importance of the Independence of Institutions 
 
It is basically an acknowledgement that an independent and impartial institution, under 
whose immediate administration arbitral tribunals are constituted to adjudicate investment 
disputes, is routinely an indispensable expectation of both investors and States. Needless to 
say, the raison d’être of investment arbitration, from a historical perspective, is to provide 
for neutral fora that let disputing parties off the hook on exterior political, administrative 
and judicial interference. The independence of international institutions (especially those 
that act as judicial and quasi-judicial bodies) entails the capacity of institutions to be 
buffered or insulated from direct external influence and pressure, thus operating neutrally 
                                                          
217 The PCA is the only institution mentioned in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The rules stipulate that if 
disputing parties fail to agree on the choice of an appointing authority, any party may request the Secretary-
General of the PCA to designate an appointing authority for arbitrator selections and challenge (see art 6 of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). Though there is no administrative support from the UNCITRAL 
Secretariat for ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, UNCITRAL arbitration does not necessarily 
deprive parties of the benefits from other institution. The PCA has played a unique role among international 
institutions to administrate an increasing number of investor-State arbitration cases under the UNCITRAL 
Rules. 
218 Preamble and art 1(2) of the Constitution of the International Chamber of Commerce (2012). 






 In the event that an arbitration institution is not perceived as an 
independent body, it would be simply tenable to criticize the credibility of tribunals 
constituted under the auspices of the institution to resolve or reconcile the conflicts of 
diverse interests. In the light of this concern, ICSID’s present ‘independence’ as an 
arbitration institution is inadequate due mainly to its perceptible link to the World Bank. In 
contrast, except ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, non-ICSID arbitration is 
ordinarily conducted under the aegis of an independent commercial arbitration institution, 
thereby effectively avoiding institutions’ inappropriate or illegitimate interference in 
arbitral proceedings. 
1.2 The Independence in ICSID Arbitration 
 
Given that the initiative for the ICSID came from the World Bank and the Centre was 
established accordingly with ‘close administrative ties to the World Bank’,220 it seems that 
ICSID’s connection with the World Bank is somehow unbreakable or, at least, close at the 
present time. Realizing the increasing importance of international institutions retaining 
autonomy and independence, ICSID has taken moderate steps to incorporate more 
independence into its structure.221 However, as one part of the World Bank Group, ICSID 
still remains, to a certain extent, not only structurally but also financially dependent upon 
the World Bank. 222  In addition, the World Bank regularly puts forward its views 
concerning the values, the interpretation and the role of investment arbitration.223
                                                          
219 Kenneth W. Abbott, Duncan Snidal, ‘Why States Act through Formal International Organizations’ (1998) 
42 J Conflict Resol 3, 19, 22. 
 All these 
factors have necessarily affected and continue to affect the independence of ICSID, and 
may further exert influences on the constitution of ICSID arbitral tribunals, arbitral 
proceedings and decision-making process. In particular, promoting private foreign 
220 Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 8. 
221 One of the most striking reforms is that the General Counsel of the World Bank is no longer elected to 
perform functions of the Secretary-General of ICSID since 2008. 
222 In regard to structure, the President of the World Bank shall ex officio chair the Administrative Council, 
and the ICSID Secretary-General is elected by the Administrative Council on the nomination of the 
Chairman. As to finance, contracting States of the ICSID Convention who are members of the World Bank 
shall bear the expenditure of the Centre in proportion to their respective subscriptions to the capital stock of 
the World Bank, provided that the charges for the use of ICSID facilities are insufficient to cover the 
expenditure of the Centre. See arts 5, 10 & 17 of the ICSID Convention. 
223 Howard Mann, et al, ‘Comments on ICSID Discussion Paper, “Possible Improvements of the Framework 
for ICSID Arbitration”’ in Karl P. Sauvant (ed), Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes, 
370. 




investment is one of the objectives of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, and the Bank’s support for investment projects in practice is normally to 
provide borrowing countries with financing for a broad range of investment activities, 
especially for large infrastructure projects necessary to reduce poverty. In the event that an 
investment dispute in which the World Bank was implicated was brought before an ICSID 
tribunal, though the Bank not as a named claimant or respondent, there could arguably be a 
possibility that the arbitration outcome would be influenced by external power. In fact, 




The connection between ICSID and the World Bank might be justifiable at the outset of 
the establishment of the Centre in that the World Bank was an appropriate and competent 
intergovernmental organization to promote international cooperation and further create 
facilities for international arbitration in the mid-twentieth century. Nonetheless, it appears 
that the connection is not in itself a necessary hallmark of ICSID arbitration in the 
contemporary world. There could be unavoidable practical impediments if ICSID’s 
financial connection with the World Bank were broken, but it could be even worse for an 
arbitration institution to be administratively and financially associated with, or attached to, 
and therefore dependent on, another organization that can be a stakeholder in arbitration 
cases. Accordingly, it is advisable to change the ICSID’s scarcity of stark independence, 
particularly in view of the impact of the inadequate independence on the ICSID’s future 
credibility and ability to achieve valuable ends. In addition to the formal split of positions 
filled by the General Counsel of the World Bank and the Secretary-General of ICSID, 
some practitioners have proposed that ICSID could follow the trends for non-ICSID 
arbitration institutions to open offices in areas other than Western capitals,225 and further to 
consider moving the arbitral seat from Washington, DC to the Hague (akin to the ICJ and 
the PCA) and subsequently being funded independently of the World Bank and by the UN 
or other bodies.226
                                                          
224 The Centre was originally to have an administrative link to the World Bank, but the administrative 
connection was discarded due to the protest of many States. See Gita Gopal, ‘International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes’ (1982) 14 Case W Res J Intl L 591, 599. 
 These proposals aim to retain, to the largest extent, the independence of 
225 For example, the PCA’s Mauritius office and the AAA (ICDR)’s Bahrain office. 
226 V. V. Veeder, The Investor’s Choice of ICSID and Non-ICSID Arbitration Under Bilateral and 
Multilateral Treaties, 9. 




ICSID as an arbitration institution which has to be trusted by disputing parties in seeking 
neutrality and impartiality, and it seems that they are not unfeasible in practice. 
 
1.3 The Independence in Non-ICSID Arbitration 
 
There has been much more emphasis placed on the importance of the independence of non-
ICSID arbitration institutions and, a focus on the separation of institutions’ administrative 
function and dispute settlement function. ICC has set an example by establishing the 
International Court of Arbitration which, as an autonomous body, carries out its function in 
complete independence from the ICC and its organs, and members of the Court are 
independent from the ICC National Committees and Groups. 227  The Singapore 
International Arbitration Centre (hereinafter ‘SIAC’) goes the way of the ICC in its current 
Arbitration Rules (2013) under which the newly established Court of Arbitration takes over 
substantive legal functions 228 from SIAC’s Board of Directors, which will be merely 
responsible for corporate and business development matters. 229
 
 Ordinarily, the 
disengagement of the dispute settlement function and other functions is conducive to 
steering clear of conflicts of interests or at least the appearance of such conflicts, which 
should be one of the foremost considerations of arbitration institutions when designing 
their future institutional structure since the independence as a question of substance is not 
only one of primary virtues of institutions that adjudicate investment disputes, but also the 
essence for its further accountability and credibility. 
2 Secretariat’s Substantive Case-related Functions 
 
2.1 Screening Power 
 
As the Secretariat is normally the main bureau that deals directly with arbitration cases, it 
is conspicuous that its substantive case-related functions can have a considerable, even 
decisive on occasion, influence on the dispute settlement. One of the substantive case-
                                                          
227 Art 1 of the ICC Arbitration Rules, Appendix I, Statutes of the International Court of Arbitration. 
228 The substantive legal functions include case administration, jurisdictional challenges, appointment of 
arbitration, challenges to arbitration, and emergency interim. See arts 6, 13, 25 the SIAC Arbitration Rules, 
and art 2 of Schedule 1, Emergency Arbitrator. 
229  However, no separate statute is being concluded to govern the functions and proceedings of the SIAC 
Court as its ICC counterpart does.  




related administrative functions of the ICSID Secretariat, which can be a difference 
between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, is the screening power of the ICSID Secretary-
General. In accordance with a unique prerogative conferred by the ICSID Convention, the 
Secretary-General may refuse to register a request for arbitration upon finding, on the basis 
of the information contained in the request, that the dispute is manifestly outside the 
jurisdiction of the Centre.230 In fact, the screening power is also an administrative function 
in a number of non-ICSID arbitration institutions. The ICC Court, for instance, shall decide 
whether and to what extent the arbitration shall proceed if the Secretary General231 refers 
the effect of an arbitration agreement to the Court. More specifically, the Court is entitled 
to determine that the arbitration cannot proceed in respect of some or all of them if it is not 
prima facie satisfied that an arbitration agreement under the Rules may exist.232 Likewise, 
the SCC Board of Directors may dismiss a case on the condition that the claimant fails to 
comply with a request for further details,233 and shall dismiss a case, in whole or in part, if 
the SCC manifestly lacks jurisdiction over the dispute.234
 
 Nevertheless, it is the ICC Court 
or the Board of Directors (rather than the Secretariat) that is conferred on the screening 
power in non-ICSID institutional arbitration, which may not be adaptively efficient as 
compared to the Secretariat performing the screening power. Apart from the distinctive 
bureaux, there are also several significant disparities between ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration regarding the screening power during the commencement of arbitral 
proceedings. 
In the first place, the ICSID Secretary-General exercises the screening power solely on the 
basis of the information contained in the request, which has an indication that contrary to 
main non-ICSID arbitration institutions, the ICSID Secretariat makes a decision without 
seeking any comments or arguments from the respondent.235
                                                          
230 Art 36(3) of the ICSID Convention. 
 For one thing, all information 
that the ICSID Secretary-General has to review, which is supported by the documentation 
231 In order to avoid confusion, it is worth mentioning that while the ICSID Convention adoptes the diction 
‘Secretary-General’, the ICC Rules use the term ‘Secretary General’. 
232 Art 6(4) of the ICC Arbitration Rules (2012). 
233 Art 6 of the SCC Arbitration Rules (2010). 
234 Ibid, art 10(i). 
235 Intriguingly, unlike the role of the ICSID Secretary-General in ICSID arbitration, the Secretary-General in 
ICSID additional facility proceedings may, either at the parties’ request or on his own initiative, hold 
discussions with the parties or invite the parties to a meeting with the officials of the Secretariat. See art 4(5) 
of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 




specified in the ICSID Institution Rules,236 comes exclusively from the requesting party. In 
practice, in the event that there is any doubt as to whether the request explicitly fails to 
comply with the jurisdictional requirements set out in article 25(1) of the Convention or 
whether the request is otherwise incomplete, the Secretariat most likely just contacts the 
requesting party to correct or further supplement the request.237 For another, the Secretariat 
is required to transmit a copy of the request for arbitration and of the accompanying 
documentation to the respondent,238
 
 but would not take the respondent’s observations into 
account when making a decision. 
In the second place, the screening power of the Secretariat in non-ICSID arbitration is 
more discretionary. When being opted as the governing rules for investor-State dispute 
cases, it appears that the Rules of ICC and SCC are ambiguous as to how to exercise the 
screening power since the grounds for dismissing a request for arbitration in the Rules of 
ICC and SCC are quite general and place particular emphasis on the resolution of 
international commercial disputes. The ICC Rules focus on the prima facie evidence that 
an arbitration agreement may exist, and the SCC Rules are silent on the criteria of 
exercising screening power. While the ICSID Secretariat in additional facility proceedings 
has plenary discretionary authority on the approval of a request, 239
                                                          
236 R 2 of the ICSID Institution Rules. 
 the provisions 
governing and limiting the ICSID Secretary-General’s screening power are explicit under 
the ICSID Convention and the Institution Rules. In general, the request for arbitration must 
be registered unless it manifestly fails to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements under 
article 25(1) of the Convention which provides that the Centre merely deals with legal 
disputes arising directly out of an investment between a contracting State and investors of 
another contracting State. The Institution Rules set forth more specific requirements, 
including the content of the request, optional information and the form of documentation. 
Based on the negative formulation of the Convention and the detailed requirements under 
237 Lucy Reed, et al, Guide to ICSID Arbitration, 127. 
238 R 5(2) of the ICSID Institution Rules. 
239 Under art 4 of Schedule C, Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, the ICSID Secretary-General shall 
register the request as soon as he has satisfied himself that the request conforms in form and substance to art 
3 regarding the consents of request. According to art 4(2) of the Additional Facility Rules, the Secretary-
General has  power to approve an alleged agreement to arbitration only if the requirements are met, which 
indicates that the Secretary-General has power to verify the existence of consent to arbitration. Thus, art 4(2) 
of the Additional Facility Rules allows, de facto, a conceivable inference of purely discretionary rejection. 
See Sergio Puig, Chester Brown, ‘The Secretary-General’s Power to Refuse to Register a Request for 
Arbitration under the ICSID Convention’ (2012) 27(1) ICSID Rev-Foreign Investment LJ 172, 187-88. 




the Institution Rules, it can be maintained that the screening power of the ICSID 
Secretariat is more restrictive and rigid. 
 
Last but not least, the effect of the decision made by virtue of the screening power can be 
disparate in non-ICSID and ICSID arbitration. Under the ICC Rules, after the ICC Court 
has made a decision that the arbitration cannot proceed in respect of some or all of them, 
disputing parties retain the right to seek remedies from any national court having 
jurisdiction to determine whether or not, and in respect of which of them, there is a binding 
arbitration agreement.240 In practice, if national courts overturned a decision of the ICC 
Court in which a request for arbitration was denied on the basis of a manifest lack of an 
arbitration agreement, the ICC is thereafter required to register the request.241 In contrast, 
the ICSID Secretariat’s decision on the request for arbitration is final and binding. In the 
case where the applicant is allowed to register a case, even though the registrability of the 
case is challenged by the respondent, the Secretariat would still notify the parties of the 
registration. In the meantime, the notice of registration shall remind disputing parties that 
the registration is without prejudice to the powers and functions of the arbitral tribunal in 
regard to jurisdiction, competence and merits.242 The Secretariat’s refusal to register a 
request for arbitration, however, would preclude access to the Centre’s facility. No 
recourse against the decision of refusal to register is available, though the decision has no 
res judicata effect. Both requesting party and respondent are entitled to make preliminary 
objections to the Secretariat’s decision, regardless of acceptance or refusal of the 
request,243
 
 but the objections would not affect the validity of the decision. 
Although the Secretariat’ screening power can be a feature that distinguishes ICSID 
arbitration from non-ICSID arbitration, it should be noted that the ICSID Secretariat’s 
                                                          
240 Art 6(6) of the ICC Arbitration Rules. 
241 For example, the ICC Court once disallowed a case to proceed to arbitration on the basis of art 6(2) of the 
ICC Rules, but the decision was then challenged and overturned by the courts of New York. Subsequently, 
the ICC allowed the arbitration to proceed. Such recourse, however, is not universal and would not have been 
available in some jurisdictions such as France and Switzerland. See Matthias Scherer and Jaime Gallego, 
‘Arbitral Institutions under Scrutiny’ (2011) 29(4) ASA Bulletin 940, 941. 
242 R 7(e) of the ICSID Institution Rules. 
243 Preliminary objections can be filed by any party not later than 30 days after the constitution of the tribunal, 
and in any event before the first session of the tribunal. Under this circumstance, the parties will be given the 
opportunity to present their observations on the preliminary objection, and if the tribunal determines that the 
dispute or any ancillary claim is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre, or that the claims are manifestly 
without legal merit, it shall render an award to that effect. See r 41(5), (6) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules.  




screening power is, as a matter of fact, limited in nature. The power of Secretariat 
originated (or one might say was ‘invented’244) to avoid the embarrassment to a respondent 
(especially a State) that had not consented to submitting disputes to the Centre and a 
possibility that the machinery of the Centre would be set in motion in cases where 
jurisdiction was obviously lacking.245 Through precluding frivolous proceedings against 
States that lack legal foundation, the ICSID Secretariat’s screening power contributes to a 
safeguard against the waste of time, effort and money, and further assists in ensuring the 
bona fide use of the Centre’s facility.246 Against this background, article 36(3) was adopted 
with a negative formulation so as not to encroach on the prerogative of tribunals to 
exercise their jurisdictional authority, 247  and such stipulation has an indication that a 
request must be registered unless the Secretariat is convinced that the dispute is manifestly 
outside the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Centre. Furthermore, the Secretariat’ screening 
power is limited to the issue of the jurisdiction rather than the merits of the disputes, which 
is different from the authority of ICSID tribunals by which tribunals in preliminary 




The ICSID Secretariat’s screening power, limited as it is, is nevertheless of significant 
administrative importance. The role of gatekeeper that the ICSID Secretariat serves 
essentially sets up a jurisdictional threshold to efficiently filter utterly unworthy disputes 
that manifestly fail to comply with the requirements set out in article 25(1) of the 
Convention from the disputes that are, substantially or potentially, meritorious. Given the 
crucial consequence that is generated by the Secretariat’s screening power, a number of 
observers have suggested that the screening power must be exercised with caution,249
                                                          
244 Antonio R. Parra, ‘The Institution of ICSID Arbitration Proceedings’ (2003) 20(2) News from ICSID 12, 
13. 
 and 
some even argue that it becomes more difficult to persuade the Secretariat to register a 
request for arbitration than it is to persuade a tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over a 
245 ICSID, ‘Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States’, para 20. 
246 Antonio R. Parra, ‘The Screening Power of the ICSID Secretary-General’ (1985) 2(2) News from ICSID 
10. 
247 When finalizing the text of the ICSID Convention, the Legal Committee defined the screening power in 
negative terms which would ‘better convey the intention of giving the Secretary-General power only for a 
formal screening’. See Antonio R. Parra, The History of ICSID (OUP, 2012) 84. 
248 R 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
249 For example, Georges R. Delaume, ‘ICSID Arbitration Proceedings’ (1986) 4 Intl Tax & Bus L 218, 220. 




claim. 250  However, it seems that the scepticism about the difficulty to persuade the 
Secretariat to register a request is inconsistent with the ICSID practice for the reasons that 
registration would probably be refused, based on the case law, merely in exceptional 
circumstances where the investment is a simply commercial transaction which apparently 
falls outside the jurisdiction of the Centre, and that only 13 requests to register have been 
refused by the Secretariat as compared to the abundant registered cases.251
 
 In any event, it 
is tenable to assert that the ICSID Secretariat’ unique prerogative largely distinguishes 
ICSID arbitration from UNCITRAL arbitration and non-ICSID institutional arbitration. 
2.2 Appointing Authority 
 
As arbitral process would be delayed or even frustrated if disputing parties fail to make an 
appointment of arbitrator or cannot reach an agreement, appointments made by a default 
appointing authority are accordingly crucial and necessary for the constitution of a tribunal. 
The appointing authority scheme is one of characteristic features of institutional arbitration 
as compared to ad hoc arbitration since the pre-established institutional rules provide, by 
and large, a list or database of potential arbitrators to choose from, and further entrust the 
bureau of institution with the authority to assist in appointing eligible arbitrators. Through 
promoting the constitution of arbitral tribunals, the involvement of institutions indubitably 
ensures that an arbitration case begins in a well-organized and timely manner, thereby 
enabling greater efficiency in arbitral proceedings. Conversely, in the light of unavailable 
administrative bureaucracy, disputing parties in ad hoc arbitration have, in principle, to be 
responsible for the appointment of arbitrators on their own, and an appointing authority 
must be designated if the appointment by the parities turns out to be impossible while 
national arbitration law is not applicable. In UNCITRAL arbitration, any party can request 
the Secretary-General of the PCA to designate the appointing authority.252
 
 
The role of the ICSID Secretariat in the appointment process can not only be a stark 
divergence between ICSID and ad hoc arbitration, but also a remarkable feature that 
distinguishes ICSID arbitration from non-ICSID institutional arbitration. Non-ICSID 
                                                          
250 Stephen D. Sutton, ‘Emilio Augustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain and the ICSID Secretary-General’s 
Screening Power’ (2005) 21(1) Arb Intl 113, 126. 
251 Martina Polasek, ‘The Threshold for Registration of a Request for Arbitration Under the ICSID 
Convention’ (2011) 5 Disp Resol Intl 177, 188. 
252 Art 6(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 




institutional arbitration rules normally do not confer the appointing authority on the 
Secretariat since such authority commonly falls within the functions of other bureaux of 
the institution such as the ICC Court253 and the SCC Board of Directors.254 In addition, the 
appointing authority in non-ICSID arbitration (especially in the newer institutions) has 
been questioned for weakening, to some extent, the relationship of trust which disputing 
parties and arbitrators are supposed to share, and probably entailing a more laborious 
process for constituting a tribunal which might not achieve the effect (such as securing the 
appointment and guaranteeing smooth procedures) that the parities expect from national 
courts as judges are appointed in court trial.255
 
  
In fact, the ICSID Convention does not entrust appointing authority to the ICSID 
Secretariat; instead, the Chairman of the Administrative Council serves the function to 
appoint an arbitrator at the request of any party if a tribunal cannot be constituted in due 
course.256 However, several instruments have designated the ICSID Secretary-General as 
the appointing authority of arbitrators in ad hoc proceedings. An annex to the High Ross 
Treaty made by Canada and U.S. in 1984, for instance, provided for the settlement of 
disputes by ad hoc arbitration where the ICSID Secretary-General served as the appointing 
authority of last resort.257 Towards the end of the 1980s, UNCITRAL arbitration clauses 
referring to the ICSID Secretary-General as appointing authority are increasingly seen 
particularly in NAFTA dispute resolution clauses under which the ICSID Secretary-
General is designated to appoint the presiding arbitrator from the agreed roster of 
arbitrators in the event that disputing parties are unable to agree on a presiding 
arbitrator. 258 In practice, as between the Chairman and the Secretary-General, the Centre 
generally encourages parties to choose the latter as the appointing authority since such 
choice is more straightforward as the Chairman ordinarily only performs the function on 
the advice of the Secretary-General.259
 
 
                                                          
253 Art 12(8) of ICC Arbitration Rules. 
254 Art 13(2), (3) & (4) of the SCC Arbitration Rules. 
255 Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, 540-41. 
256 Art 38 of the ICSID Convention. 
257 Treaty between Canada and the United States of America Relating to the Skagit River and Ross Lake, and 
the Seven Mile Reservoir on the Pend d’Oreille River (High Ross Treaty), 2 April 1984, Annex, sec.10. 
258 Art 1124(3) of NAFTA. 
259 Antonio R. Parra, The History of ICSID, 152. 




The ICSID Secretary-General serving as the appointing authority of arbitrator is not merely 
a nuance between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration regarding trivial administrative 
mission, but a substantive case-related function which stands out as the characteristic trait 
of ICSID arbitration as distinguished from non-ICSID arbitration mainly in the light of two 
concerns. First, an appointment made by an arbitration institution is of significant 
consequence since it (or at least the perception of such appointment) is more neutral, in 
particular considering that party-appointed arbitrators possibly tend to depart from their 
mandate that requires them to be and to remain independent and impartial.260 Second, the 
appointment process can essentially be complicated in view of the fact that in practice the 
Secretary-General has to take into account a variety of conflict-of-interests issues such as 
the politics of an arbitrator,261 the repeat appointment of arbitrator by the same party or 
counsel262 and even the racial biases in the appointment of an arbitrator.263
 
 Therefore, the 
deliberation of the Secretary-General would indubitably have a considerable influence on 
the arbitral integrity since arbitral integrity rests, in large part, on the independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators. 
3 The Cost Conundrum 
 
3.1 High Arbitral Costs 
 
                                                          
260 Two distinguished arbitrators, Jan Paulsson and Albert Jan van den Berg, levelled the criticism that party-
appointed arbitrators were untrustworthy, and Paulsson even called for the elimination of party-appointed 
arbitrators (see Jan Paulsson, ‘Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution’ (2010) 25 ICSID Rev-
Foreign Investment LJ 339; Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in 
Investment Arbitration’ in Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, et al (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on 
International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman, 821). However, Paulsson’s and van den Berg’s critiques 
had been questioned in that the right of disputing parties to choose arbitrators and the ability of arbitrators to 
express a dissenting opinion were significant elements of the legitimacy of international dispute resolution 
(see Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, ‘The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale: Why the 
Paulsson - van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded’ 
(2013) 29(1) Arb Intl, 7). 
261 Catherine A. Rogers, ‘The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators’ (2013) 12 Santa Clara J Intl L 
223. 
262 Maria Rivera-Lupu and Beverly Timmins, ‘Repeat Appointment of Arbitrators by the Same Party or 
Counsel: A Brief Survey of Institutional Approaches and Decisions’ (2012) 2012(15) Spain Arb Rev 103. 
263 Umar A. Oseni and Hunud Abia Kadouf, ‘The Discrimination Conundrum in the Appointment of 
Arbitrators in International Arbitration’ (2012) 29 J Intl Arb 519; Sam Luttrell, ‘Bias challenges in investor–
State arbitration: Lessons from international commercial arbitration’ in Chester Brown, Kate Miles (eds), 
Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (CUP, 2011) 445-82. 




The extraordinary development in both number and size of investor-State arbitration has 
been accompanied by debates in academia and practice on the remarkably increasing 
arbitral costs. The costs occurred in investor-State arbitration fall into two categories. The 
first category contains administrative fees of the institution and fees and expenses of the 
tribunal. An empirical study showed that the average costs of an tribunal in an ICSID 
arbitration case were 10 per cent lower than in an UNCITRAL case,264 mainly due to the 
ICSID’s cap on arbitrator’ fees.265
 
 As compared to the second category, which commonly 
comprises fees and expenses of legal representation, hearing, experts and witnesses, it is 
discernible that administrative expenses and arbitrators’ fees are much less expensive. 
Accordingly, arbitral costs in this thesis only refer to fees and expenses occurred by 
disputing parties to present and defend their claims. The costs issues in investment 
arbitration can be elucidated in two aspects when it comes to the divergences as to the role 
of institution in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, ie, high arbitral costs and the 
apportionment of arbitral costs. 
The UNCTAD report indicated that costs involved in investor-State arbitration had 
skyrocketed in recent years, and legal fees amounted to an average of 60 per cent of the 
total costs of the case.266 More specifically, an empirical analysis suggested that arbitral 
costs represented more than 10 per cent of an average award, namely over U.S. $1.2 
million.267 It can be conceivable that high arbitral costs and time expenditure so far can be 
ascribed, in part, to the complexity of a substantial number of claims submitted to arbitral 
tribunals. To begin with, it is conspicuous that too much emphasis has been placed upon 
the battles on all manner of procedural issues wherein challenges against jurisdiction and 
the tribunal’ authority, though legitimate for the appropriate defense in some cases, are 
typically employed as tactical manoeuvres.268
                                                          
264 Matthew Hodgson, ‘Counting the costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration’, Global Arb Rev 24 March 2014. 
 Furthermore, complex investment disputes 
result from far more non-legal factors in the contemporary business world in which there is 
265 ICSID caps arbitrator’ fees at U.S. $3,000 per day (see ICSID Schedule of Fees, 2013, para 3). However, 
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266 UNCTAD, ‘Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration’, 2010, 16-17. 
267 Susan D. Franck, ‘Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2011) 88 Wash U L Rev 769, 
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a possibility that political, economic and cultural influences triumph over the rule of law in 
arbitral processes,269 in particular in investor-State arbitration where politics, economics or 
sociology has the potential to take a part. Arbitral costs in investor-State arbitration, which 
have been depicted as ‘the sting in the tail’,270
 
 are of no less importance to the stakeholders, 
and in a broader context, to the investor-State arbitration mechanism as a whole. 
Though a research has revealed that ICSID proceedings entail lower costs than 
UNCITRAL arbitration, 271
 
 high costs are not dissimilar in ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration. However, unlike ICSID arbitration, many non-ICSID arbitration institutions 
gradually attach high importance to the increasing arbitral costs due to the competition in 
the arbitration industry. As compared to ICSID which was specially created to solve 
investment disputes and is thus considered the most suitable and common mechanism for 
the resolution of investment disputes, non-ICSID arbitration is merely an alternative for 
resolution of investment disputes since it is initially designed for settlement of international 
commercial claims. In order to keep or increase their market share of investment disputes, 
a number of globalization-driven initiatives taken by major non-ICSID arbitration 
bureaucracies or proposed by practitioners are in the works or have already been carried 
out, aiming to resolve investment disputes in a more economical way. By contrast, the 
ICSID Convention and Rules, though not wholly silent on the matter, simply provide 
slightly general provisions on arbitral costs which seem insufficient to assist in controlling 
arbitral costs, let alone reducing the costs.  
As Veeder observed, arbitral costs were an essential factor that had a significant impact on 
investor’s choice of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. 272
                                                          
269 According to Rosendahl’s observation, the political, economic and cultural factors have more or less 
influences on arbitral process, and the influences take place not only in emerging market countries, but also 
in developed countries. See Roger W. Rosendahl, ‘Political, Economic and Cultural Obstacles to Effective 
Arbitration of Foreign Investment Disputes’ in Norbert Horn and Stefan Michael Kröll (eds), Arbitrating 
Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law International, 2004) 33-49. 
 Indeed, arbitral costs create 
diverse incentives regarding the choice of investor-State arbitration as a dispute resolution 
method. Insofar as input-output analysis is concerned, since claimants tend to weigh the 
risks and value of investor-State arbitration prior to commencing arbitral proceedings, the 
270 Klaus Reichert and James Hope, ‘Costs - The Sting in the Tail’ (2006) 1(2) Global Arb Rev 30, 30. 
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large amount of arbitral costs is apparently one of indispensable factors that claimants have 
to take into account when considering bringing claims before international arbitral 
tribunals, in particular those who make small investments and thus have to face a number 
of extra challenges that may possibly put them at a disadvantage against sovereign States. 
Therefore, claimants need to estimate distinct arbitral costs and related risks in ICSID and 
non-ICSID arbitration (eg, the apportionment of arbitral costs after the merits of the cases 
have been decided) and manage their expectation in terms of their financial means. 
 
Furthermore, arbitral costs are notably onerous for developing countries in some cases in 
the light of their relatively scarce budget and financial resources.273 There is a possibility 
that regulatory chill eventually result from the high arbitral costs; in other words, high 
arbitral costs incurred by respondent States, in turn, influence the course of States’ 
investment policy development. In addition to the payment of money, arbitral costs paid by 
respondent States can take different forms, and every form has, more or less, an impact on 
the sensitive issues within the framework of host State’s investment policy. Particularly, 
the form of political costs is relevant to the value of transferring State sovereignty, while 
the form of social costs is related to unrest or other social consideration such as sustainable 
development of the host State.274 As compared to the pecuniary payment, such impact of 
political or social costs can be more far-reaching.275
 
 Hence, how to deploy different ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration rules to control and reduce arbitral costs should become a 
priority for States before they vindicate the legitimacy of the actions they took to regulate 
foreign investment. 
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3.2 Major Initiatives in Response to High Arbitral Costs 
 
3.2.1 Advance Arrangement on Arbitral Costs 
 
It is a common practice in both institutional and ad hoc arbitral proceedings that an 
advance on costs, which is intended to cover fees and expenses of arbitrators and 
administrative fees in case of institutional proceedings, shall be payable by disputing 
parties at the outset of arbitral proceedings.276 By analogy, an advance arrangement on the 
fees and expenses of disputing parties’ counsels and other expenses incurred by the parties 
can be a potential solution in controlling arbitral costs. Even though reaching an agreement 
on arbitral costs prior to or at the outset of the arbitral proceedings is impractical in 
arbitration practice,277 a similar proposal under which disputing parties impose a cap on the 
total arbitral costs seems to be, to some extent, feasible and promising. Cost capping dates 
back to the Arbitration Act (1996) in England, Wales and Northern Ireland which entrusts 
power to limit recoverable costs to arbitral tribunals.278 The London Maritime Arbitrators’ 
Association has applied the stipulation to the settlement of intermediate claims.279
 
  
Cost capping imposed on both parties, however, may encounter a number of hurdles in the 
context of international investment arbitration. First, there is a possibility that a dissonance 
between disputing parties would substantially influences the arbitral process and the 
outcome since the party who is fiscally constrained in accordance with the cost cap may 
deliberately be swamped by his counterpart who operates beyond the ambit of the cost cap. 
Second, a rigid cost cap at an early stage can lead to guerrilla tactics. For one thing, a 
respondent who foresees his failure urges to work out an extraordinarily costly fee cap, 
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which will discourage the claimant from proceeding with the arbitration case. For another, 
a party with a weaker case has an incentive to propose a rather rigorous self-serving cap in 
the guise of efficiency norms.280 It appears that guerrilla tactics particularly tend to be 
more easily employed in arbitration involving States where States can facilitate these 
tactics in their exercise of sovereign powers.281
 
  
Be that as it may be, it would be beneficial and desirable to fix the total sum of fees 
disputing parties believe should be reasonably and acceptably spent on the conduct of 
arbitral proceedings, and that such cost capping can be, as advocated by a number of 
practitioners, achieved with the assistance of the Secretariat and the tribunal. For instance, 
Veeder has designed a process for ICSID arbitration where there are three draft arbitral 
budgets, namely the claimant’ budget, the respondent’ budget and the budget drafted by 
the ICSID Secretariat and the tribunal concerning administrative fees and fees and 
expenses of the tribunal. Based on these private draft budgets, which are edited to remove 
all confidential, sensitive or legally privileged items and shall be placed on the table at the 
first session of arbitration, disputing parties and the tribunal will discuss an overall draft 
budget for the entire arbitral proceedings.282 The ICSID Secretariat is the main bureau that 
is of necessary assistance with the process, especially in further jointly monitoring legal 
costs throughout the whole arbitral procedure.283
 
 Considering that an accurate assessment 
of the total costs figure may not be unproblematic to make at an early stage of arbitral 
proceedings, an alternative approach is to utilize a percentage cap which ensures that 
arbitral costs incurred by disputing parties are not excessively large as compared to the 
claimed amount of compensation in issue. 
3.1.2 Control of Costs in Arbitral Proceedings 
 
The non-ICSID arbitration community has launched a number of initiatives aiming to 
control and reduce arbitral costs, thereby retaining arbitration as a speedy, cost-effective 
and adaptable method of international dispute resolution. Given that legal costs and 
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witness and expert costs amount to 82 per cent of total cost in ICC arbitration on average, 
the ICC has set up the Task Force on Reducing Time and Cost in Arbitration which issued 
a special Report on Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration in 2007 and 
an updated version to reflect the modifications made in the 2012 ICC Rules. Based on the 
observation that costs in arbitration are ordinarily caused by ‘unnecessarily long and 
complicated proceedings with unfocused requests for disclosure of documents and 
unnecessary witness and expert evidence’, the Report provides a range of techniques that 
could be adopted by arbitral tribunals, parties and their counsels to avoid expensive, slow 
and frustrating proceedings, thus cogently demonstrating the ICC’s endeavour to 
institutionalize its commitment to facilitating tribunals and parties in devising tailor-made 
procedures suitable and efficient for their case.284
 
 
Another salient non-ICSID institutional innovation is the expedited procedures provided in 
the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration (2012) under which arbitration cases are 
referred to a sole arbitrator, disputing parties have only one exchange of responsive 
pleadings and a single hearing (unless the parties agree that the case is to be decided on the 
basis of documentary evidence only), and awards shall be rendered within six months from 
transmission of the file to the arbitrators. 285  The expedited procedures have been 
remarkably successful in limiting delay and cutting arbitral costs as almost 40 per cent of 
cases have undergone an expedited procedure since the procedures were introduced in 
Swiss Rules.286
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hearings, use of telephone and video conferencing for procedural hearing and avoidance of post-hearing 
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Time and Costs in Arbitration, 2nd edn, 2012. 
 In addition, in 2011 the Swiss Arbitration Association (hereinafter ‘ASA’) 
launched the Swiss Initiative for Transparency in Arbitration Costs in which the ASA 
proposed the formation of an International Working Group for Transparency in Arbitration 
Costs, jointly led by the ASA and the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (hereinafter 
‘CIArb’), with the core aims of reaching a common understanding of the concept of 
‘arbitration costs’, determining the causes of arbitration costs and examining potential 
ways to control arbitration costs and improve cost-efficiency through collecting reliable 
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data and presenting such data in a relatively transparent form while preserving the 
necessary confidentiality of individual case.287
 
 
However, it is worth noting that whether non-ICSID arbitral institutional initiatives 
actually work to reduce costs in international arbitration practice is far from certain. The 
vast majority of measures suggested by the ICC Report on Techniques for Controlling 
Time and Costs in Arbitration, for instance, require particular conditions such as disputing 
parties’ agreement and proactive arbitrators, which are, however, normally difficult to meet 
during the arbitral procedures. Moreover, a number of provisions intended to cut costs 
have the potential to give rise to unintended consequences and further create a basis for 
further costly battles. 288
 
 Notwithstanding the possible obstruction, non-ICSID arbitral 
institutional initiatives have demonstrated the importance of controlling and cutting arbitral 
costs and set a positive example for the ICSID in directing disputing parties and tribunals 
to take steps to promote cost-efficiency. 
3.1.3 Third-party Funding 
 
Third-party funding is an increasingly used financing method in non-ICSID arbitration 
whereby a third-party who has no interest in the substances of the arbitration procedures 
bears all costs incurred by a disputing party, probably including administration costs, fees 
and expenses of arbitrators, the party’s cost or even the costs of the opponent where the 
case is lost, against a portion of the proceeds collected from the losing party where the case 
is won.289
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have given third-party funding moderate attention,290 and scholars have probed into the 
propositions as to whether third-party funding should be introduced into investor-State 
arbitration and to what extent third-party funding should be regulated in the international 
investment regime. 291  The ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force on Third-Party Funding in 
International Arbitration has formed a special Investment Arbitration Working Group, 
which includes the ICSID Secretary-General looking into essential issues specific to 
investment arbitration in depth.292
 
 
Despite its advantages, third-party funding would have a detrimental influence on the 
conduct of arbitral proceedings. Arbitration institutions have to examine the tensions 
caused by third-party funding agreements, namely the tension between the efficiency and 
viability of the investor-State arbitration (given that such agreements, commonly signed 
between investors in need and funders, are within the ambit of business secrets and thus 
seem to be irreconcilable with the need for transparency in investor-State arbitration), and 
the tension between the inter partes effect of third-party funding agreements and the 
arbitral tribunals’ mandate which is restricted within the adjudication of investment 
disputes since the agreements disconnect from the main investment disputes. These 
tensions are also the reasons why ICSID tribunals and ad hoc committees have refrained 
from taking into account the relevance of a third-party funding agreement when 
determining the apportionment of cost.293
 
 
In addition, it is intriguing that unlike the traditional notion of ‘third-party funding’ in the 
context of non-ICSID arbitration, funders in investor-State arbitration may invest in 
disputes for public interest purposes. There are at least two reported cases in which not-for-
profit entities pursued charitable or strategic goals in ICSID arbitral proceedings.294
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would be impractical to capture all forms adopted by various funders in this financing 
market in a single regulation of third-party funding at the international level, it appears 
more advisable that arbitral institutions provide a general guideline for arbitral tribunals in 
handling recurring issues with respect to third-party funding.  
 
3.2 Apportionment of Arbitral Costs 
 
In determining costs in international arbitration, tribunals have two principal approaches to 
follow, namely the English rule of ‘costs follow the event’ (or ‘loser pays’) and the 
traditional American rule that calls for disputing parties to share arbitral costs equally, with 
each party bearing its own legal fees. As one of the pivotal matters, there are divergences 
in treatment of arbitral costs under a variety of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration rules.295 
Under the ICSID Arbitration Rules, though ICSID tribunals can assess costs and 
proportionate allocation at any stage of the proceedings, final awards must contain any 
decision regarding costs.296 The ICSID Convention confers on arbitral tribunals general 
discretion to assess the expenses incurred by disputing parties in connection with the 
arbitral proceedings, and decide how and by whom the expenses shall be paid.297 However, 
the Convention, the Arbitration Rules and the Administrative and Financial Regulations 
are silent as to how to allocate arbitral costs between disputing parties. The ICC, SCC and 
LCIA somehow have similar approaches, merely providing tribunals with limited guidance 
on allocating costs.298
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 By comparison, more specific guidance on the apportionment of 
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costs of legal representation and assistance of the successful party is contained in the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) under which tribunals are entitled, with guided 
discretion on how to apportion arbitral costs, to adopt a ‘loser pays’ approach while taking 
into account the circumstances of the case.299 The 2013 version of the Rules explicitly 
stipulates that the costs of the arbitration shall, in principle, be borne by the unsuccessful 
party, and tribunals can apportion costs as they determine that apportionment is reasonable, 
taking into account the circumstances of the case.300 Though the Rules provide tribunals 
with substantial flexibility in apportioning costs, it is also evident that the formulation of 




As to the apportionment of arbitral costs in investor-State arbitration, two issues are worthy 
of further detailed analysis. The first normative question is whether clarity of the allocation 
of arbitral costs is more desirable. It is conspicuous that diverse approaches to cost 
allocation create different incentives to initiate arbitral proceedings. As the starting point 
for apportionment of arbitral costs in UNCITRAL arbitration is the adage that ‘costs 
follow the event’, such a clear approach to denoting how tribunals can and should exercise 
their discretion would unambiguously diminish the unpredictability of tribunals’ awards on 
costs, thereby reducing disputing parties’ risks and increasing the efficiency of the arbitral 
proceedings. The broad discretion conferred on ICSID tribunals, however, would be less 
advantageous for potential disputing parties to assess their risks, and has a further 
detrimental effect on the utility and viability of the dispute resolution method, considering 
that the practice of ICSID tribunals in apportioning costs has been claimed ‘neither clear 
nor uniform’302 and has been condemned by scholars who have urged the ICISD to adopt a 
uniform approach to awarding costs and fees by amending its Rules so as to provide for a 
permissive presumption for allocating costs and fees.303
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As a uniform approach, or at least improved normative guidance, is worth pursuing since it 
brings predictability and efficiency in arbitral proceedings, a further question would be 
which approach is more appropriate for international investment arbitration. Advocates for 
the American rule ordinarily aver that the English rule is largely a deterrent to investor-
State arbitration, making arbitration less appealing to claimants and would-be third-party 
funders and more risky or outright economically unviable.304 Accordingly, UNCITRAL 
tribunals in investor-State arbitration shall reject adherence to the rule of ‘costs follow the 
event’ under article 42(1), which is more suitable for international commercial arbitration, 
and further require disputing parties to bear their own arbitral costs, save in cases of 
frivolous or bad faith claims. 305  Schill proposes a one-way, pro-plaintiff cost-shifting 
approach under which respondent States have to bear their own legal costs regardless of 
the outcome of the adjudication, while claimants may recover their legal costs if they 
prevail on the merits.306 The justification for one-way cost-shifting relies mainly on three 
arguments, namely the nature of international investment arbitration as a mechanism for 
the enforcement of obligations under public international law, the impact of one-way cost-
shifting as an incentive to arbitrate on the predictability of and compliance with these 
obligations, and the protection rationale of investment treaties.307
 
 
Nevertheless, the tide, ever so slightly, seems to be turning to an application of the 
authentic English rule on arbitral costs in investor-State arbitration.308 The assertion that 
the English rule deters potential claimants in cases where the claims are small relative to 
the anticipated costs may be tenable, but it is inconsistent with cases in which claimants are 
confident about their claims because in these cases the English rule serves to incentivize 
meritorious claims while discouraging frivolous or weak claims.309
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public policy perspective, the English rule is conducive to reducing political and economic 
burdens on respondents States, and such burdens might be one of the consequences of 
applying the pro-plaintiff cost-shifting approach and the American rule. 310  More 
specifically, although the object and purpose of investment treaties are principally the 
protection of investment, a pro-plaintiff cost-shifting approach appears to be openly and 
deliberately biased and unbalanced, in particular considering that much-publicized 
challenge of the legitimacy of investor-State arbitration is directed at the perceived pro-
investor systemic bias. The American rule creates financial incentives that foster low-merit, 
high-value claims but discourage strong, small claims, and may further have a chilling 
effect on States’ legitimate use of sovereign powers.311
 
 On the whole it has become evident 
that the English rule is more feasible in striking a balance between investors’ rights and 
States’ interests, which seems to account for the emerging trend in favour of the rule of 
‘costs follow the event’ in investment arbitration. In this regard, as ICSID tribunals’ broad 
discretion on apportionment of arbitral costs can become problematic, it is desirable that 
ICSID provides enhanced clarity on the apportionment of arbitral costs, probably adopting 
the English rule, thereby promoting a uniform practice and cost-effective dispute resolution. 
4 Consistency 
 
4.1 Fostering Consistency in Investment Arbitration 
 
In 2004, the ICSID Secretariat issued a discussion paper which, in addition to increasing 
the efficiency of arbitral proceedings in various ways, addressed the matter of 
consistency. 312
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numerous recurring problems presented to tribunals and would have further influence on 
investors’ and States’ future attitudes towards investment. Accordingly, the original 
intention of the ICSID Secretariat in fostering consistency of arbitral awards is, by and 
large, beneficial and desirable, in particular given that legal certainty is one of the primary 
means of the ICSID to foster economic development and thus consistency of arbitral 
awards shall contribute to the ICSID’s interior certainty. 
 
The ICSID Secretariat serving to foster consistency and promote coherent development of 
investment arbitration jurisprudence can be a significant feature that distinguishes ICSID 
arbitration from non-ICSID arbitration. It would be extremely difficult, if not impracticable, 
to promote consistency in non-ICSID arbitration. Despite the publication of UNCITRAL 
treaty-based arbitral awards since December 2013, there is no attempt from main non-
ICSID arbitration institutions to consider making arbitral awards public. In case of 
UNCITRAL arbitration, the various applicable laws, such as lex mercatoria, mandatory 
rules of the arbitral situs and general principles of law which confer on arbitral tribunals 
considerable discretion, would be an enormous hurdle in fostering a harmonized case law. 
 
The different roles that ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration institutions play in fostering 
coherence and consistency in the case law emerging under investment treaties have to do 
with their strategies for main users in the arbitration industry. The mainstream international 
investment arbitration community has not perceived inconsistent arbitral awards ‘as a 
fundamental problem’, or does it view it ‘as an obstacle to the doctrinal reconstruction of 
substantive or procedural investment law’.313 Accordingly, some non-ICSID arbitration 
institutions would be reluctant to engage in the promotion of consistency. As Reisman 
stated, international investment arbitrators were only authorized to act as law-appliers but 
not law-makers, and they should confine themselves to their case-specific mandate and 
refrain from departing from it to take account of what arbitrators might conceive to be the 
‘systemic implications’ of their decision. In the meantime, he acknowledged three 
exceptions, namely thoughtful consideration of previous awards, interpretation of the 
object and purpose of an investment treaty and ‘occasional’ supplementary 
interpretation.314
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may, in fact, have a detrimental effect in view of the facts that there is a high risk that 
arbitrators as law-makers do more harms than good in creating law, filling gaps and 
furthering the rule of law, and that bad rules applied consistently in a predictable way and 
in a regularized patterns, in turn, give rise to outcomes that contradict the value of 
investment arbitration.315 In addition, the cost of consistency can be extraordinarily high 
since consistent adjudication in investment arbitration can only be realized by sacrificing 
accuracy, sincerity and transparency.316
 
 
In contrast, other commentators observed that decision-makers had an obligation to strive 
for consistency and predictability and accordingly to follow a consistent line of cases, 
especially given that international investment law was in its early stages of development 
and thus required consistency. 317  Such viewpoint is in accordance with the decision 
rendered by the tribunal in Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh which 
postulated two duties on investment arbitral tribunals, namely a duty to ‘adopt solutions 
established in a series of consistent cases’ and a duty to ‘seek to contribute to the 
harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate 




It is conspicuous that the pursuit of consistency is one of potential ways to promote 
predictability, thereby allowing investors and States to orient their behaviours in a manner 
such that more certainty about the outcomes of their behaviours and more equality in the 
sense of fairness can be guaranteed. In a broader context, as investor-State arbitration is in 
its infantile stage, it appears that consistency is indispensable for the sake of the 
development of the rule of law. Substantive and procedural investment rules applied in 
investor-State arbitration, currently consisting of a massive number of treaties and laws, 
are fragmented and dynamic, and the application and interpretation of these rules, taking 
the different decisions rendered on the basis of virtually identical circumstances in which 
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Argentina took actions to limit the risk and damage from economic crisis for examples,319
 
 
can be radically discrepant. Inconsistency, which is perceived as a major challenge against 
the legitimacy of investor-State arbitration, has aroused necessary perceptual awareness 
towards the essential role of consistency in ensuring the viability of investor-State 
arbitration. In brief, an appropriate degree of consistency is conductive to the ICSID 
jurisprudence. Accordingly, the role of ICSID Secretariat in fostering consistency and 
further promoting coherent development of ICSID jurisprudence can be one of remarkable 
characteristic traits that should be singled out when compared to non-ICSID arbitration.  




Though no precedent is binding on ICSID tribunals, ICSID arbitral proceedings and 
awards can ordinarily be disclosed to the general public, which will unequivocally 
stimulate a widespread circulation of ICSID’s notes, orders and decisions and encourage a 
degree of reliance on such decisions by subsequent tribunals. Aside from the case law of 
other international judicial bodies to which ICSID tribunals may make reference,320 ICSID 
tribunals are more likely to rely, to various extents in practice, on previous decisions 
rendered by other ICSID tribunals. The tribunal in Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation v. 
The Republic of Liberia maintained that it was instructive to consider the interpretations 
established by other ICSID tribunals despite the absence of precedents in ICSID 
arbitration.321
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 More fundamentally, the tribunal in El Paso Energy International Company 
v. The Argentine Republic further affirmed the authority from other ICSID tribunals by 
elucidating that the facts that ICSID arbitration was established ad hoc, from case to case 
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failed to attack a reasonable assumption that ICSID tribunals would generally take into 
account the precedents set by other international tribunals, especially considering that in 
the present case disputing parties had heavily relied on those precedents in their written 
pleadings and oral arguments.322
 
 
In general terms, ICSID tribunals reject the concept of legally ‘binding precedent’ in the 
form of stare decisis due to the unchallenged scarcity of a doctrine of precedent under 
international investment law, but they adhere to decisions issued by ICSID and other 
tribunals, therefore developing ‘de facto case-law’.323
 
 As the developing jurisprudence in 
ICSID arbitration would give rise to increased scrutiny of decisions by tribunals and 
practitioners, it is advisable that precedents should be relied upon properly and rigorously 
in particular in the light of two concerns. In the first place, there is no justification for 
giving previous awards precedential value since there is no hierarchy of international 
investment arbitral tribunals. Accordingly, the cliché that ICSID tribunals shall retain a 
sense of autonomy on a case-by-case basis cannot be overemphasized. In the second place, 
a simple reliance on previous awards without a detailed analysis of the cases by identifying 
the resemblance has the potential to cause an annulment proceeding on the ground that a 
decision had failed to state reasons. 
4.2.2 Consolidation 
 
Insofar as parallel proceedings are concerned, the consolidation of connected cases, in 
addition to reducing costs, is a potential method to avoid inconsistent outcomes as the 
Geneva Colloquium Report has demonstrated that though consolidation was unlikely to 
decrease ‘inter-fragmentation’ results from related disputes being submitted to different 
resolution mechanisms, it could prevent or reduce ‘intra-fragmentation’ through joining 
disputes being adjudicated in the same resolution forum or under the same institutional 
rules.324
                                                          
322 ICSID Case No ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, para 39. 
 Consolidation has been incorporated in the ICC Arbitration Rules under which the 
323 As Reinisch observed, there were two form s of precedent that led to coherence and predictability, namely, 
a formal binding precedent (stare decisis) in common law jurisdictions and a de facto case-law in civil law 
traditions. See August Reinisch, ‘The Role of Precedent in ICSID Arbitration’ (2008) Austrian Arb YB 495-
510. 
324 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, et al, ‘Consolidation of Proceedings in 
Investment Arbitration: How Can Multiple Proceedings Arising from the Same or Related Situations Be 
Handled Efficiently?’ (2006) 21(1) ICSID Rev-Foreign Investment LJ 59. 




Court has been called upon from time to time to provide possible consolidation of related 
claims where disputing parties have agreed so, or all claims are made under the same 
arbitration agreement, or in case of different arbitration agreements the arbitration cases 
are between the same parties with the same legal relationship.325 NAFTA has provided a 
consolidation clause in the context of investment arbitration, conferring upon tribunals 
discretionary authority in assuming jurisdiction over claims that have a question of law or 
fact in common after hearing the parties.326
 
 
Consolidation is not covered by the ICSID Convention, but the tribunal in Cambodia 
Power Company v. Kingdom of Cambodia has recognized two core principles governing 
consolidation in ICSID arbitral proceedings. The uncontroversial starting point is that 
consolidation of claims depends upon the consent of disputing parties, which normally 
takes the form of an express provision, whether in a treaty or contract, and can be implied 
from the circumstances on occasions.327 The second relevant principle denotes how to 
identify the precise mechanism by which it has been agreed that claims be coordinated. In 
particular, tribunals can encourage disputing parties to agree that disputes out of multiple 
contracts are all to be brought within the ambit of one arbitration agreement in one of the 
contracts, or that claims under multiple contracts are merged into one arbitration 
proceeding and determined concurrently by way of one award.328 When it comes to the 
role of institutions, the ICSID Secretariat has attempted to foster consistency by having the 
same arbitrator appointed in various cases.329 Such practice has potential to harmonize the 
outcomes of ICSID awards, but there is still a possibility that it is of no avail in avoiding 
incoherence in some cases.330
                                                          
325 Art 10 of the ICC Arbitration Rules. 
 Accordingly, it would be more promising in many ways if 
appropriate rules which combine consistency and cost-efficiency while maintaining 
326 Art 1126(2) of the NAFTA. 
327 ICSID Case No ARB/09/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 22 March 2011, paras 121-23. 
328 Ibid, paras 127-28. 
329 For instance, the decisions on jurisdiction in Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic (ICSID 
Case No ARB/02/16, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 11 May 2005) and in Camuzzi International S.A. 
v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No ARB/03/2, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 11 May 2005) 
were rendered by the same arbitrators sitting on two different ICSID tribunals, under which the tribunals 
relied largely on identical reasons and reached the same conclusions in upholding their jurisdiction. 
330 For example, H. E. Judge Francisco Rezek sat on two distinct tribunals in CMS Gas Transmission 
Company v. The Republic of Argentina (ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Award, 12 May 2005) and LG&E 
Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/1, Decision of Liability, 3 October 2006), but these tribunals diverged on the application of 
necessity under customary international law on virtually identical facts. 




discrete factual and legal basis of each claim by guiding arbitral tribunals in determining 
consolidation of related cases are set by the ICSID Secretariat. 
 
4.2.3 An Appellate Mechanism/Permanent Court 
 
Based on the assumption that ‘efficiency and economy, as well as coherence and 
consistency, might best be served by ICSID offering a single appeal mechanism as an 
alternative to multiple mechanisms’, the ICSID Secretariat had proposed the creation of an 
ICSID Appeals Facility. 331  However, while retaining the efficiency and transparency 
proposals, the Secretariat abandoned the appeals facility for the reason that it was 
premature to attempt to establish an appellate mechanism at the current stage, in particular 
in view of the difficult technical and policy issues raised. 332  Though an appellate 
mechanism is able to reduce the risk of conflicting decisions, thus developing a coherent 
jurisprudence and further making ICSID arbitration sustainable and legitimate in the long 
run, there are still no compelling reasons to move towards an appellate mechanism.333 By 
the same token, a proposal to substitute an international investment court which is 
perceptibly accountable and capable of delivering consistency for investor-State arbitration, 
though tenable in some ways,334
 
 seems to be impractical at the present time. 
Concluding Observations 
 
Although the integrity and weight of investor-State arbitration rest largely on the charisma 
of arbitrators and arbitral tradition, it is also evident that arbitration institutions, which 
should be structurally and financially dependent, also take essential parts in facilitating 
arbitral proceedings and fostering the sustainable development of international investment 
arbitration. The role of institutions takes, by and large, two distinct forms. To begin with, 
the secretariats, with their unique position at the fulcrum of international arbitration 
bureaucracy, serve to fulfil substantive case-related functions in the process of promoting 
arbitration as a suitable mechanism for investor-State dispute resolution. Since there is no 
                                                          
331 ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, 22 October 2004, 16. 
332 ICSID Secretariat, ‘Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations’, 12 May 2005, 4. 
333 The creation of an appellate investment structure may be confronted with a number of obstacles, eg, 
political feasibility and ‘finality’ (time, cost and trust). See Christian J. Tams, ‘Is There A Need for an ICSID 
Appellate Structure?’ in Rainer Hoffman & Christian J. Tams (eds), The International Convention for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes: Taking Stock After 40 Years (Nomos, 2007) 223-49. 
334 Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, 180-84. 




administrative bureau readily available in ad hoc arbitration, the role of the Secretariat is a 
remarkable divergence between ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration. In addition, as 
compared to the Secretariat in non-ICSID institutional arbitration, the ICSID Secretariat 
performs two distinctive functions, namely screening power and appointing authority 
which are conducive to ensuring the bona fide use of the Centre’s facility and providing 
appropriate solutions to problems that are liable to affect arbitral tribunals that are on the 
verge of being constituted or have already been constituted. 
 
Furthermore, ICSID’s intrinsic responsibility in ensuring the viability of international 
investment arbitration in the long run, through carrying on a wide range of advisory and 
research activities concentrating on international investment law, significantly 
distinguishes ICSID from non-ICSID arbitration. On balance, such functions are primarily 
reflected in two aspects when investigating the divergence between ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration. First, considering that so far investor-State arbitration has consistently been 
perceived as a high-risk and high-cost option for investors and States, it is advisable that 
ICSID considers paying more attention to the crucial matter of arbitral costs where a 
number of non-ICSID arbitration institutions have played vigorous roles in the context of 
international commercial arbitration. Second, ICSID has the potential to serve a unique 
function in fostering consistency in investment arbitration and thus promoting the 
development of ICSID jurisprudence in a coherent, harmonized and equitable manner. 
 
 
Chapter III Post-award Remedies 
 
 
It is unequivocal that post-award remedies are one of the most discrepant proceedings in 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, which could ultimately be the decisive factors in 
investors’ selection between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration and have momentous 
implications for the safeguarding of national interests. Prior to embarking on an evaluation 
of the divergent post-award remedies between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, light 
should be shed on four pre-requisites. First, what kind of remedy is worth exploring? 
Though a variety of possible remedies are provided under the ICSID Convention and 
national statutes respectively, a number of remedies that include supplementation, 
rectification, interpretation and revision 335 normally involve mere incidental, trivial or 
minor issues that would have slight relevance to the final decision of the claims for 
compensations and any other kind of relief. These remedies, though important and 
necessary, are instruments that are too blunt and insignificant by themselves to 
substantively distinguish ICSID arbitration from non-ICSID arbitration. Therefore, only 
the annulment mechanism in ICSID arbitration and the vacatur mechanism in non-ICSID 
arbitration, 336
 
 which are thoroughly radical but limited remedies enabling parties to 
challenge the finality of awards, will be examined in this chapter.  
Second, what type of award can be annulled by ad hoc committees or set aside by national 
courts? Despite the absence of a definition of ‘award’ under the ICSID Convention, it has 
been held that an award shall satisfy the requirements of both form and substance as set 
forth in article 48(2) and (3).337
                                                          
335 See, eg, arts 49(2), 50 & 51 of the ICSID Convention, s 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act and art 56 of the 
Chinese Arbitration Act (1994). 
 However, not all awards can be brought within the purview 
of annulment. In general, a preliminary decision on jurisdiction incorporated into an award, 
a decision declining jurisdiction, an order or award noting settlement and discontinuance in 
accordance with rule 43(2) of the Arbitration Rules and a post-award decision under article 
336 In addition to ‘vacate’, other dictions such as ‘annul’, ‘set aside’, ‘revoke’ or ‘nullify’ may be adopted by 
different national arbitration statutes; eg, the Code of Civil Procedure of Netherlands adopts the terms 
‘reversal and revocation’ (see Dutch Arbitration Act, Code of Civil Procedure - Book Four: Arbitration, 
effective 1 December 1986, s five). In this chapter the dictions of ‘set aside’ (verb) and ‘vacatur’ (noun) will 
be adopted in accordance with the common usage in international commercial arbitration. 
337 R 47 of the ICSID Arbitration Rule sets out the requirements in more detail. 




49(2) of the Convention are types of awards for the purpose of annulment.338 The question 
in non-ICSID arbitration is more complicated where two issues need to be further analysed. 
In the first place, what type of award rendered by international tribunals is considered to 
pertain to a domestic award and thus can be set aside by national courts? While the 
nationality of an international arbitral award rests ordinarily in national statutes since each 
State can determine which award shall be considered domestic, the criterion of the seat of 
arbitration dominates in practice.339 Accordingly, it is the competent authority at the seat of 
arbitration that has the power to set aside an international arbitral award. In the second 
place, what type of award might be set aside by national courts at the arbitral situs? 
Though non-ICSID arbitral tribunals can render an interim, interlocutory, partial or final 
award,340 disputing parties typically request for a final award to be set aside. In addition to 
a final award, a partial award may, in theory, be set aside, provided that it is considered to 
be final and requested accompanying with a final award.341
                                                          
338 A partial award may be subject to annulment if it deals with a clearly defined portion of the dispute. 
However, a request for annulment of a preliminary decision affirming jurisdiction and paving the way for a 
subsequent award, procedural order, a decision on provisional measures under art 47 of the Convention or an 
order under r 43(1) is entirely unfounded under the ICSID Convention. See Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The 
ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 921-26; Gaëtan Verhoosel, ‘Annulment and Enforcement Review of 
Treaty Awards: To ICSID or Not to ICSID’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York 
Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference, 290-91. 
 The distinctions between the 
type of award that can be annulled in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, in some ways, 
have the potential to affect the parties’ choice. For instance, claimants in ICSID arbitration 
will not encounter annulment proceedings initiated by respondents against an interim 
award in case the tribunal has upheld jurisdiction in a separate decision, while claimants in 
339 Autonomy of disputing parties in determining the seat of arbitration is theoretically possible but seems to 
be both unnecessary and unhelpful (see Nigel Blackaby, et al, Redfern and Hunter on International 
Arbitration, 591). Meanwhile, as an exception, the jurisdiction of annulment is also vested in the court of the 
State under the law of which the award is made (see Alexander J. Bělohlávek, ‘Importance of the Seat of 
Arbitration in International Arbitration: Delocalization and Denationalization of Arbitration as an Outdated 
Myth’ (2013) 31(2) ASA Bulletin 262, 280). However, since it is the national law governing the challenge of 
non-ICSID awards, national courts of a State may even set aside an award rendered outside the territory of 
the State (see Koji Takahashi, ‘Jurisdiction to Set Aside a Foreign Arbitral Award, In Particular an Award 
Based on an Illegal Contract: A Reflection on the Indian Supreme Court’s Decision in Venture Global 
Engineering’ (2008) 19 Am Rev Intl Arb 173). 
340 See, eg, art 32(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) and art 2(v) of ICC Arbitration Rules 
(interlocutory award is not included in the text). It is worth mentioning that art 34(1) of 2010 revision of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules does not classify the type of award and merely provides that the tribunal may 
make separate awards on different issues at different times. The revision might take account into the lack of 
uniform criteria related to the definition and the classification of arbitral awards in practice. 
341 Tibor Várady, et al, International Commercial Arbitration: A Transnational Perspective (4th edn, West, 
2009) 742. 




non-ICSID arbitration expose themselves to the risk of an instant proceeding setting aside 
the decision. 
 
Third, which competent authority is entitled to annul an ICSID award or set aside a non-
ICSID award? The autonomous nature of the ICSID system entails delocalized arbitration 
where annulment proceedings are conducted by ad hoc committees established pursuant to 
article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The annulment in ICSID arbitration is a challenge 
against awards through utterly internal review procedures within the centralized ICSID 
system, precluding any scrutiny by any national authority. The challenge of non-ICSID 
awards, however, is under the framework established generally by national law,342 or treaty 
in some instances. 343  The UNCITRAL Model Law, though not binding but having 
influenced legislation in an increasing number of States, 344  expressly recognizes an 
application for setting aside an award before the courts of the place of arbitration as the 
exclusive recourse against award; 345 in other words, only the courts at the arbitral situs 
have the power to vacate awards. Furthermore, given that most non-ICSID investor-State 
arbitral awards are recognized and enforced by virtue of mechanisms provided by the New 
York Convention, and that the recognition and enforcement may be rejected under the New 
York Convention if the award has been set aside by a competent court of the State in which, 
or under the law of which, it was made,346 the courts of the State that supplies arbitral law 
under which the award is made can be also entitled to set aside an award under the New 
York Convention.347
                                                          
342 It is intriguing that following International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution and Judicial 
Arbitration and Mediation Services, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) adopts the Optional 
Appellate Arbitration Rules, effective on 1 November 2013, which create an appeal to an appellate arbitral 
panel empowered specifically to review ‘an error of law that is material and prejudicial; or determinations of 
fact that are clearly erroneous’. Considering that the AAA Rules are seldom applied in published investor-
State arbitration case, this non-judicial appeal procedure will not be discussed. 
  
343 For example, art 1136(3)(b) of NAFTA provides that a disputing party may commence a proceeding 
before national courts to revise, set aside or annul a final award in arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules or 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 
344 For a current list of legislation based on the UNICITRAL Model Law see 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html>. 
345 Arts 1(2) & 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
346 Art V(1)(e) of the New York Convention. 
347 Although the New York Convention specifically contemplates the possibility that an award could be 
rendered in one State but under the arbitral law of another State, this situation may be so rare as to be a ‘dead 
letter’ (see Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform 
Judicial Interpretation (Kluwer Arbitration International, 1981) 28). Accordingly, though in a few instances 
international arbitral awards have been set aside by courts other than those of the seat of arbitration (see 





Fourth, can the right to annul or set aside arbitral awards be waived ex ante? In ICSID 
arbitration, advance waiver seems possible at first glance in that disputing parties are free 
to modify arbitral procedures through agreement in accordance with article 44 of the 
Convention and hence there is a possibility that the parties modify or even exclude the 
annulment right. Nonetheless, considering that article 52, which is directed at the 
requirement of basic procedural fairness that is inherent in any judicial process, should be 
seen as serving a public order function by protecting the integrity and legitimacy of ICSID 
arbitration, annulment cannot be deemed a procedural technicality and thus is not at the 
parties’ disposal. 348 On the contrary, waiver as a general principle of estoppel or venire 
contra factum proprium is commonly accepted by national laws, some of which even 
contain statutory provisions on the waiver of right to challenge awards.349 Legislation 
containing advance waiver attaches importance to the finality of awards, but such 
legislation is rarely applied in practice since numerous claimants initiate dispute resolution 
proceedings based on investment treaties and consequently it would be difficult for 
disputing parties to agree on an agreement containing a waiver ex ante. Be that as it may, 
the advance waiver has been used in investor-State arbitration and the effect of the waiver 
has been upheld by national courts.350
 
  
1 Risks of Challenge 
 
1.1 Uncertainty in Challenging Proceedings 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Michael Mcilwrath & John Savage, International Arbitration and Mediation: A Practical Guide (Kluwer 
Law International, 2010) 333), it is not common in practice for the courts of the State under the law of which 
the award was made to set aside the award.  
348 Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 919-20. 
349 Daniel M. Kolkey, ‘Attacking Arbitral Awards: Rights of Appeal and Review in International Arbitrations’ 
(1988) 22 Intl L 693, 703; Julian D. M. Lew, et al, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, 684-
86. In fact, after the 2011 Decree which reformed the French Code of Civil Procedure, more national laws 
have allowed the possibility of waiving setting aside proceedings. See Daniella Strik, ‘Growing Number of 
Countries Allowing Exclusion Agreements with Respect to Annulment Warrants Greater Scrutiny of 
Arbitration Clauses’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 11 January 2012. 
350 In Switzerland, disputing parties without any connection to Switzerland are allowed to waive the right to 
challenge the award (see art 192 of the Swiss Private International Law Act). The Swiss Federal Tribunal 
affirmed in France Telecom v. Lebanon that the right to challenge the award on the ground of the 
UNCITRAL tribunal’ lack of jurisdiction was unambiguously waived by the parties, thus the jurisdictional 
objection ought to be declined (see Matthias Scherer, et al, ‘Domestic Review of Investment Treaty 
Arbitrations: The Swiss Experience’ (2009) 27(2) ASA Bulletin 256, 273-74). 




As compared to the self-contained and centralized system that provides ad hoc committees 
with powers to annul ICSID arbitral awards on the basis of a rather limited number of 
specific grounds, the vacatur of non-ICSID arbitral awards will be reviewed by national 
courts at the arbitral situs where standards applicable to set aside awards vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Such relatively decentralized framework indubitably indicates 
different standards of review in non-ICSID arbitration; and, more importantly, the disparity 
found in national statutes as regards the various standards of review entail, prima facie, a 
remarkable degree of uncertainty. Certain ‘problem jurisdictions’ even demonstrate a 
tendency to set aside arbitral awards for unforeseeable reasons, in particular in the case 
where the home State is involved as a party.351 Admittedly, the area of uncertainty in 
investor-State arbitration remains large,352 some of which, taking annulment for example, 
are inherent in international arbitration so long as post-award remedies are necessary for 
disputing parties to pursue justice. Therefore, the debate on post-award remedies in ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration is not directed to the utter avoidance of uncertainty but rather to 
the scrutiny of the degree of uncertainty in different fora that reflects the risks of 
challenging arbitral awards. Arguably, unlike the more consistent ICSID system that relies 
merely on one set of rules, a multi-layered system of review provided in a variety of 
national statutes with respect to the vacatur in non-ICSID arbitration gives rise to a greater 
degree of uncertainty, 353
 
 which probably diminishes the appeal to disputing parties of 
choosing non-ICSID arbitration since the risks of challenge resulting from the uncertainty 
are, as a matter of fact, incongruent with the expectation of prospective claimants. This 
intriguing assumption will be examined in both theoretical and empirical ways, namely the 
uncertainty and the ratio of annulment or vacatur application. 
1.1.1 Reducing Uncertainty in Non-ICSID Arbitration 
 
The uncertainty in setting aside non-ICSID arbitral awards is somehow unavoidable in 
view of the varying standards of review that may be applicable. Nonetheless, a number of 
factors to which uncertainty is attributable can be predicted ex ante, and thus the 
uncertainty in non-ICSID arbitration can be and is being mitigated through a range of paths. 
                                                          
351 Juan Fernández-Armesto, ‘Different Systems for the Annulment of Investment Awards’ (2011) 26(1) 
ICSID Rev-Foreign Investment LJ 128, 130. 
352 Andrés Rigo Sureda, Investment Treaty Arbitration: Judging under Uncertainty (CUP, 2012) 10. 
353 R. Doak Bishop & Silvia M. Marchili, Annulment under the ICSID Convention (OUP, 2012) 261. 




First, disputing parties’ choice of a neutral and arbitration-friendly place as a primary 
manifestation of their efforts to ensure equality is very common in practice.354
 
 Among ten 
published non-ICSID investor-State arbitration cases initiated in the period from 2010 to 
2013 (as of the date when the seat of arbitration confirmed), disputing parties’ preferences 
for the arbitral situs are always directed at cities in North America and Europe where 
arbitration-friendly jurisdictions and consistent law enforcement are commonly provided. 
The selection of a seat from these jurisdictions is not only conductive to adjudicating 
investment disputes in a more practical and convenient way, but also guarantees the 
certainty in post-award remedies due to their sound legal systems that seldom contain any 
peculiar ground for setting aside arbitral awards.  
Table III: The Seat of Published Non-ICSID Arbitration Cases 
 
Case Arbitral Situs Rules Document 
Confirming the 
Seat 
British Caribbean Bank 
Limited v. The Government 
of Belize 
The Hague, the 
Netherlands 
UNCITRAL Procedural Order 
No 1, 6 September 
2010 
Apotex Inc. v. The 
Government of the United 







No 1, 16 December 
2010 
Guaracachi America, Inc. 
and Rurelec PLC v. The 
Plurinational State of 
Bolivia 
The Hague, the 
Netherlands 
UNCITRAL Terms of 
Appointment and 
Procedural Order 
No 1, 9 December 
2011 
Saint Marys VCNA, LLC v. 
Government of Canada 
Toronto, 




No 1, 10 
September 2012 
                                                          
354 According to the 2010 International Arbitration Survey, London, Geneva, Paris, Tokyo, Singapore, and 
New York are the preferred seats of arbitration, and all these jurisdictions, in general terms, are neutral to 
disputing parties and arbitration-friendly. See Paul Friedland & Loukas Mistelis, 2010 International 
Arbitration Survey: Choices in International Arbitration, 19. 




Philip Morris Asia Limited 
v. The Commonwealth of 
Australia 
Singapore UNCITRAL Procedural Order 
No 3 (Regarding 




Bridge Company v. 
Government of Canada 
Washington 
DC, U.S. 
UNCITRAL Procedural Order 
No 3, 27 March 
2013 
Mesa Power Group, LLC v. 




No 3, 28 March 
2013 
Ruby Roz Agricol and 




UNCITRAL Award on 
Jurisdiction, 1 
August 2013355 
The Renco Group, Inc. v. 
The Republic of Peru 
Paris, France  
 
UNCITRAL Procedural Order 
No 1, 22 August 
2013 
Windstream Energy LLC v. 
Government of Canada 
Toronto, 




No 1, 16 
September 2013 
 
Second, notwithstanding the noticeable divergences, it can be asserted that a convergence 
of national arbitration statutes emerges, given that a similar approach limiting the review of 
setting aside arbitral awards to the grounds that generally parallel those set out in article V 
of the New York Convention in the context of non-recognition and non-enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards has been adopted in a number of national arbitration regimes. The 
adoption of such similar approach can be attributed, in part, to the multilateral 
convention356 and the UNCITRAL Model Law.357
                                                          
355 The document confirming the seat of arbitration is unpublished, but it can be concluded from the 
 Obviously, the convergence of national 
legislation can mitigate, to some degree, the uncertainty in non-ICSID arbitration. 
award on 
jurisdiction that the parties agreed to London as the seat of the arbitration on 4 May 2011. 
356 For example, the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration is the only multilateral 
convention that provides the specific grounds for setting aside international commercial arbitral award. See 
art 9(1) of the Convention. 





Third, non-ICSID tribunals, in particular those constituted by experienced arbitrators, 
routinely take their part in proactively managing the risk of challenges of awards when 
conducting arbitral proceedings. In the event that the seat of arbitration is not agreed upon 
by disputing parties, tribunals in ad hoc proceedings are likely to evaluate an arbitral seat 
by making reference to the guidance provided under the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing 
Arbitral Proceedings,358 and then typically determine a neutral and arbitration-friendly seat 
so as to steer clear of any a priori suspicion related to equal treatment for both parties and 
any potentially applicable ground for setting aside the awards rendered by them. At times, 
tribunals even try to avoid any risk of challenges at the expense of promoting efficiency.359
 
 
Putting aside the controversy of the decency of such practice, it is undeniable that the 
practice is supportive in protecting the finality of awards and reducing the uncertainty in 
non-ICSID arbitration. 
1.1.2 Non-uniformity of the Standard in ICSID Arbitration 
 
In view of the fact that specific grounds for annulling awards have been set out explicitly 
in article 52 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID arbitration shall carry, at first sight, less risk 
stemming from the uncertainty in annulment proceedings. However, it seems that a 
substantial lack of certainty in annulment proceedings is also a thorny issue in ICSID 
arbitration as the standard of review adopted by different ad hoc committees is far from 
uniform. In terms of the standard to what extent ad hoc committees have implemented 
their review authority under article 52 of the Convention, Schreuer classified the ICSID 
annulment jurisprudence into three generations: the first generation of ICSID annulment 
decisions, consisting of Klöckner v. Cameroon I and Amco v. Indonesia I, was widely 
condemned for re-examining the merits of the decisions since they virtually amounted to 
appeal proceedings. The concern of substantive review aroused in the first generation was 
alleviated in the second generation of decisions which included MINE v Guinea, Klöckner 
v. Cameroon II and Amco v. Indonesia II. The ad hoc committees in the third generation of 
decisions had found their proper balance in Wena Hotels v. Egypt, Vivendi v. Argentina I 
                                                                                                                                                                                
357 In fact, the grounds for setting aside arbitral awards set forth under the UNCITRAL Model Law are taken 
from article V of the New York Convention which provides grounds for refusing to recognize and enforce 
arbitral awards. 
358 See UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, 2012, 10-11. 
359 Michael Mcilwrath and John Savage, International Arbitration and Mediation: A Practical Guide, 328. 




and CMS v. Argentina.360
 
 The three generations of ICSID annulment jurisprudence have 
demonstrated a great deal of inconsistency which would, in turn, affect the finality, 
certainty and predictability of ICSID arbitration. 
Though the third generation of annulment decisions wins praise for navigating between the 
Scylla of complete fairness and the Charybdis of absolute finality, 361 the standard of 
review established in the third generation will not be applied compulsorily to future cases. 
In fact, a number of annulment proceedings that have been initiated in the past few years 
might be a watershed that marks the beginning of the fourth generation of ICSID 
annulment jurisprudence.362 Nevertheless, the features of the fourth generation would be 
particularly difficult to depict since it is like a mixed bag containing considerably different 
criteria of review.363
 
 Accordingly, it can be assumed that the uncertainty resulting from the 
divergent interpretation and application of the grounds for annulment set forth under article 
52 will continue, and the lack of uniformity increases, indubitably, the risk of challenges of 
ICSID arbitral awards. 
1.2 Ratio of Annulment/Vacatur 
 
Since the annulment proceedings are subsequent contents following the award section in 
the ICSID Convention, it appears to disputing parties who receive unfavourable awards 
that it is a ‘routine step’ to attack the awards by virtue of annulment,364
                                                          
360 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Three Generations of ICSID Annulment Proceedings’ in Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas 
Banifatemi (eds), Annulment of ICSID Awards (Juris Publishing, 2004) 17-20. 
 either for strategic 
and tactical considerations or on account of a genuine sense of fundamental injustice. The 
inflationary requests result accordingly in an increasing number of annulment decisions. 
Similarly, more applications for setting aside non-ICSID arbitral awards have been 
initiated because of a greater number of non-ICSID awards that have been issued in recent 
361 Pierre Lalive, ‘Absolute Finality of Arbitral Awards?’ in Revista Internacional de Arbitragem e 
Conciliaçao-Año I-2008, available at ICCA website <http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12641359550680/lalive_absolute_finality.pdf> accessed 19 February 2014. 
362 Promod Nair, ‘Claudia Ludwig, ICSID Annulment Awards: The Fourth Generation?’ 5(5) Global Arb 
Rev, 28 October 2010. 
363 For example, the annulment decision in Mr. Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICSID 
Case No ARB/99/7) was condemned for focusing too much on the merit of the case, while the ad hoc 
committee in CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (ICSID Case No ARB/01/8) 
was criticized in part for exceeding its power by issuing unwarranted obiter dicta. 
364 Christoph Schreuer, ‘From ICSID Annulment to Appeal Half Way Down the Slippery Slope’, 213. 




years. As of 1 November 2014, ICSID ad hoc committees have determined 41 annulment 






Figure IV: Decision on Annulment or Vacatur Application 
 
As depicted in Figure IV, it would be imprudent to conclude that there is a significant 
difference between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration in terms of the total number of 
decisions on annulment and vacatur.366
                                                          
365 See Tables IV and V. 
 However, of the 41 ICSID annulment decisions, up 
to 32 per cent of decisions were eventually annulled both in full and in part, as compared to 
a mere 7 per cent of non-ICSID decisions that had been set aside by national courts. As the 
ratio of ICSID annulment is much higher than in non-ICSID arbitration, it seems that 
disputing parties have to face more risks of their awards being annulled in ICSID 
arbitration. Does the data have an implication that the sharpness of the sword in 
challenging ICSID awards is more brutal against the shield in defending the finality and 
366 It is noteworthy that some variables have to be taken into account, such as the fluctuant data of decisions 
on annulment or vacatur, the lack of transparency in non-ICSID arbitration and the deviation of data (eg, 
Argentina is one State but initiates many annulment or vacatur proceedings in both ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration).   




integrity of ICSID arbitration than that in non-ICSID arbitration? In response to the 
Philippines’ request for the guidelines aiming to ensure fair and effective annulment 
proceedings, the ICSID Secretariat presented that the ratio of ICSID annulment was not as 
high as perceived. 367 In fact, according to the ICSID 2014 Annual Report, of the 420 cases 
registered and 189 awards rendered, only 6 awards had led to full annulment and another 7 
awards had been annulled partially. 368
 
 In other words, the ratio of annulment, in the 
context of overall ICSID caseload being taken into account, is somewhat low. 
 
 
Figure V: Annulment Outcome in ICSID Arbitration 
 
                                                          
367 ICSID Secretariat, ‘Background Paper on Annulment: For the Administrative Council of ICSID’ (2012) 
27(2) ICSID Rev-Foreign Investment LJ 443, 491. 
368 ICSID 2014 Annual Report, 26. 










Figure VII: ICSID Caseload and Outcome369
 
 
                                                          
369 Data base on the ICSID 2014 Annual Report which covers the fiscal year from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 
2014. 




In a nutshell, it would be subtle and insufficient to infer, based on the theoretical analysis 
and empirical study, that the different post-award remedies approaches provided in ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration are inherited with superiority or inferiority from the perspective 
of the challenge of the finality of arbitral awards. On the one hand, though the degree of 
unavoidable uncertainty in non-ICSID arbitration is more perceptible in the light of the 
varying applicable grounds for setting aside arbitral awards, the uncertainty can be and is 
actually being mitigated by prospective parties’ choice of a neutral and arbitration-friendly 
seat of arbitration, the convergence of national arbitration statutes and the efforts made by 
tribunals. This uncertainty does not seem to be particularly conspicuous, on the other hand, 
given that the non-uniformity of the standard of review adopted by ad hoc committees in 
different generations of ICSID annulment decisions also reveals relatively high uncertainty 
that ICSID arbitration can generate. In fact, it is the uncertainty surrounding ad hoc 
committees’ application of diverse standards of review that opens the door for 
condemnation of post-award remedies in ICSID arbitration. Furthermore, the number of 
annulment or vacatur decisions and the ratio of annulment and vacatur are, in general terms, 
slightly limited to indicate that one approach carries ostensibly more risks than the other. 
Consequently, uncertainty in annulment and setting aside proceedings is not necessarily 
directed at disputing parties’ assessment and selection of a dispute resolution mechanism. 
Instead, when it comes to the evaluation of the post-award remedies in ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration, analyses on the differences as to how the grounds for annulment and 
vacatur are applied and the effect of annulment and vacatur are of more consequence.  
 
2 Grounds for Annulment/Vacatur 
 
2.1 Grounds Provided under the ICSID Convention 
 
2.1.1 Manifest Excess of Powers 
 
Considering that the improper constitution of a tribunal and the corruption of an arbitrator, 
though important as practical arbitration issues, are seldom used as a ground for annulment 
in practice,370
                                                          
370 Questions related to the constitution of tribunal can be solved, before and during the arbitral proceedings, 
by parties’ challenge of the qualification of arbitrators and by the Secretariat’ scrutiny. Corruption has 
aroused particular concerns, but arbitrators appointed in investor-State arbitration are ordinarily independent 
and impartial, thus allegation of corruption has not been made in ICSID annulment proceedings. See Tamar 
 these two grounds will not be discussed in this chapter. In addition, though a 




serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure is a frequent ground for 
annulment, 371  there is also a similar ground for setting aside awards in non-ICSD 
arbitration, namely the breach of due process. Notwithstanding their distinctions, these two 
procedural grounds cover, in essence, the same issue372
 
 and thus cannot reveal substantive 
divergences that would make considerable influences on the parties’ evaluation of a 
dispute resolution mechanism. Therefore, this part focuses on the other two grounds listed 
in article 52 of the ICSID Convention. 
The most common ground on which ad hoc committees rely to annul ICSID arbitral 
awards is that the tribunal in question had manifestly exceeded its powers (see Figure VIII). 
The manifest excess of powers under the ICSID Convention has a counterpart under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.373 However, the ground of excess of mandate in non-ICSID 
arbitration contemplates, in general, two situations in which arbitral tribunals fail to decide 
all claims submitted to them, resulting in a decision infra petita, and where tribunals deal 
with claims not falling within the terms of the agreement to arbitrate or containing matters 
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, thereby ruling ultra petita. 374
 
 By 
comparison, the ground of manifest excess of powers in ICSID arbitration distinguishes 
itself in at least three aspects. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Meshel, ‘The Use and Misuse of the Corruption Defence in International Investment Arbitration’ (2013) 30(3) 
J Intl Arb 267; Loukas Mistelis, ‘Legal Issues Arising out of Disputes Involving Fraud, Bribery, Corruption 
and other Illegality Issues’ in Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico di Pietro (eds), Enforcement of Arbitration 
Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron May, 2008) 
573. 
371 Not all departures of rules of procedures can be grounds for annulment. The seriousness of the departure 
requires that it be more than ‘minimal standards of procedure to be respected as a matter of international law’, 
and that it ‘deprive[s] the party of the benefit or protection’ which would ‘have made a difference in the final 
result’; additionally, a departure is fundamental only if it ‘affects the fairness of the proceedings’. See CDC 
Group v. Seychelles, ICSID Case No ARB/02/14, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for 
Annulment, 29 June 2005, para 49; Wena Hotels Limited v. Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, Decision on 
Application for Annulment issued on 5 February 2002, para 57; Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, 
Principles of International Investment Law (OUP, 2008) 283. 
372 Juan Fernández-Armesto, Different Systems for the Annulment of Investment Awards, 138. 
373 Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
374 For example, the Court d’Appel de Paris stated that an arbitral tribunal exceeded its mission by awarding 
a party damages that exceeded the amount of the claimed damages. See Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage 
(eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 938-41. 






Figure VIII: Annulment Grounds in ICSID Concluded Proceedings375
 
 
The first aspect relates to the standard of review. If an allegation of manifest excess of 
powers is argued as a ground for setting aside a non-ICSID award, a de novo review of the 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdictional determination will be conducted by national courts in some 
main arbitration jurisdictions, in which the test of courts is ‘was the tribunal right or wrong 
in asserting or refusing to assert jurisdiction under the treaty or contract as it did’ rather 
than ‘was the tribunal entitled to reach the decision that it did’.376 The ICSID committees, 
however, take at least three different standards of review in practice: (i) according to the 
first methodological approach, the term ‘manifest’ only relates to the cognitive process that 
makes it ‘self-evident’, ‘obvious’ or ‘apparent’;377
                                                          
375 8 awards were annulled on the ground of manifest excess of powers, 7 were on the ground of failure to 
state reasons, and 2 were on the ground of a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure. 
 (ii) as a qualitative matter, ‘manifest’ 
376 The approach of a de novo review is adopted in England, Canada, Sweden and Switzerland. See Gaëtan 
Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID or Not to ICSID, 296-97. 
377 The ICSID committees in Wena Hotels Limited v. Egypt, CDC Group v. Seychelles and Repsol v. 
Petroecuador applied this approach. See ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, Decision on Application for Annulment, 
5 February 2002, para 25; ICSID Case No ARB/02/14, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application 
for Annulment, 29 June 2005, para 41; ICSID Case No ARB/01/10, Decision on the Application for 
Annulment, 8 Jan, 2007, para 36. 




concerns the extent of the excess rather than its clarity;378 in other words, the excess should 
make a difference to the result;379 (iii) the third standard reconciles the two foregoing 
approaches, requiring an excess to be both obvious and substantively serious based on a 
two-step method or a prima facie test.380
 
 Accordingly, as compared to one main approach 
in non-ICSID arbitration, an ICSID award will be reviewed depending on which standard 
is adopted by the ad hoc committee. 
The second aspect concentrates on the lack of jurisdiction. A tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction, 
regardless of a total or partial lack in accordance with article 25 of the ICSID Convention, 
comes necessarily within the scope of the manifest excess of powers381
 
 since a tribunal is 
not conferred the power to make a decision on the merits of a claim that is not covered by 
parties’ consent and fails to meet the requirement set forth in the Convention. Currently, 
the lack of jurisdiction has been recognized as the most apparent example of a manifest 
excess of powers. On the contrary, in a treaty-based investment arbitration context, all 
disputes related to investment, including pure commercial disputes, are subject matters that 
can be resolved by tribunals under non-ICSID arbitration rules. Most, if not all, non-ICSID 
arbitration rules neither provide a notion of ‘investment’, nor limit themselves to 
settlement of mere investment disputes. Therefore, the lack of jurisdiction over investment 
disputes or disputes related to investment seems to be an unusual phenomenon in non-
ICSID arbitration. 
The third aspect concerns the failure to apply the proper law. In view of its general 
obligation to apply the proper law to the dispute under article 42(1) of the ICSID 
Convention, a tribunal’s failure to do so amounts to a manifest excess of powers.382
                                                          
378 It was stated in Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No ARB/02/7, Decision on the Application 
for the Annulment of the Award, 5 June 2007, para 38. 
 Failure 
to apply the proper law can also constitute an excess of powers under national arbitration 
379 This approach was taken by the committee in Vivendi v. Argentina. See ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, 
Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, paras 104-12.   
380 The committee in Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates created this approach. See ICSID Case No ARB/02/7, 
Decision on the Application for the Annulment of the Award, 5 June 2007, para 40. 
381 Klöckner v. Cameroon, ICSID Case No ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment of 3 May 1985, para 4. 
382 The ad hoc committee in CDC Group plc. v. Seychelles stated that failure to apply the law specified by the 
parties was an excess of powers; essentially, a tribunal’s legitimate exercise of power was tied to the consent 
of the parties, and so the tribunal exceeded its powers where it acted in contravention of that consent. See 
ICSID Case No ARB/02/14), Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment, 29 June 
2005, para 40. 




statutes. The distinction of failure to apply the proper law in ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration is that the inquiry by ad hoc committees into tribunals’ application of the proper 
law is, on occasion, more stringent and rigorous than that by national courts. Such 
distinction can be indicated by a comparison of the decisions in MTD Equity v. Chile 
(ICSID arbitration) and CME v. Czech (UNCITRAL arbitration) where the ICSID ad hoc 
committee scrutinized whether the tribunal had not applied the governing law to the 
questions which were necessary for its determination,383 while the Svea Court of Appeal, 
conversely, refused to examine whether the tribunal had applied the governing law to the 
right questions but just verified whether any of the laws listed in the 1991 Netherlands-
Czech and Slovak BIT (including laws that parties agreed on to be applicable and laws that 
the tribunal decided as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono with parties’ explicit 
permission) had been applied to any of the relevant questions.384 In fact, based on the rigid 
inquiry, an ICSID award faces the risk of annulment on the ground of failure to apply the 
proper law under a number of circumstances when a tribunal: (i) fails to apply the proper 
law; (ii) applies a different law other than that agreed by the parties;385 (iii) makes errors 
that are so gross or egregious as substantially to amount to non-application;386 and (iv) 
decides ex aequo et bono without an authorization by the parties.387
 
 
                                                          
383 ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment, 21 March 2007, para 72. 
384 As the Svea Court of Appeal stated, the Court did not believe that the various sections in the arbitral 
award were to be reviewed in order to ascertain which of the sources of law listed in art 8.6 of the Treaty had 
been applied by the arbitral tribunal. In the Court’s opinion, when assessing whether the arbitrators had 
exceeded their mandate, it was sufficient to clarify whether the arbitral tribunal applied any of the sources of 
law listed in the choice of law clause or whether the tribunal had not based its decision on any law at all but, 
rather, judged in accordance with general reasonableness. See Svea Court of Appeal, The Czech Republic v. 
CME Czech Republic B.V., Challenge of Arbitral Award, 15 May 2003, 42 ILM 919, 965 (2003).  
385 Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No ARB/84/4, 
Decision on Annulment of 22 December 1989, para 5.03. 
386 Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No ARB/02/7, Decision on the Application for the 
Annulment of the Award, 5 June 2007, para 86.  
    A careful distinction must be made between ‘gross or egregious misinterpretation or misapplication of the 
proper law’ and ‘erroneous application of the law’ because a mere error in the application of the proper law, 
even though it leads to incorrect result, does not constitute a ground for annulment. See Amco v. Indonesia, 
ICSID Case No ARB/81/1, Ad hoc Committee Decision on the Application for Annulment of 16 May 1986, 
para 23. 
387 As an exception from the rules of applicable law, tribunals may decide on the basis of equity in 
accordance with art 42(3), but such power of tribunals is restricted to cases where explicit permission by the 
parties is given. A decision ex aequo et bono without parties’ permission accounts to an excess of powers for 
failure to apply the governing law. See Klöckner v. Cameroon, ICSID Case No ARB/81/2, Decision on 
Annulment of 3 May 1985, para 59. 




2.1.2 Failure to State Reasons 
 
The other ground for annulment provided under the ICSID Convention that applicants 
frequently contend is the argument that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it 
is based.388 Failure to state reasons seems not to be, of necessity, a scarce ground for 
setting aside non-ICSID awards since major non-ICSID arbitration rules normally contain 
an obligation of tribunals to state reasons which is, however, subject to parties’ otherwise 
statement.389 Be that as it may, the UNCITRAL Model Law does not include the failure to 
state reasons as a ground for setting aside awards.390 This might be partially relevant to the 
longstanding amiable composition and ex aequo et bono in non-ICSID arbitration, which 
either confer authorities on tribunals to determine the case at hand on the basis of what 
they consider to be fair and equitable or provide that arbitrators act as amiable 
compositeurs. In practice, the failure to state reasons in a decision rendered by the French 
Cour de Cassation was not in itself contrary to the French understanding of international 
public policy.391 In Italy, the Court of Appeal of Florence rejected the contention of the 
defendant that the lack of reasons in the arbitral award violated the Italian public order 
since a violation should be determined on the basis of the decision rather than the 
reasoning of the award.392 The Court further recalled that the reasoning was not required 
for an award under Anglo-Saxon and U.S. law.393 In general, national courts in many 
jurisdictions, taking Belgium, Canada, England, Switzerland and U.S. as examples, would 
reject a request for setting aside an arbitral award on the ground of failure to state reasons, 
or take a particularly restrictive approach.394
 
 In fact, applicants seldom rely on the ground 
of failure to state reasons when seeking the setting aside of awards in non-ICSD treaty-
based arbitration. 
                                                          
388 The basis of this ground rests in art 48(3) of the ICSID Convention, which provides that an award shall 
state the reasons upon which it is based. 
389 For example, art 34(3) of the UNCITRAL Rules, art 31(2) of the ICC Arbitration Rules and art 36(1) of 
the SCC Rules.  
390 Art 34(2)(iii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
391 Yas Banifatemi, ‘Defending Investment Treaty Awards: Is There an ICSID Advantage?’ in Albert Jan van 
den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference, 322. 
392 Italy No 29, Bobbie Brooks Inc. v. Lanificio Walter Banci s.a.s., Corte Di Appello Di Firenze, 8 October 
1977, IV YB Com Arb 289, 291 (1979). 
393 Ibid. 
394 Gaëtan Verhoosel, ‘Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID or Not to ICSID’, 
302. 




Failure to state reasons, however, is invoked in nearly every application for annulment, and 
it is, as shown in Figure VIII, a common ground on which ad hoc committees rely to annul 
arbitral awards, despite the facts that ad hoc committees routinely remain cautious in 
applying this ground to the annulment and that they would not annul an award tainted by a 
lack of reason supporting the tribunal’s conclusion so long as the reason can be 
reconstructed or explained by the committee itself.395 This is because, unlike the other 
grounds provided under the ICSID Convention, limiting terms such as ‘properly’, 
‘manifestly’, ‘serious’ and ‘fundamental’ are absent in this ground. As a consequence, the 
criteria of interpretation of ‘a statement of reasons’ are highly subjective. At least three 
different levels of review can be identified in ICSID annulment practice. First, several ad 
hoc committees restrict their powers to the investigation of the absence of reasons (for a 
particular aspect of the award). For example, the ad hoc committee in Klöckner I upheld 
the claimant’s request by determining that the tribunal had imposed an obligation of result 
upon the claimant but it was not possible to discern how and why the tribunal had reached 
such decision.396 Under the standard, the power of the committee under article 52 is to 
scrutinize whether there is a failure to state any reason rather than a failure to state correct 
or convincing reasons.397 It is also noteworthy that though the requirement for addressing 
every question398 is not explicitly enumerated in article 52, ad hoc committees accept the 
possibility of failure to address every question being considered as a ground of failure to 
state reasons. To be precise, failure to deal with a question does not ipso facto amount to a 
failure to state reasons, but it does on condition that it is not the cases of inadvertent 




Second, a number of ad hoc committees extend their understanding of stated reasons to 
consistent reasons; in other words, contradiction of reasons constitutes a failure to state 
reasons since two genuinely contradictory reasons cancel each other out.400
                                                          
395 Wena Hotels Limited v. Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/98/4, Decision on Application for Annulment, 5 
February 2002, para 83. 
 The award in 
396 Klöckner v. Cameroon, ICSID Case No ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment of 3 May 1985, para 141. 
397 Vivendi v. Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment of 3 July 2002, para 64.   
398 Under art 48(3) of the ICSID Convention, an award shall not only state reasons but also deal with every 
question submitted to the tribunal. 
399 Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 1013-14. 
400 Klöckner v. Cameroon, ICSID Case No ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment of 3 May 1985, para 116. 




Amco I, for instance, included a load in calculating the ‘investment’ the investor had made, 
but it had previously recognized that load funds were excluding from the ‘investment’. 
Therefore, the ad hoc committee determined that the tribunal had contradicted itself and 
failed to state reasons for its method of calculation.401 According to this approach, what an 
ad hoc committee should look at is the coherence of the reasons;402
 
 in particular, an ad hoc 
committee is supposed to examine whether reasons follow a logical sequence in which the 
tribunal’s final conclusions are expected to infer in a manner consistent with the premises. 
Third, the inquiry of ad hoc committees is occasionally extended into a determination of 
the adequacy or persuasiveness of reasons. This approach is taken by the ad hoc committee 
in Klöckner I, which had developed a standard that reasons should be ‘sufficiently relevant’ 
or ‘reasonably sustainable and capable of providing a basis for the decision’.403 The terms 
‘inadequate’ and ‘insufficient’ employed by ad hoc committees in determining whether a 
tribunal’ reasoning is without some substance are somewhat elusive and subjective, which 
entail a high risk of awards being annulled. Accordingly, the emphasis on the quality and 
correctness rather than the existence and pertinence of the reasons under this approach has 
been widely criticized for wrongly basing annulment on excess of powers.404
 
 
2.2 Substantive Grounds 
 
2.2.1 Review on the Merits 
 
The term ‘manifestly’, ‘serious’ and ‘fundamental’ adopted in the ICSID Convention are 
theoretically subjective, and it appears that several grounds405 even permit, de facto, a 
certain degree of review of the merits on a few questions such as the tribunals’ 
determination of jurisdiction and application of the proper law.406
                                                          
401 Amco v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No ARB/81/1, Ad hoc Committee Decision on the Application for 
Annulment of 16 May 1986, para 97. 
 However, article 52 
restricts such review on the merits to the situation in which an excess of powers is manifest 
402 CDC Group v. Seychelles, ICSID Case No ARB/02/14, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the 
Application for Annulment, 29 June 2005, para 70. 
403 Klöckner v. Cameroon, ICSID Case No ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment of 3 May 1985, paras 119-20. 
404 CDC Group v. Seychelles, ICSID Case No ARB/02/14, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the 
Application for Annulment, 29 June 2005, para 66. 
405 For example, the ground of manifest excess of power. 
406 Yas Banifatemi, ‘Defending Investment Treaty Awards: Is There an ICSID Advantage?’, 324-25. 




and ad hoc committees should have a self-restraint attitude towards such review. 407  
Despite the ICSID Convention’s travaux préparatoires which did not offer a justification 
for an expansive interpretation of article 52(1),408 extensive interpretation of the grounds 
for annulment, at least in the cases of failure to apply the proper law and serious departure 
from a fundamental rule of procedure, is not rare in practice since hyperactive ad hoc 
committees typically have a wide perception of their functions.409 Based on the extensive 
approach, a number of ad hoc committees engage in greater substantive review of awards 
than that permitted under the ICSID Convention. The first generation of annulment 
decisions actually reviewed arbitral awards in a manner approaching appeal, and such 
unauthorized appellate review was resurrected in the ‘second viral phase’410 of annulment 
decisions in Enron v. Argentine,411 Sempra v. Argentine412 and Fraport v. Philippines413 
where the ad hoc committees seemed unable to defy the temptation of excessive annulment. 
Some commentators even inquire into whether the contemporary annulment of ICSID 
arbitral awards is back to the first generation.414
 
 
The recent annulment decisions have not only revealed jurisprudence suffused with 
inconsistency, but also indicated that ad hoc committees readily tend to exceed their 
competence. Accordingly, scholars have presented the argument that ICSID annulment 
mechanism has to adjust itself to the growing judicialization of ICSID arbitral tribunals, 
and thus the establishment of a mechanism with official powers of substantive review is 
needed.415
                                                          
407 Ibid 
 Nevertheless, such proposal seems less attractive since the matter directs not 
only to the objective of the ICSID annulment proceedings but also to the legitimacy of the 
ICSID arbitration. In the first place, the innovative annulment proceedings created under 
408 Paul Friedland and Paul Brumpton, ‘Rabid Redux: The Second Wave of abusive ICSID Annulments’ 
(2012) 27(4) Am U Intl L Rev 727, 731-34. 
409 On occasion, ad hoc committees even ex officio searched for additional reasons for annulment that had not 
been raised by the applicants. See Christoph Schreuer, ‘From ICSID Annulment to Appeal Half Way Down 
the Slippery Slope’, 215-25. 
410 Paul Friedland and Paul Brumpton, Rabid Redux: The Second Wave of abusive ICSID Annulments, 730. 
411 ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment, 30 July 2010. 
412 ICSID Case No ARB/02/16, Decision on Annulment, 29 January 2010. 
413 ICSID Case No ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment, 23 December 2010. 
414 Antonio Crivellaro, ‘Annulment of ICSID Awards: Back to the “First Generation”?’ in Laurent Levy & 
Yves Derains (eds), Liber Amicorum en L’honneur de Serge Lazareff (Pedone, 2011) 145-75. 
415 Dohyun Kim, ‘The Annulment Committee’s Role in Multiplying Inconsistency in ICSID Arbitration: The 
Need to Move Away from an Annulment-based System’ (2011) 86 NYU L Rev 242. 




the ICSID Convention are meant to be used as a limited and extraordinary remedy.416 The 
limited nature of the post-award remedy of annulment has an indication that annulment is 
not a remedy against an incorrect decision, and consequently ad hoc committees may not, 
in effect, reverse an award on the merits.417 Considering that annulment is limited, and in 
that sense extraordinary, article 52(1) should be interpreted rigorously in accordance with 
its object and purpose, which excludes perceptibly extending the review on the merits.418
 
  
In the second place, although the alleged backlash against the regime governing 
international investment disputes can be attributable, partially but poignantly, to the current 
ICSID annulment mechanism for its insufficiency in resolving the issues of conflicting 
awards,419 it has to reiterate that the purpose of the annulment has also been interpreted as 
the control of the essential integrity of the ICSID arbitral process in all its facets.420 The 
debate leads to a more crucial and fundamental issue as to whether the desire for the 
accuracy of awards is sufficient to compromise the finality of award. As the primary virtue 
of appeal, the greater substantive accuracy fosters the uniformity of law that accrues to the 
investment community in one respect, but also has the potential to lead to further 
undesirability and enormous hurdles in more important respects such as an significant 
change of the ICSID Convention, in particular given the fact that both States and investors 
have not been subject to inaccurate awards to the extent that they yearn for compromising 
the ICSID’s underlying principal of finality in return for the potential accuracy.421 In fact, 
the first generation of ICSID annulment decisions in which the ad hoc committees 
reviewed decisions in a manner approaching appeal has been described as a ‘breakdown of 
the control mechanism in ICSID arbitration’, though a breakdown in legal control does not 
necessarily amount to calamity or systematically dysfunction.422
                                                          
416 Aron Broches, ‘On the Finality of Awards: A Reply to Michael Reisman’ (1993) 8(1) ICSID Rev-Foreign 
Investment LJ 92, 102. 
 While the legitimacy of 
the ICSID arbitration is somehow affected by the current annulment practice, the influence 
417 MINE v. Guinea, ICSID Case No ARB/84/4, Decision on Annulment of 22 December 1989, para 4.04. 
418 Ibid, para 4.05. 
419 Christina Knahr, ‘Annulment and Its Role in the Context of Conflicting Awards’ in Michael Waibel, et al, 
(eds), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration, 163. 
420 Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No ARB/02/7, Decision on the Application for the 
Annulment of the Award, 5 June 2007, para 23. 
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is not only limited to a few cases as compared to the large caseload of ICSID arbitration 
but also relatively inconsequential to challenge the ICSID arbitration as a whole. Besides, 
appellate review of awards is not yet powerful enough to shore up the legitimacy of 
international investment regime. As elucidated previously, at the present time there are no 
compelling reasons to introduce an appeal facility under the ICSID arbitration framework. 
Instead, an excessive annulment with appellate review of awards will, in turn, irreversibly 




Therefore, annulment proceedings are not supposed to be conducted to the detriment of the 
finality, stability and integrity of the awards rendered by arbitral tribunals, and ad hoc 
committees should be conscious of potential risk of acting like a court of appeal. Otherwise, 
the objective of the annulment will be undermined if the ad hoc committees exceed their 
competence to review awards on the merits (except for a few extremely limited reviews on 
the merits of awards as mentioned above). When making observations on such substantive 
questions, ad hoc committees ought to exert their powers prudently and make a distinction 
between annulment and appeal. All told, review on the merits in ICSID arbitration is, in 
general terms, unacceptable under the Convention and undesirable in practice. 
 
By comparison, though a significant number of jurisdictions adopt the limited and 
exclusive grounds of recourse laid down in the UNCITRAL Model Law, there are also 
numerous jurisdictions permitting international arbitral awards to be set aside on grounds 
that are broader than those set forth in UNCITRAL Model Law, in which judicial review 
on the merits of arbitral awards may be legitimate. Review on the merits occurs in two 
circumstances where the intervention of national courts includes a limited right of appeal. 
In the first circumstance, the mistake of law can be a ground for setting aside arbitral 
awards. The English Arbitration Act explicitly provides that disputing parties to arbitral 
proceedings in a few categories of cases can appeal to the court on substantive errors of 
law.424
                                                          
423 David D. Caron, ‘Reputation and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction 
Between Annulment and Appeal’, 53. 
 The U.S. Federal Arbitration Act (hereinafter ‘FAA’) does not expressly enumerate 
review on the basis of mistake of law, but national courts have followed the dictum in 
424 S 69 of the English Arbitration Act (1996). 




Wilko v. Swan that a ‘manifest disregard of law’ is justified to set aside arbitral awards. 425 
The second circumstance in which arbitral awards would be subject to appellate review 
rests on the existence of a mistake of fact. In LaPine v. Kyocera, the Court of Appeals 
allowed judicial review because the contract permitted judicial scrutiny of award when 
parties agreed that review would be for errors of fact or law.426 In addition, a number of 
jurisdictions have provided a variety of grounds for substantive review of arbitral awards 
on the merits. For instance, Chinese national courts may set aside arbitral awards if the 
court concluded that the evidence that was sufficient to affect the impartiality of the award 




One school of thought asserts that judicial review on the merits is conducive to the 
development of substantive legal principles. 428  In the light of the public aspect of 
investment arbitration, an appellate review, arguably, provides justification for adjudicators 
to take part in the arbitration of public values.429 As far as the safeguarding of the integrity 
of the arbitral process is concerned, the existence of substantive review on the merits hangs 
over international arbitration like a sword of Damocles430 in view of the fact that limited 
judicial review on the merits is a bulwark that cannot be ignored against the abuses of 
arbitral authority, and thus it is, if properly cabined, desirable to safeguard against arbitrary 
or unjust awards. Such observation, however, has been criticized by scholars who maintain 
that review of awards on the merits is unnecessary.431
                                                          
425 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (U.S. S.Ct. 1953). See Michael H. LeRoy, ‘Are Arbitrators above the Law? 
The “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard’ (2011) 52 BC L Rev 137, 140. 
 Notwithstanding a variety of statutes 
and practice allowing review on the merits of awards, the vast majority of jurisdictions 
exercise relatively minimal control over arbitral awards and seldom provide for vacatur 
426 LaPine v. Kyocera, 139 F. 3d 884 (9th Cir., 1997). See Eric van Ginkel, ‘“Expanded” Judicial Review 
Revisited: Kyocera Overturns LaPine’ (2003) 4 Pepp Disp Resol L J 47. 
427 Art 58(5) of Chinese Arbitration Act(1994) and art 20 of the Judicial interpretation of Chinese Arbitration 
Act. 
428 The assumption behind such review is that court cases create precedents that provide guidance on business 
conduct. See William W. Park, ‘Why Courts Review Arbitral Awards’ in Briner Robert Georg, et al (eds), 
Liber Amicorum Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel (Carl Heymann, 2001) 602. 
429 Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 1114-23. 
430 William W. Park, ‘The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform’ (2003) 36 
Vand J Transnatl L 1241, 1253. 
431 See, eg, Stephan Wilske, Nigel Mackay, ‘The Myth of the ‘Manifest Disregard of the Law’ Doctrine: Is 
this Challenge to the Finality of Arbitral Awards Confined to U.S. Domestic Arbitrations or Should 
International Arbitration Practitioners be Concerned?’ (2006) 24(2) ASA Bulletin 216. 




grounds based on substantive review on the merits of awards. Even if arbitral awards are 
not entirely free from judicial review on the merits or appeal in some jurisdictions, national 
courts in these jurisdictions, by and large, take a restrictive view on challenging arbitral 
awards on the basis of substantive grounds. In England, for permission to appeal on a point 
of law to be upheld by national courts will need to meet a number of requirements which 
include (i) there is a consensual agreement by all parties; (ii) the tribunal’s determination 
on the question of law will substantially affect the right of parties; and (iii) the tribunal’s 
decision on the question is obviously wrong or the question is of general public importance 
and the decision is at least open to serious doubt.432 These requirements indicated that the 
right of appeal is extremely limited and would be only granted in exceptional 
circumstances. The application of the manifest disregard of law as a ground for setting 
aside awards in the U.S. is more complicated. The review standard was critically doubted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street Associates LLC v. Mattel where the Court held 
that the statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA were exclusive.433 In practice, the 
ground for setting aside awards on the basis of the manifest disregard of law is rarely 
requested by applicants and much less seldom successful.434
 
 Overall, as there may remain 
a rationale for substantive review of non-ICSID awards on the merits by national courts, it 
is, at any rate, imperative that the scope of substantive review be restricted.  
2.2.2 Public Policy 
 
While public policy (or ‘ordre public’) consideration is not enumerated under the ICSID 
Convention as a ground for annulment, public policy, which would include but not be 
restricted to peremptory rules of international law such as prohibition of slavery, piracy, 
drug trade, terrorism, genocide and the protection of basic human right, can be invoked in 
the form of a general failure to apply international law which amounts to an excess of 
powers.435 Nonetheless, in practice it is much far-fetched that international public policy 
will be applied to an investment contract.436
                                                          
432 S 69(2), (3) of the English Arbitration Act. 
  
433 Hall Street Assoc., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1396 (U.S. S.Ct. 2008). 
434 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2639. 
435 Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 975-76. 
436 One exception is that the ICSID tribunal in World Duty Free v. Kenya based its decision partially on 
international public policy, stating that bribery was contrary to the international public policy in most States 
and thus claims based on contracts of corruption or obtained by corruption could not be upheld. See ICSID 
Case No ARB/00/7, Award, 4 October 2006, para 157. 





In contrast, public policy is a standard ground for setting aside non-ICSID arbitral awards 
in most jurisdictions. The UNCITRAL Model Law also provides that an award may be set 
aside if the court ex officio finds that the award is in conflict with the public policy of the 
State involved. 437 More importantly, the concept of ‘public policy’ in the non-ICSID 
arbitration context underlines, in general terms, the national values or the basic tenets 
under national laws. It is acknowledged that public policy in vacatur of arbitral awards not 
only originated from, but is also associated with, the application of public policy under 
(other areas of) private international law.438 Based on private international law, though the 
concept of public policy can be diverse under different national statutes, the trend has been 
towards emerging a convergence of a similar understanding of application of public policy 
to international disputes in most developed arbitral jurisdictions. 439 The terms ‘public 
policy’ in the UNCITRAL Model Law context are not equivalent to the political stance or 
international policies of a State; instead, it comprises the fundamental notions of law and 
justice in both procedural and substantive respects which, taking corruption, bribery or 




In practice, the application of public policy in vacatur actions is, consistent with its main 
function as ‘escape device’ under private international law, exercised in limited and 
exceptional cases. In Parsons & Whittemore Overseas v. RAKTA, a U.S. corporation 
received an unfavourable ICC arbitral award due to its failure to complete a project in 
Egypt as a result of the U.S. government’s actions against Egypt during the Six Day War, 
and sought relief on the ground of public policy. The Second Circuit held that the fact that 
U.S. policy supported the U.S. company’ position was insufficient to annul the award, and 
further stated that in case of refusal of enforcement of awards, public policy could only be 
                                                          
437 Art 34(2)(b)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
438 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2621. 
439 For example, the degree of connection or proximity between the State and the dispute is one of the limits 
on the application of public policy to international dispute; in other words, the strength of a public policy 
consideration must be directly proportional to the intensity of the link which connects the facts of the case 
with the State (see Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism 
and Subsidiarity in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (CUP, 2009) 258-59). In the 
international arbitration context, most developed jurisdictions adopt similar conceptions of public policy 
(Nigel Blackaby, et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 591). 
440 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Eighteenth 
Session, Vienna, 3-21 June 1985, A/40/17, paras 296-97. 




invoked in the case of the violation of a State’s most basic notions of morality and 
justice.441 In the same vein, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice declined a request for 
setting aside an award rendered under the NAFTA and ICSID Additional Facility Rules by 
determining that an award worthy of judicial interference on the ground of public policy 
should ‘fundamentally offend the most basic and explicit principles of justice and fairness 
in Ontario, or evidence intolerable ignorance or corruption on the part of the arbitral 
tribunal’. 442 In France, public policy as a basis for setting aside international arbitral 
awards is limited practically to exceptional cases involving mandatory investment 
regulations, insolvency proceedings and bribery. 443 Ordinarily, as noted in Schreter v. 
Gasmac Inc. that the ubiquitous resort to public policy as a justification for relief could 
malign the integrity of arbitration,444 national courts constantly take particularly restrictive 
view on challenging arbitral awards based on public policy, and the public policy 
arguments in vacatur actions are rarely successful.445
 
 
Notwithstanding the restriction, the risks that a non-ICSID arbitral award is set aside on the 
ground of public policy remain, in particular taking into account the following factors. 
First, despite the convergence of legislation in developed jurisdictions, the nebulous nature 
of the concept of public policy makes it possible that public policy is inappropriately and 
occasionally used since national courts in a State may set aside an arbitral award which is 
valid in terms of public policy in other States. Second, it is intriguing that national courts in 
France may set aside an arbitral award if it is contrary to ‘public policy’ in accordance with 
the 2011 French Decree reforming the law governing arbitration,446
                                                          
441 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Générale de L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 
969 (2d Cir., 1974). 
 as compared to the 
terms ‘international public policy’ (rather than domestic or local public policy) adopted in 
442 United Mexican States v. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa, Decision on the Application to Set Aside Award, 
Oct. 27, 2003, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Court File No 03-CV-23500, para 80. The decision was 
upheld by the Court of Appeal for Ontario. See Decision on appeal from the judgment of Justice W. Dan 
Chilcott of the Superior Court of Justice, 11 January 2005. 
443 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2627. 
444 United Mexican States v. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa, Decision on the Application to Set Aside Award, 
Oct. 27, 2003, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Court File No 03-CV-23500, para 117. 
445 For example, the Indonesian State-owned oil corporation lost public policy arguments before the U.S. 
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit in Karaha Bodas Co. (Cayman Islands) v. Perusahaan Pertambangan 
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Indonesia), 364 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2004). 
446 Art 1492(5) of French Code of Civil Procedure, Decree No 2011-48 of 13 January 2011. However, as to 
the ground for refusal of recognition and enforcement, the terms ‘international public policy’ are still retained 
in the new French Code. See arts 1514 and 1520. 




the old French Code of Civil Procedure. 447  It is also noteworthy that the traditional 
viewpoint that public policy should be construed narrowly and merely refers to 
‘international public policy’ in the context of setting aside arbitral awards rests primarily 
on the French law and practice.448 Since the French law has been revised, it is ambiguous 
as to whether the revision would ostensibly disrupt the justification that structures the line 
drawn between ‘international public policy’ and ‘domestic public policy’ in vacatur 
proceedings. Third, a misapplication of mandatory statutes of the arbitral situs may amount 
to, on occasion, a violation of the underlying public policy. In Marketing Displays 
International v. VR where one of the objections of the respondent was based on public 
policy on the ground that the patent, trademark and know-how licence in question was 
contrary to EC antitrust rules since the licence agreement was entered into without being 
notified to the EC Commission under Regulation (EC) 17/62 in force at the time, the 
Hague Court of Appeal determined that the licence was in breach of article 81(1) of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community and thus a national court must set aside the 
arbitral award. As the Court observed, article 81(1) of the EC Treaty was a fundamental 
provision that was essential for the fulfilment of the tasks of the Community for the 
functioning of the internal market.449 Although the judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal 
lends itself to severe criticism under both competition law and arbitration law and has been 
regarded a deplorable step back on the road towards the finality of arbitral awards,450
                                                          
447 Arts 1502(5) and 1504 of French Code of Civil Procedure, Decree No 81-500 of 12 May 1981. 
 it at 
least reflects the relatively tendentious safeguard of underlying public values on the part of 
the sovereign States, and reveals the risk of non-ICSID arbitral awards being set aside on 
the ground of a violation of mandatory rules at the arbitral situs. Last but not least, public 
policy of a foreign State (other than the State of the arbitral situs) has a potential to play a 
role in vacatur process. In fact, an application of foreign public policy is available under 
448 The French courts draw a clear distinction between ‘international public policy’ and ‘domestic public 
policy’, pointing out that no account should be taken of the domestic public policy for the purpose of setting 
aside arbitral awards. See Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration, 954; Yas Banifatemi, ‘Defending Investment Treaty Awards: Is There 
an ICSID Advantage?’, 325. 
449 Netherlands No 29, Marketing Displays International Inc. (US) v. VR Van Raalte Reclame B.V. 
(Netherlands), Gerechtshof [Court of Appeal], The Hague, Not Indicated, 24 March 2005, XXXI YB Com 
Arb 808, 815-16 (2006). 
450 Alexis Mourre and Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, ‘Towards Finality of Arbitral Awards: Two Steps 
Forward and One Step Back’ (2006) 23(2) J Intl Arb 171, 181-85. 




private international law in numerous jurisdictions. 451
 
 Accordingly, if domestic public 
policy demands giving effect to public policy of a foreign State in accordance with rules of 
choice of law, national courts can give effect in vacatur actions to that foreign public 
policy. 
On balance, ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration employ, in a sense, two discrepant 
approaches with respect to the grounds for annulment or setting aside awards and the 
standards applied in specific cases. However, different paths lead to the same destination. 
It appears impractical to conclude that one approach necessarily brings about a higher 
likelihood of annulment or vacatur. Therefore, the evaluation of the two approaches lays 
more emphasis on illustrating the risks that prospective parties would face in the 
annulment proceedings. In terms of risks, considering that national courts normally display 
great deference to international arbitral awards,452 in particular those dealt with investment 
disputes between investors and States, the standards of review applied by ICSID ad hoc 
committees seem to indicate, to some extent, a higher risk that an award would be annulled 
than a non-ICSID award would be set aside.453 In fact, the concerns regarding the danger 
that ad hoc committees might be tempted to exceed the role vested in them by the ICSID 
Convention have been expressed since the first generation of annulment decision.454 A 
survey conducted in 2010 also shows that the majority of international arbitration experts 
generally have negative views on the ICSID annulment proceedings for the reason that the 
proceedings are unpredictable and go too far into the merits of the cases, and they prefer 
UNCITRAL arbitration rather than ICSID arbitration.455
                                                          
451 For example, art 187(2) of the 1971 U.S. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws stipulates that the law 
of the State chosen by the parties will be applied unless ‘application of the law of the chosen State would be 
contrary to a fundamental policy of a State which has a materially greater interest than the chosen State in the 
determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the State of the applicable 
law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties’. This provision is similar to art 7(1) (regarding 
the mandatory rules) of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 
 Although substantive review of 
452 For example, in a recent case the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued on 7 January 2014 a 
non-precedential summary order in Ometto v. ASA Bioenergy Holding A.G., affirming the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York’s denial of a petition to set aside an ICC arbitral award on the grounds 
of the evident partiality of the presiding arbitrator under the FAA. See No 12-4022(L), 13-225(con)-cv (2d 
Cir. Jan. 7, 2014). 
453 Christoph Schreuer, ‘From ICSID Annulment to Appeal Half Way Down the Slippery Slope’, 211. 
454 Georges R. Delaume, ‘The Finality of Arbitration Involving States: Recent Developments’ (1989) 5(1) 
Arb Intl 21, 31. 
455 The questionnaires, which were distributed to 198 international arbitration experts, contained the 
following questions: ‘[I]n advising a future claimant investor, how does the possibility of ICSID annulment 
influence the advice as compared to the possibility of an award being challenged under U.S., French or 




non-ICSID awards is legitimate in many jurisdictions, it appears that it is only the ad hoc 
committees’ substantive review that causes considerable concerns, and such concerns 
would even hold back the growth of ICSID cases. Accordingly, it is advisable that ad hoc 
committees avoid reviewing awards in a manner approaching appeal, which is not only 
crucial but also necessary. 
 
3 The Effect of Annulment 
 
The issue concerning the effect of the annulment of an international arbitral award, which 
is of both significantly theoretical and substantial practical importance, has not yet reached 
a consensus. The matter seems to be less complicated when it comes to ICSID arbitration 
since in the light of the effect of annulment, an award or a part thereof which has been 
annulled by an ad hoc committee becomes a nullity.456 Given that the effect of annulment 
terminates the binding force of the award or the annulled portion of the award, the award 
or the annulled portion is therefore unenforceable under the ICSID Convention. While the 
decision to annul does not replace the original award or substitute the justification stated by 
the tribunal, either or both disputing parties can resubmit the dispute to a new tribunal in 
accordance with article 52(6) of the Convection. Although some practical concerns may 
arise regarding the resubmission,457
 
 the relief provided under the ICSID Convention in 
case of annulment seems to be evident and concise. 
A vacated non-ICSID arbitral award ceases, generally and arguably, to have continued 
legal effect, at least in the State where it was set aside. However, the effect of setting aside 
distinguishes itself from that of ICSID annulment in three aspects. First, there is a 
possibility of appealing lodged against the national court’s decision on the application for 
setting aside an award to a higher court.458
                                                                                                                                                                                
English law’. Only a few expert respondents favoured ICSID procedures over domestic procedures: 16 per 
cent as compared to English law and 10 per cent as compared to French or US law. See Markus Burgstaller 
and Charles B. Rosenberg, ‘Challenging International Arbitral Awards: To ICSID or not to ICSID?’ (2011) 
27(1) Arb Intl 91, 94-55. 
 Second, national courts can remand the case to 
the arbitral tribunal for reconsideration, provided that the serious irregularity has 
456 The ICSID Secretariat, ‘Background Paper on Annulment: For the Administrative Council of ICSID’, 469. 
457 For example, disputing parties may not introduce new claims when resubmitting the dispute to a new 
tribunal, and the change of the parties such as State succession, alteration of corporate structure, assignment 
of rights or a dissolution of a corporate investor may cause problems since the resubmitted dispute must be 
brought by the parties in the original proceedings. 
458 For example, s 16(a)(1)(E) of the Federal Arbitration Act. 




substantially affected the tribunal, the proceedings or the award.459 Last, but perhaps most 
important, recent decades have seen an increasing number of non-ICSID arbitral awards 
that have been set aside by national courts at the seat of arbitration being enforced in other 
jurisdictions. The underlying principle of such case law is based on the proposition that 
international arbitration is entirely detached from any legal system; in other words, 
international arbitration may ‘create obligations even if no such effect is recognized by lex 
fori’. 460 To be more specific, given that the legal force of international arbitration is 
founded on the parties’ creation of a contractual institution, the effect of the arbitral 
proceedings may be left to be controlled by any legal system that is requested to recognize 
the award.461 In practice since arbitral situs is determined for little more than the sake of 
neutrality and convenience, the effect of arbitration derives from the legal orders that 
recognize the validity of the arbitration agreement and the award rather than the arbitral 
situs, and thus national courts at the arbitral situs have little bearing on the effect of the 
award. Accordingly, as stated in Bargues Agro Indudstrie by the Paris Court of appeal, the 
rationale for such case law is that an award ‘is not integrated into the legal order [of the 
State of the seat] with the consequence that its possible setting aside by the courts of the 
seat does not affect its existence by precluding its recognition and enforcement in other 
national legal orders.’ 462  The Court of Cassation provides a reinforced theoretical 
foundation in Putrabali by enunciating that ‘[an] international award, which is not 
anchored in any national legal order, is a decision of international justice whose validity 
must be ascertained with regard to the rules applicable in the country where its recognition 
and enforcement are sought.’463
 
 
The justification for the enforcement of vacated awards also rests on international 
conventions. Though the New York Convention is silent on the effect of awards set aside 
by national courts, article V(1) provides that enforcement ‘may be refused’ where the 
language is permissive and not mandatory since it is the diction of ‘may’ rather than ‘must’ 
                                                          
459 For example, s 68(3) of the English Arbitration Act. 
460 Jan Paulsson, ‘Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of its Country of Origin (1981) 30 
Intl & Camp L Q 358, 363. 
461 Ibid, 367. 
462 Emmanuel Gaillard, Legal Theory of International Arbitration, 139. 
463 Ibid 




or ‘shall’ that is adopted,464 thereby indicating that the article can be interpreted in such a 
way that the enforcement court has residual discretionary authority to enforce a vacated 
award. 465 Furthermore, under article VII(1) which is commonly known as the ‘more-
favourable-right provision’, the New York Convention acknowledges explicitly that if 
another national law or multilateral or bilateral agreement has a more favourable regime 
for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards than the Convention itself, any party can 
invoke that regime to take advantage of the more favourable law or treaty. Besides the 
New York Convention, the European Convention goes a step further, under which if an 
award is set aside outside the grounds set forth in article IX(1)(a) to (d) of the Convention, 
taking grounds of a substantive review on the merits or public policy for examples, a 
foreign court of enforcement may not take into account the fact that the award has been set 
aside at the seat of arbitration.466
 
  
In addition to the justification in international conventions, scholars also provide a variety 
of theories supporting the enforcement despite the fact that the award was set aside at the 
arbitral situs.467
                                                          
464 It is noteworthy that Pieter Sanders who engaged in drafting the New York Convention stated that even 
the extremely liberal and internationally minded previous draft of the Convention stipulated ‘shall be refused’ 
(see ICC’s Report and Preliminary Draft Convention (1953), art IV, 9 ICC Intl Ct Arb Bulletin 35). The 
initiative to replace the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses and the 1927 Geneva Convention on 
the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards came from the ICC which issued a preliminary draft ‘the Report 
and Preliminary Draft Convention’ that was adopted by the Committee on International Commercial 
Arbitration in 1953 and eventually provided the basis for the New York Convention.  
 In contrast, a number of scholars have expressed their cautious academic 
    In addition, the French text of art V(1) of the New York Convention adopts the terms ‘seront 
refusées’(shall be refused) which is mandatory. However, even in the French version, the objective of the 
Convention is to limit the conditions under which awards can be refused to enforce, while national laws 
remain entitled to take a more liberal stance in accordance with art VII (see Jan Paulsson, ‘May or Must 
under the New York Convention: An Exercise in Syntax and Linguistics (1998) 14(2) Arb Intl 227; 
Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial 
Arbitration, 983-40). 
465 Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Annulled in Russia - Case Comment on Court 
of Appeal of Amsterdam, April 28, 2009’ (2010) 27(2) J Intl Arb 179, 186. 
466 Art IX(1) of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. 
467 Paulson proposed that the annulment of an award by a national court in the State where it was rendered 
should not be a bar to enforcement if the grounds for vacatur were under a local standard, and the local 
standard annulment was a decision consistent with the substantive provisions of the first four paragraphs of 
art V(1) of the New York Convention and art (1)(a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (see Jan Paulsson, 
‘Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment (LSA)’ (1998) 9 ICC Intl Ct Arb 
Bulletin 14). However, Park maintained that enforcement of vacated awards should depend not on the nature 
of the vacatur standard, but on whether the vacatur was made in good faith and comported with fundamental 
notions of justice (see William W. Park, ‘Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration’ (1999) 93 Am J 
Intl L 805). Drahozal took an economic approach to the question under which the default rule was that 




commentaries on the practice favouring the enforcement of vacated awards.468 In practice, 
there are also two divergent approaches regarding the treatment of a vacated award. The 
first approach endorsing the enforcement of arbitral awards that were set aside by national 
courts at the arbitral situs under some circumstances is dominant in many civil law States. 
This view is illustrated by a number of well-known cases emanating from the French 
courts.469 Remarkably, in June 2012 the Tribunal de Grande Instance in Paris court issued 
an order recognizing the award rendered by the International Commercial Arbitration 
Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation (hereinafter 
‘ICAC’) in favour of Nikolai Maximov for approximate U.S. $300 million against 
Novolipetsk Steel Mill (NLMK). Though the award was set aside by the Moscow 
Arbitrazh Court whose judgement was subsequently upheld by the Federal Arbitrazh Court 
of the Moscow District and the Supreme Arbitrazh Court on the ground of non-
arbitrability470, the Tribunal de Grande Instance in Paris determined that the ICAC award 
set aside by the Russian courts was insufficient to prevent its recognition in France, and 
further concluded that the award was valid since it had been procured in line with parties’ 
agreed contractual method and thus should be recognized and enforced. 471
                                                                                                                                                                                
vacated awards were not enforceable with possible exception of decisions of the court of vacatur procured in 
bad faith. In the exceptional case, parties should be permitted to resolve the issue by contract (see 
Christopher R. Drahozal, ‘Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration Awards: An Economic Approach’ 
(2000) 11 Am Rev Intl Arb 451).  
 The 
enforcement of vacated awards has also again been thrust into the limelight in the 
468 For example, by conceding that the New York Convention allowed an enforcing jurisdiction to disregard 
an annulment decision at the seat of arbitration, Reisman asserted that the New York Convention contained 
an implicit understanding that the arbitral situs would monitor the procedural integrity of arbitration, in 
exchange for which other States would recognize awards that passed muster where rendered. Therefore, to 
enforce annulled awards would violate an implicit allocation of national court authority (see W. Michael 
Reisman, Systems of Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration: Breakdown and Repair (Duke 
University Press, 1992) 113-120). van den Berg had expressed that the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam’s 
reasoning of its decision on enforcement of  four awards annulled by Russian courts was at odds with the 
New York Convention (see Albert Jan van den Berg, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Annulled in Russia - 
Case Comment on Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, April 28, 2009). 
469 See, eg, (i) Société Berardi v. Société Clair (1980); (ii) Société Pabalk Trcaret v. Société Norsolor (1984); 
(iii) Société Polish Ocean Line v. Société Jolasry (1993); (iv) Société Hilmarton Ltd. v. Société OTV (1994); 
(v) S.A. Lesbats et Fils v. Esterer WD GmbH (Dr. Volker Grub) (2007); (vi) Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia 
v. Société Rena Holding (2007). 
470 Disputes arising out of the parties’ agreement aimed at the transfer of shares could not be resolved by 
arbitration since corporate disputes were not arbitrable under the Russian laws. 
471 Mike Mcclure, ‘Enforcement of Arbitral Awards that have been Set Aside at the Seat: The Consistently 
Inconsistent Approach across Europe’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 26 June 2012. 




Netherlands, with two high-profile cases. 472  Even in Russia, which has not been 
traditionally regarded as a pro-arbitration State, 473  the arbitrazh court of the city of 
Kemerovo issued a ground-breaking decision in 2011 by recognizing, based on article IX(2) 
of the European Convention, an ICC award in Ciments Français v. Sibirskiy which was set 
aside by a Turkish court.474
 
 
In common law States, the U.S. court in Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp. v. Arab Republic 
of Egypt enforced an arbitral award that was set aside by an Egyptian court on the ground 
that Egyptian law had been misapplied. The analysis of the U.S. court is well-structured, 
based on articles V(1)(e) and VII of the New York Convention and the FAA which has 
been interpreted as establishing a compelling national policy favouring the enforcement of 
international arbitration agreements and awards. 475  The reasoning in Chromalloy has 
frequently been acknowledged in subsequent decisions. 476  However, there are also a 
number of courts that take another approach and refuse to recognize a vacated award.477 
The approach of the U.S. courts is still evolving; 478
                                                          
472 One is the case of Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co. in which the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
held that the fact that a Russian court had set aside a Russian arbitral award on the ground of lack of 
independence of Russian judiciary was not sufficient to refuse enforcement in the Netherlands (see Yukos 
Capital SARL v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Co., Court of Appeal, Amsterdam, 28 April 2009, case No LJN: BI2451). 
Despite the decision of Amsterdam Court of Appeal, Yukos did not obtain payment and then in 2010 further 
initiated actions before the English High Court, seeking to enforce the awards under common law and the 
New York Convention.  
 as a whole, it is apparently less 
    The other is the case of Nikolai Maximov v. Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky Kombinat (NLMK), where in 
September 2012 the Amsterdam Court of Appeals rendered an interim judgment enforcement of award set 
aside by Russian courts. The case is identical to the above Yukos case in many respects, but the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeals applied different standards in this case, that were, ‘sufficiently specific indications’ were 
required to apply an exception of enforcement of a vacated award, and under art V(1)(e) of the New York 
Convention even unfair foreign setting aside proceedings might result in refusal of enforcement of the award. 
See Nikolai Viktorovich MAXIMOV v. OJSC Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky Kombinat, Judgment of 
Amsterdam Court of Appeals, Case number 200.100.508/01, 18 September 2012. 
473 It appears that recently the Russian State courts aimed to extend their competence by restricting the scope 
of disputes that could be arbitrable. See Peter J. Pettibone, ‘The Nonarbitrability of Corporate Disputes in 
Russia’ (2013) 29(2) Arb Intl 263. 
474 Arbitrazh Court of Kemerovo Oblast, Ruling on Recognition of a Foreign Arbitral Award, Case No A27-
781/2011, 20 July 2011. 
475 939 F.Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996). 
476 For example, Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 
357, 367 (5th Cir. 2003); Compare Termorio SA v. Electranta SP, 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
477 For example, Baker Marine Ltd v. Chevron Ltd, 191 F.3d 194, 197 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999); Spier v. 
Calzaturificio Tecnica, SpA, 71 F.Supp.2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), reargued, 77 F.Supp.2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
478 Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2687. 




expensive than that of French courts and appears to be inclined towards a more restrictive 
solution.479 Nonetheless, it is also worth noting that in August 2013 a federal district court 
in the Southern District of New York confirmed an ICC award against a Mexican State oil 
corporation, even though the award had been set aside by a Mexican court.480 The latest 
case may signal a nuanced trend in international arbitration in which it is possible to 
enforce vacated awards in U.S., as compared to the arguably evolving restrictive approach. 




The second approach is taken by English courts, which traditionally refuse to enforce a 
vacated arbitral award. In the long-running Yukos case, the England and Wales Court of 
Appeal found that the act of State doctrine did not apply to the appellant’s (a State-owned 
Russian corporation) allegations of impropriety against foreign courts’ decisions, and the 
decision of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal refusing to recognize the decisions made by 
Russian courts on setting aside the award did not create an issue estoppel preventing the 
appellant from resisting enforcement of the awards in England. As to the reasoning of the 
issue estoppel, more thoroughly, the England and Wales Court of Appeal determined that 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal refused to recognize the annulment decisions by Russian 
courts depending on the Dutch public policy grounds, but whether the annulment decisions 
were not to be recognized as contrary to the English public policy would have to be a 
trial.482 The German approach is similar to that of the English courts. The Berlin court 
evidenced that German courts preferred international comity towards annulment decisions 
made by foreign courts to the maintaining the finality of arbitral awards; further, German 
courts basically recognized the precedence of the European Convention (which limited the 
application of article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention in some circumstances) over the 
New York Convention.483
                                                          
479 Emmanuel Gaillard, Legal Theory of International Arbitration, 139. 
 
480 Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L de C.V v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción, 
No 10 Civ. 206 (AKH), 2013 WL 4517225, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2013). 
481 The enforcement of vacated awards is also likely available in Austria, Brunei, Croatia, Denmark, Hong 
Kong, Ireland, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Panama, Poland, Spain, and Turkey, though courts in these 
jurisdictions have yet to consider the issue. See ICC Guide to National Procedures for Recognition and 
Enforcement of Awards under the New York Convention, 2012, 20. 
482 Yukos Capital SARL v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Company, [2012] EWCA Civ 855.  
483 Claudia Alfons, Recognition and Enforcement of Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards (Peter Lang, 2010) 
115. 





To sum up, there is a radical difference between the two approaches on the fate of non-
ICSID arbitral awards that were set aside at the arbitral situs, which translates a 
fundamental divergence of views on the underlying philosophical representation of 
international arbitration.484
 
 Although the vacated awards that have been enforced in other 
jurisdictions are almost international commercial awards between business parties, it is 
notable that some of the respondents in relevant arbitral proceedings are State-owned 
corporations (such as in the Yukos case). Considering that national courts at the arbitral 
situs can take into account public policy of foreign States in certain circumstances, there is 
a possibility that States in the investor-State arbitration context seek to have unfavourable 
awards set aside by virtue of imposing political pressure. In view of this concern, the 
possible enforcement of vacated awards may be in accord with the expectation of investors. 
In addition, the issue also reaffirms the importance of taking great care to select an arbitral 




The post-award remedies in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration are of considerable practical 
importance since they act as the first avenue for disputing parties to remedy possible 
injustice following the making of awards. In particular, if an award was disregarded in 
whole or in part by ad hoc committees or national courts, it or the annulled part will be 
treated as invalid and may be consequently unenforceable. Moreover, post-award remedies 
are directed at the legitimacy of the investor-State arbitration as a whole if the issue of 
annulment or setting aside proceeding deviates from its objective as a remedy against 
injustice.  
 
It is notable that the ICSID annulment and non-ICSID vacatur proceedings are starkly 
divergent: (i) the frameworks of interior ICSID annulment and exterior non-ICSID vacatur 
are disparate; (ii) the grounds for annulling ICSID awards or setting aside non-ICSID 
awards derive from different heritages, which are respectively article 35 of the 
International Law Commission’s 1958 Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure and normally 
article V of the New York Convention; (iii) the two genres of arbitration encompass a 
                                                          
484 Emmanuel Gaillard, Legal Theory of International Arbitration, 139. 




converse effect of vacated awards. However, the evaluation of these divergences has 
revealed that both ICSID annulment and non-ICSID vacatur serve an ultimately similar 
function through two instruments with dissimilar natures, and the disparate natures do not 
necessarily lead to distinct outcomes. This is because the ratio of ICSID awards being 
annulled or of non-ICSID awards being set aside bears less significant distinctions, despite 
the different degree of uncertainty and inconsistency in ICSID and non-ICSID challenging 
proceedings, and the discrepant standards of review applied by ad hoc committees or 
national courts in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration.  
 
More fundamentally, the issue of post-award remedies denotes the tension between the 
finality and justice in investor-State arbitration and presents an essential proposition as to 
how to balance prevailing parties’ concern for finality and the counterparts’ desire for 
procedural safeguards in the annulment and vacatur mechanism, and ensure the 
construction of an efficient instrument for resolution of investment disputes in the 
meantime. Although a golden mean sensibly balancing the finality, accuracy and efficiency 
in post-award remedies proceedings remain mysterious, it can be still expected that in non-
ICSID arbitration disputing parties weigh prudently the potential risks and relevant 
drawbacks entrenched in the seat of arbitration, while States deal with properly the 
ambivalence to the international arbitral autonomy and judicial scrutiny instrument. 
Furthermore, States can explore a more rational and acceptable counterpoise between 
international arbitral autonomy and judicial scrutiny instrument by virtue of, for instance, 
adopting relatively limited grounds for setting aside awards in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and displaying greater deference to the investment arbitration 
awards rendered by international tribunals when it comes to the substantive review on the 
merits. In like manner, the annulment proceedings should be conducted in line with the 
objective of the ICSID Convention under which ICSID ad hoc committees have to be 
conscious of the undesirable consequences of extending their interpretation in ways similar 
to that of a court of appeal, in particular considering that the extensive authorities would 
jeopardize the finality of awards which is, in general terms, at the core of international 
investment arbitration. 
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Chapter IV Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
 
 
As one of the stark discrepancies between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, the 
recognition and enforcement system has considerable impacts on how a variety of 
participants in the arbitral proceedings vindicate their rights and safeguard their legitimate 
interests. To begin with, recognition and enforcement are essential in enhancing the 
fulfilment of disputing parties’ reasonable expectation of a final binding resolution, 
without which a successful party in arbitral proceedings might eventually suffer a Pyrrhic 
victory. Second, though it is indubitable that an award is an ad hoc decision on whether a 
host State is liable or legally responsible for compensation to a particular investor, 
investor-State arbitral awards as a whole are arguably considered to implicate the global 
significance and resonance concerning States’ relevant public and economic policy. At the 
very least, investor-State arbitral awards can be benchmarks in the domestic sphere as they 
provide for guidelines on optimizing the harmonization of national courts’ decisions on 
issues relating to the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention or any other treaty. 
Investor-State arbitral awards consistently display the hallmark of such implication that 
never ceases to influence States’ legal environment, in particular in a further globalized 
world where transnational investment proliferates in regions with diverse and uncertain 
legal systems. In this regard, more emphasis should be placed on the different recognition 
and enforcement regimes and their respective impacts, which should also be in the 
limelight when examining the divergence between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. 
 
1 Distinction in General Framework 
 
1.1 ICSID’s Self-contained System/Non-ICSID Arbitration’s Onerous Process 
 
The self-contained nature of ICSID arbitration entails a thoroughly autonomous system for 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, which imposes a presumptive obligation 
not only on the disputing parties to abide by and comply with the terms of the award,488 but 
also on all contracting States to recognize an award rendered under the ICSID Convention 
and further enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by the award within its territories as 
if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. 489
                                                          
488 Art 53(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
 It has been held that this self-
489 Ibid, art 54(1). 




contained enforcement scheme shelters ICSID arbitral awards from the scrutiny of 
domestic courts or other authorities before which enforcement is sought. Given that 
national courts or other authorities are not empowered to review an ICSID arbitral award 
on both the jurisdiction and the merits, no refusal ground can therefore be invoked by the 
losing party to prevent the enforcement. 
 
By comparison, a presumptive obligation to recognize and enforce non-ICSID arbitral 
awards is specified in different instruments. First, it has been acknowledged that a number 
of international conventions pragmatically take an enormous part in recognition and 
enforcement of the vast majority of non-ICSID arbitral awards in a case where the award 
fails to be complied with voluntary recognition and enforcement. In particular, the New 
York Convention has been the ‘most successful international instrument in the field of 
arbitration’, and can possibly be considered as ‘the most effective instance of international 
legislation in the entire history of commercial law’490 in view of the facts that it represents, 
to a large extent, a quantum leap forward for arbitration on an international plane, and that 
it forms the backbone of international regime for recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards by virtue of imposing a general obligation on contracting States to 
recognize arbitral awards made in foreign countries as binding and enforce them under the 
rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, subject to procedural 
conditions not substantially more onerous than those applied to enforcement of domestic 
arbitral awards. 491  Second, several contemporary regional conventions also treat non-
ICSID arbitral awards as presumptively valid, normally paralleling the Geneva Convention 
and the New York Convention. 492
                                                          
490 Michael John Mustill, ‘Arbitration: History and Background’ (1989) 6 J Intl Arb 43, 49. 
 Third, aside from multilateral convention, the 
presumptive obligation to recognize and enforce non-ICSID arbitral awards is also 
491 Art III of the New York Convention. 
492 For example, the 1961 European Convention was designed primarily to manage disputes arising between 
European States, especially those between West and East Europe (it is worth mentioning that a presumptive 
obligation to recognize and enforce international arbitral awards is not expressly stipulated in the European 
Convention, but it can be implied by the limitations of the Convention upon the grounds on which an arbitral 
award may be set aside); The 1972 Moscow Convention promulgated by the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (hereinafter ‘CMEA’) was originally signed by central and eastern European States; the 1975 
Panama Convention was ratified by South American States and the U.S., as reflected in its name ‘Inter-
American Convention’; and the 1987 Amman Convention made under the aegis of the Arab Centre for 
Commercial Arbitration. In a realm focusing mainly on investment disputes, NAFTA is applied to U.S., 
Canada and Mexico. 




provided in bilateral treaties,493 some of which are recently apt to refer to the New York 
Convention so as not to derogate the uniformity facilitated by the New York Convention. 
Fourth, national arbitration statutes frequently require the recognition and enforcement of 
non-ICSID arbitral awards, merely incorporating the exceptions enumerated in article V of 
the New York Convention by reference, 494  or following articles 35 and 36 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law which provide that international arbitral awards shall be 
recognized and enforced, save where specified exceptions that actually mirror the New 
York Convention apply.495
 
 Overall, the New York Convention can be laid claim to be the 
most essential international instrument with regard to the recognition and enforcement of 
non-ICSID arbitral awards. In addition, although diverse instruments operate in the 
recognition and enforcement of non-ICSID arbitral awards, these different regimes parallel, 
more or less, those in the New York Convention. Accordingly, this chapter concentrates 
primarily on the New York Convention when elucidating the divergence between ICSID 
and non-ICSID as regards the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 
It might be asserted, at first sight, that recognition and enforcement of ICSID arbitral 
awards have a number of practical advantages over that of non-ICSID arbitral awards. In 
fact, as compared to the compliance and enforcement under the ICISD Convention which 
provides a self-contained enforcement mechanism and relatively straightforward processes, 
the recognition and enforcement of non-ICSID arbitral awards suffer, of necessity, from 
more onerous procedures or even substantive review on the merits of awards. First, 
recognition and enforcement are, though intertwined in most circumstances, distinct in the 
non-ICSID arbitration context. On the one hand, recognition of a non-ICSID arbitral award 
does not necessarily guarantee enforcement of the award. Through confirming the award as 
binding or res judicata, recognition is used as a defensive process, acting as a shield496
                                                          
493 Franz Matscher, ‘Experience with Bilateral Treaties’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Improving the 
Efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards: 40 Years of Application of the New York Convention 
(Kluwer Law International, 1999) 452. 
 to 
block any attempts by unfavourable parties to initiate new proceedings against the subject 
matter that has already been decided in the arbitral proceedings that produced the award 
whose recognition is sought. In other words, recognition is simply a formal confirmation of 
494 For example, U.S. FAA, 9 U.S.C. §207; arts 190 & 194 of the Swiss Law on Private International Law. 
495 For example, ss 66, 101,103 of the English Arbitration Act; art 1514 of the French Code of Civil 
Procedure(2011). 
496 Nigel Blackaby, et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 627-28. 




the legal effect of the award, giving no effect to the enforcement of the award.497 On the 
other hand, a denial of recognition may give rise to the non-enforcement in some 
jurisdictions in that a decision declining an application for recognition of an award on the 
ground of article IV of the New York Convention is binding with res judicata effect. For 
instance, Italian courts had dismissed requests for enforcement since recognition of the 
award had been rejected due to the applicant’s failure to provide a certified arbitration 
agreement.498 The reason why a party failed to be entitled to cure defects in subsequent 
proceedings was ambiguous, though some scholars maintained that efforts to redress 
wrongs should be permitted under national statutes.499 The Italian Court of Cassation, 
however, overruled in 1995 the Nesher decision and clarified that the rejection of an 
application on the ground of failure to submit requisite documents under article IV of the 
New York Convention neither affected the merits of the enforcement request nor prevented 
an applicant’s de novo application.500 By contrast, it is conceivable that recognition and 
enforcement are normally inextricably linked in ICSID arbitration. The ICSID Convention 
provides for an automatic recognition of ICSID awards, and recognition is ordinarily 
described as a preliminary step towards enforcement; as a result of recognition, an award 
becomes a valid title that can form the basis of enforcement.501
 
 More importantly, given 
that an ICSID award is not subject to any condition for recognition not provided under the 
ICSID Convention, or to any review by national courts or other authorities, the task of 
domestic authorities at the stage of recognition is therefore restricted to verifying the 
authenticity of an ICSID award. As long as the parties duly provide the requisite 
documentation required by article 54(2) of the Convention, there will be no room for 
domestic authorities to refuse, at their sole discretion, the recognition of the award. 
Furthermore, recognition and enforcement of non-ICSID awards under the New York 
Convention may be subject to two reservations, namely reciprocity and commercial 
                                                          
497 As is illustrated in Dallal v. Bank Mellat, the English courts recognized the validity of the arbitral award 
rendered by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal whose competence seemed to derive from international 
law or practice, but did not enforce the award. See [1986] QB 441. 
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reservations.502 In view of the generally broad definition of the term ‘commercial’ which 
commonly includes investment disputes, only reciprocity reservation would have an effect 
on the evaluation of ICSID and non-ICSID award enforcement mechanisms. In accordance 
with article I(3) of the New York Convention, if contracting States have signed the 
Convention on the basis of reciprocity, they would merely recognize and enforce 
‘Convention awards’ which are made in the territory of another contracting State or apply 
the Convention only to the extent to which those States grant reciprocal treatment in case 
of awards made in the territory of non-contracting States. As of September 2014, 78 out of 
150 contracting States have made the reciprocity reservation. 503
 
 Although the limiting 
effect of the reciprocity reservation is of less significant importance as the number of 
contracting States increases year by year, the reciprocity reservation has, undoubtedly, the 
effect of slightly narrowing the scope of application of the Convention and thus affect the 
enforcement of non-ICSID awards to an extent. 
Last but certainly not least, the presumptive obligation to recognize and enforce non-
ICSID arbitral awards is subject to a number of exceptions. The exceptions set out in 
article V of the New York Convention not only include five grounds related to procedural 
issues for denying recognition and enforcement of awards, but also confer on national 
competent authorities discretionary rights ex officio to raise the defense of public policy in 
a case where the recognition and enforcement of awards would be contrary to the public 
policy of the State. It is understandable that States’ own concept of public policy shall be 
allowed in the light of the cultural pluralism of international arbitration. However, it is also 
established that it would be extremely difficult, if not impractical, to define the notion of 
public policy exactly and to reach a consensus on a widely accepted notion of international 
public policy. In addition, it is the competent national authorities before whom 
enforcement is sought that have the power to determine whether the enforcement of an 
award would contradict the public policy of the State. Accordingly, public policy exception 
grants national competent authorities rather broad discretion to resist the recognition and 
enforcement of non-ICSID awards. In particular, investment arbitration ordinarily reflects 
fundamental issues of public interests such as legitimate regulatory interests, human rights 
and environmental protection that can be invoked, arguably, as public policy defense in the 
                                                          
502 Art I(3) of the New York Convention. 
503 The figure is available at UNCITRAL website 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html>.  




enforcement proceedings. Moreover, though exceptions enumerated under the New York 
Convention are envisaged by the drafter to be exclusive, 504  other reasons, including 
judicial review under the guise of excess of authority or public policy,505 may be not 
unanticipated at the enforcement stage.506
 
  
1.2 Debate on the Intrinsic Superiority of ICSID Arbitration 
 
It is conspicuous that onerous procedures and substantive review can result in a high rate 
of non-compliance with non-ICSID arbitral awards. Despite the fact that the average rate 
of refusal of enforcement under the New York Convention reported in the Yearbook of 
Commercial Arbitration generally rose from 2 to 10 per cent in different years, one of the 
studies assessed that the rate of refusal in a sample of reported and unreported cases was 
higher (approximately 13 per cent in the U.S. and 25 per cent in China).507 The number 
would be even higher in a number of States that cannot be categorized as traditional pro-
arbitration jurisdictions. 508  In contrast, through creating an autonomous and relatively 
simplified regime for recognition and enforcement of awards, the record of compliance 
with ICSID arbitral awards has normally been good.509
                                                          
504 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation, 265. 
 Accordingly, several observers 
opine that the ICSID Convention ensures ‘a better and safer enforcement’ scheme as 
505 It is axiomatic that no review of the merits of the awards is permitted under the New York Convention. 
However, the grounds of excess of authority and public policy offer a degree of direction to national courts in 
interpreting them and incorporating national bias and political undertones into the assessments of the awards. 
See Jessica L. Gelander, ‘Judicial Review of International Arbitral Awards: Preserving Independence in 
International Commercial Arbitrations’ (1997) 80 Marq L Rev 625, 629-32. 
506 Other reasons for denying enforcement of Convention awards include jurisdiction over applications for 
enforcement (forum non conveniens), retroactive application of the Convention and lack of implementing 
legislation (Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘New York Convention of 1958: Refusals of Enforcement’ (2007) 18(2) 
ICC Intl Ct Arb Bull 1, 22-34). In particular, some States adopt less favourable standards for recognition and 
enforcement of non-ICSID awards; eg, in several developing countries recognition and enforcement of 
Convention awards have encountered more hurdles, being subject to essentially de novo judicial review 
(Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2728-29). 
507 Quentin Tannock, ‘Judging the Effectiveness of Arbitration through the Assessment of Compliance with 
and Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards’ (2005) 21 Arb Intl 71, 88. 
508 For example, a survey revealed that out of thirteen cassation court resolutions regarding the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards in 2008, eight had been refused (61.54 per cent). See Patricia Nacimiento, Alexey 
Barnashov, ‘Recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in Russia’ (2010) 27 J Intl Arb 295, 303. 
509 Antonio R. Parra, ‘The Enforcement of ICSID Arbitral Awards’, 24th Joint Colloquium on International 
Arbitration, Paris, 16 November 2007, 9. 




compared to the situation facing the enforcement of non-ICSID awards, 510  and some 
further assert that the ICSID enforcement system is ‘plainly superior’ to the enforcement 
under the New York Convention,511 and even to all other systems for enforcement of 
investment arbitral awards.512
 
 These viewpoints make sense in certain respects, but it is 
still debatable whether the ICSID Convention achieves more success of enforcement, and 
whether the ICSID enforcement system is more effective and desirable than the other 
system in the investment arbitral award enforcement regime. 
Admittedly, based on the autonomous and self-contained regime, the recognition and 
enforcement of ICSID awards are much easier to obtain than those under the New York 
Convention. 513 At any rate, such a simpler method ensures, to a large extent, shorter 
periods and lower costs in the pursuit of enforcement of ICSID awards. Nevertheless, non-
ICSID arbitration also excels with its trustworthy mechanism of enforcement of 
international investment arbitral awards. Notwithstanding the relatively higher rate of 
refusals of enforcement under the New York Convention as a whole, the rate is not that 
high in the context of enforcement of investment arbitral awards. In fact, judicial 
enforcement of seven reported non-ICSID arbitral awards has demonstrated that the non-
ICSID enforcement method is not inferior as perceived by some commentators. Among 
these cases, first, judicial enforcement was granted by national courts in International 
Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States,514 National Grid plc v. 
The Argentine Republic515 and Swembalt AB, Sweden v. The Republic of Latvia.516
                                                          
510 Piero Bernardini, ‘ICSID versus non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Miguel Ángel Fernández-
Ballesteros, et al (eds), Liber Amicorum Bernardo Cremades (La Ley, 2010) 186. 
 Second, 
511 Gaëtan Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID or Not to ICSID, 
317. 
512 Sylvia Tonova, ‘Compliance and Enforcement of Awards: Is There a Practical Difference between ICSID 
and Non-ICSID Awards?’ in Ian A. Laird, et al (eds), Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law 
(Vol 5, JurisNet, 2012) 229. 
513 Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 1118. 
514 Memorandum of Opinion of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 14 February 2007, Civil 
Action 06-00748 (HHK), Case 1:06-cv-00748-HHK; 473 F. supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d 255 Fed. Appx. 
531 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (denying Thunderbird’s petition to vacate a NAFTA award in favour of Mexico, and 
granting Mexico’s motion for confirmation of the award on the ground that judicial review of an international 
arbitration award was extremely limited and that a court had no discretion but to confirm an award if a legal 
basis to vacate the award was absent). 
515 Order of U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 7 June 2010, Civil Action No 09-248 (RBW), 
Case 1:09-cv-00248-RBW (dismissing Argentina’s petition to vacate or modify the award on the ground that 
the petition was time-barred under 9 U.S.C. § 12, and granting Nationa1 Grid’s cross-motion for 
confirmation, recognition and enforcement of the award under the FAA and the New York Convention), aff’d 




enforcement is underway in Mr. Franz Sedelmayer v. The Russian Federation 517 and 
Werner Schneider, acting in his capacity as insolvency administrator of Walter Bau Ag (In 
Liquidation) v. The Kingdom of Thailand.518 In these two cases, Sedelmayer has obtained 
partial enforcement, though the enforcement lasts for over sixteen years, and the German 
court’s decision does not shut the door on the attempts of Walter Bau’s liquidator to 
enforce the award in Germany. Third, with regard to two cases under the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules, the applicant in Sistem Mühendislik Inşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. v. Kyrgyz 
Republic519 is currently pursuing the enforcement of the award, and Cargill in Cargill, 
Incorporated v. United Mexican States reached a settlement in 2013 with Mexico in a 
NAFTA dispute that resulted in a U.S. $77 million arbitration award in favour of 
Cargill.520
                                                                                                                                                                                
Decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 11 March 2011, No 10-7093; 
Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 21 April 2011, Case: 10-7093 
(denying the petition for rehearing en banc); Order List 565 of U.S. Supreme Court, 28 November 2011 
(denying petition for certiorari). 
 These practical experiences, though somewhat limited, indicate that the success 
516 Decision of the Svea Court of Appeal, Stockholm, 2002, Case No Ö 7192-01 (granting enforcement of the 
award rendered under the Agreement between Sweden and Latvia on the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (SÖ 1992:93)). 
517 In 1998 Franz Sedelmayer obtained a favourable SCC arbitral award against the Russian Federation, but 
had to attempt to enforce the awards against Russia’ assets abroad since Russia failed to comply voluntarily 
with the award. His various applications were denied in Germany since German courts ruled that the assets 
and activities of the Russian Federation that he claimed were immune, except a building of the former Soviet 
Trade Office in Cologne which was not immune from enforcement because it was used for any official 
business (see, eg, Decision of the Oberlandesgericht Köln, Case No 16 W 35/02; Decision of the 
Kammergericht Berlin, Case No 25 W 15/03; Decision of the Landgericht Köln, Case No 22 O 410/03; 
Decision of the Kammergericht Berlin, Case No 20 Sch 1/07; Decision of the Landgericht Köln, Case No 7 
O 26/06; Decision of the Oberlandesgericht Köln, Case No 8 W 59/07; Decision of the Oberlandesgericht 
Köln, Case No 11 U 6/07; Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, Case No 2 BvR 2162/07 and Case No 
2 BvR 2271/07; Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof, Case No VII ZB 37/08; Decision of the Kammergericht 
Berlin, Case No 1 W 276/09). 
    In Sweden, in 2011 the Supreme Court of Sweden declined Russia’s request for sovereign immunity 
protection of the Russian trade mission (see Decision of the Swedish Supreme Court, Stockholm, 2011, Case 
No Ö 170-10). 
518 At first instance, in 2012 the Kammergericht in Berlin declared an UNCITRAL arbitral award against 
Thailand enforceable, but in 2013 the BGH overturned the first instance ruling by stating that recognition and 
enforcement proceedings should be characterized as a special type of adjudication proceedings sui generis, 
therefore the principle of sovereign immunity relating to immunity from the jurisdiction of a foreign State’s 
courts should be applied to the enforcement. It is also worth mentioning that the BGH subsequently upheld a 
first instance decision which ordered Thailand to pay a security deposit for obtaining the release of the crown 
prince’s Boeing 737-4Z6 at Munich airport (see Roland Kläger, ‘Werner Schneider (liquidator of Walter Bau 
AG) v Kingdom of Thailand, Sovereign Immunity in Recognition and Enforcement Proceedings under 
German Law’ (2014) 28(2) ICSID Rev-Foreign Investment LJ 1). 
519 ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/06/1; Decision of Superior Court of Justice, Ontario, 17 April 2012, 2012 
ONSC 4351, COURT FILE NO: CV-11-9419-00CL. 
520 ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/05/2. 




rate of enforcement of non-ICSID awards is quite high.521
 
 Therefore, there appears to be 
little evidence demonstrating the inferiority of the mechanism for enforcement of non-
ICSID awards as compared to the counterpart in ICSID arbitration. 
It is further worth noting that while the exceptions to the enforcement of awards could be, 
from the perspective of parties seeking enforcement, a potential drawback as compared to 
no refusal ground available in ICSID Convention on the one hand, they also serve an 
indispensable function on behalf of host States to protect fundamental rights, justice and 
even national interests on the other. Such function might be contributed directly to States’ 
choice of UNCITRAL or other non-ICSID arbitration. On no account would a State 
include ICSID arbitration clauses in relevant investment treaties if the State places 
considerable emphasis on sovereignty, in particular those relating to enhancement of 
national courts’ scrutiny at the international arbitral enforcement stage. Consequently, 
despite that judicial review of national courts could lead to onerous and probably less 
effective procedures, which run perceptibly counter to the objectives of enforcement of 
international awards, it may sit as well at the heart of States’ consideration of judicial 
sovereignty. 
 
In addition, in recent times the voluntary ICSID enforcement scheme has encountered 
numerous obstacles in Latin America522
 
 where the compliance with ICSID awards has 
been challenged on the grounds of a variety of defenses within and outside the ICSID 
Convention. A number of tactics that unfavourable parties deploy to attempt to oppose the 
enforcement of ICSID awards has, unavoidably, an impact that cannot be ignored on the 
rate of successful enforcement. As compared to the limits to enforcement of ICSID awards, 
a range of system designs in non-ICSID arbitration are notable for facilitating transnational 
enforcement of non-ICSID arbitral awards. 
                                                          
521 Insofar as the rate of enforcement is concerned, it should be noted that if there is a legitimate ground of 
refusal of enforcement, an award debtor will ordinarily be recommended in practice by his counsel to take the 
initiative through making use of a challenge of the award as a tactic rather than adopting a passive attitude in 
an attempt to resist enforcement later. Such an attitude (ie, challenging the award at the earliest possible 
opportunity) is not only likely to impress national courts, but also increases the possibility of successfully 
setting aside the award because grounds of setting aside awards are normally wider than those upon which 
enforcement of awards may be refused (see Nigel Blackaby, et al, Redfern and Hunter on International 
Arbitration, 677). Accordingly, there are fewer cases entering into the stage of resistance of enforcement. 
522 Andrew P. Tuck, ‘Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed 
Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ (2007) 13 L & Bus Rev Am 885, 905-911. 




2 The Obstacles to Enforcement of ICSID Arbitral Awards  
 
2.1 Stay of Enforcement 
 
Under the ICSID Convention, the enforcement of an ICSID arbitral award may be 
suspended in the light of the pending resolution of an application for interpretation, 
revision or annulment.523 The effect of stay of enforcement can be understood in two 
respects. First, as an exception to the binding force of an award, an ICSID award can no 
longer be deemed a decision with binding effect to execute as long as the stay is in 
place.524 As a consequence, the obligation for unfavourable party to abide by and comply 
with the award will be pro tanto suspended.525 Second, article 54 of the ICSID Convention 
does not mention the stay of enforcement, but the enforcement scheme contained in article 
54 is subject to any stay of enforcement. In other words, though the intrinsic legal validity 
of the award remains unaffected, it is unambiguous that the suspension of a disputing 
party’s obligation of compliance with the award necessarily carries with it suspension of a 
State’s obligation to enforce the award.526
 
  
Stay of enforcement is a minor obstacle to enforcement of ICSID awards, but it can be 
deployed as a tactical manoeuvre since a stay request obviously postpones the enforcement 
procedure. There is even a risk that the unfavourable party would subsequently disobey the 
award even though the annulment application is declined by the ad hoc committee. By the 
end of January 2014, there were 25 cases in which written pleadings on a request for stay 
are filed, a number of which are requested by Argentina. In order to regulate the abuse of 
stay of enforcement, from 1985 when the ad hoc committee in Amco Asia Corporation and 
others v. Republic of Indonesia rendered the first decision on a stay of enforcement to 2004, 
losing parties who requested a stay of enforcement were ordinarily required to post a 
security as a condition for the continued stay of the enforcement of awards during the 
annulment proceedings. 527
                                                          
523 Arts 50(2), 51(4) & 52(5) of the ICSID Convention. 
 Most securities were in the form of an irrevocable and 
524 Aron Broches, ‘Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, 
Recognition, Enforcement, Execution’ (1987) 2 ICSID Rev-Foreign Investment LJ 287, 294. 
525 MINE v. Guinea, ICSID Case No ARB/84/4, Interim Order No 1 on Guinea’s Application for Stay of 
Enforcement of the Award, 12 August 1988, 4 ICSID Rep 111, 112. 
526 Ibid, 113. 
527 Only one exception took place in Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt. 




unconditional bank guarantee or escrow accounts. The practice, however, shifted in Patrick 
Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo where the committee granted a request for a 
stay without any condition. This jurisprudence is followed by many committees in later 
annulment proceedings. Meanwhile, a new trend in which the financial guarantee is not 
requested but other reasonable assurances should be provided to the committee emerged 
from 2006.528 On balance, in more than a third of cases a stay of enforcement was granted 
unconditionally,529 in 60 per cent of cases the application for stay of enforcement was 
upheld subject to conditions, either imposing obligation to provide financial security530
                                                          
528 For example, the committee in CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic requested a 
written statement on behalf of the Argentina Republic concerning its compliance with the award under the 
ICSID Convention in the event that the award was not annulled. See ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Decision on 
the Argentine Republic’s Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award, 1 September 2006, 
para 47. 
 or 
529 This category comprises the following cases: (i) MINE v. Guinea, ICSID Case No ARB/84/4, Decision of 
the ad hoc Committee of 22 December 1989; (ii) Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
ICSID Case No ARB/99/7, Decision on the Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 30 November 2004; (iii) 
MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Ad hoc 
Committee’s Decision on the Respondent's Request for a Continued Stay of Execution of 1 June 2005; (iv) 
Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12, Decision on the Continued Stay of 
Enforcement of the Award of 28 December 2007; (v) Víctor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. 
Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No ARB/98/2, Decision on Stay of Enforcement of 5 August 2008; Decision 
on Republic of Chile’s Application for a Stay of Enforcement of the Award, 5 May 2010; (vi) Continental 
Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, Decision on Argentina’s 
Application for a Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 23 October 2009; (vii) Libananco Holdings Co. 
Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB/06/8, Decision on Applicant’s Request for a Continued 
Stay of Enforcement of the Award, 7 May 2012; (viii) Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for a 
Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 7 October 2008; (ix) Occidental Petroleum Corporation and 
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/06/11, 
Decision on the Stay of Enforcement of the Award, 30 September 2013. 
530 These cases include (i) Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No 
ARB/81/1, Interim Order No 1 Concerning the Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 2 March 1991; (ii) 
Wena Hotels Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Case No ARB/98/4, Procedural Order No 1 of the ad hoc 
Committee concerning the continuation of the stay of enforcement of the award, 5 April 2001; (iii) CDC 
Group Plc v. Republic of the Seychelles, ICSID Case No ARB/02/14, Decision on Whether or Not To 
Continue Stay and Order in CDC Group plc v. Republic of the Seychelles of 14 July 2004; (iv) Repsol YPF 
Ecuador S.A. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos del Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/01/10, Procedural Order No 1 
concerning the Stay of Enforcement of the Award of Dec. 22, 2005; Procedural Order No 4 concerning the 
Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 22 February 2006; (v) Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. The Republic of 
Georgia, ICSID Case No ARB/05/18, Decision on Applicant's Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement 
of the Award, 12 November 2010; Decision of the ad hoc Committee to terminate the Stay of Enforcement of 
the Award, 19 Jan. 19, 2011; (vi) Ron Fuchs v. The Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case No ARB/07/15, 
Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Stay of Enforcement of the Award of Nov. 12, 2010; Decision of 
the ad hoc Committee to terminate the Stay of Enforcement of the Award, 19 January 2011; (vii) Sempra 
Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine 
Republic’s Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award of Mar. 05, 2009; Decision on 
Sempra Energy International’s Request for the Termination of the Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 7 




letter of assurance on the applicant,531 and only in one case the award debtor itself agreed 
to post a bank guarantee in exchange for a waiver of the right by the award creditor to 





Figure IX: Condition on Stay of Enforcement 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
August 2009; (viii) Elsamex, S.A. v. Republic of Honduras, ICSID Case No ARB/09/4, Decision on the 
Continuation of the Stay of Enforcement of the Award, 7 January 2014; (ix) Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine, 
ICSID Case No ARB/06/18, Decision on Ukraine’s Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the 
Award, 14 February 2012. 
531 These cases contain (i) CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
ARB/01/8, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award 
of 1 September 2006; (ii) Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for a Continued Stay of 
Enforcement of the Award (ICSID Rule 54) of 4 November 2008; (iii) Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim 
Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v, Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No ARB/05/16, Decision of the ad hoc 
Committee on the Stay of Enforcement of 25 March 2008 (not public); (iv) Duke Energy International Peru 
Investments No. 1 Ltd. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No ARB/03/28, the ad hoc Committee released its 
Decision on Peru’s Stay Request on 23 June 2009; (v) Togo Eléctricité & GDF Suez Energies Services v. La 
République Togolaise, ICSID Case No ARB/06/07, Decision on Annulment, 6 September 2011 
(unpublished). 
532 The case is Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt. Though the case 
was settled by the parties and proceedings discontinued at their request, the condition on stay of enforcement 
can be inferred from Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No 
ARB/01/3, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award 
of 7 October 2008, para 27. 




The different practices ascribe to the absence of explicit rules in the ICSID Convention and 
Rules, leaving ad hoc committees with discretionary rights to determine on a case-by-case 
basis whether or not a stay request is subject to conditions. In general terms, it is tenable to 
condition the continued stay of enforcement on the posting of a security so as to avoid the 
potential non-compliance of awards. In particular, imposing conditions on a stay of 
enforcement is essentially effective in warding off any tactical manoeuvre employed by the 
unfavourable party in an attempt to delay or avoid the enforcement through a dilatory stay 
request. Given that so far all stay requests are submitted in annulment proceedings, ad hoc 
committees may, in view of some observers, take up a new role to assist in ensuring a 
better compliance at post-award enforcement level through taking into account the 




Nevertheless, a number of practical problems will arise in case a stay of enforcement is 
subject to conditions. Among these problems, parties’ ambivalence towards annulment 
applications is palpable. On the one hand, conditioning a stay request upon a posting of 
financial security would have a deterrent effect on annulment application which is, 
however, an extant remedy under the ICSID Convention. The ad hoc committee in Patrick 
Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo had accepted Congo’s argument about the 
deterrent effect of posting financial security on developing countries’ annulment 
submission made in good faith, and further determined that though imposing conditions 
had a certain value, it was always a burden and would infringe on the right to seek post-
award relief through invoking an annulment application.534
                                                          
533 Tsai-Yu Lin, ‘Systemic Reflections on Argentina’s Non-Compliance with ICSID Arbitral Awards: A New 
Role of the Annulment Committee at Enforcement?’ (2012) 5(1) Contemp Asia Arb J 1. 
 Furthermore, financial security 
has the potential to cause economic hardship and conditionality, especially where it is the 
investor who requests a stay of enforcement. For instance, the ad hoc committee in 
Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey upheld a continued stay of 
enforcement without imposing a condition on the grounds that there was no evidence 
demonstrating that Turkey’s chances of obtaining enforcement of the award would 
deteriorate as a consequence of the stay of enforcement if the annulment application was 
534 ICSID Case No ARB/99/7, Decision on the Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 30 November 2004, 
para 40. 




eventually declined,535 and that requiring financial security would be likely burdensome 
for the applicant in the light of its scarce financial means 536  and would affect the 
applicant’s situation in a disproportionate manner.537 On the other hand, the requirement of 
financial security as a condition of a stay of enforcement would give foreign investors a 
windfall in that it places investors in a better position than they would have been if no 
annulment application was filed.538
 
 The windfall arises at least in such a scenario: a State 
has to provide financial security for its request for stay of enforcement; however, if the 
State did not initiate the annulment proceedings, they might apply sovereign immunity to 
insist the enforcement of the award. 
2.2 Domestic Enforcement Approach 
 
Notwithstanding the autonomous and self-contained system well-established in ICSID 
arbitration for recognition and enforcement of awards, a similar simple and self-governing 
system for execution of awards is not set up by the ICSID Convention.539 A number of 
national courts distinguish between enforcement and execution, and such practice gives 
rise to two obstacles to the enforcement of ICSID awards. The first one is the defense 
based on domestic enforcement approach, which has typically been adopted by Argentina. 
After ad hoc committees in CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina and Azurix 
Corp. v. Argentina rejected respectively to annul parts of awards that were rendered in 
favour of investors with compensation in the amount of nearly U.S. $298 million, 
Argentina refused to pay the compensation by contending that neither claimants had 
initiated a formal process before the competent Argentine authorities in order to obtain 
payment of awards. The same argument was raised later in Siemens A.G. v. Argentina.540
                                                          
535 ICSID Case No ARB/06/8, Decision on Applicant’s Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the 
Award, 7 May 2012, para 60. 
 
536 Ibid, para 59. 
537 Ibid, para 61. 
538 Paul D. Friedland, ‘Stay of Enforcement of the Arbitral Award Pending ICSID Annulment Proceedings’ 
in Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi (eds), Annulment of ICSID Awards, 180-81. 
539 Though the interpretation which best reconciles the equally authentic English, French and Spanish text of 
the ICSID Convention would be that ‘enforcement’ and ‘execution’ are identical in meaning (see Christoph 
H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 1134-35), the distinction between the two terms is 
also of practical importance since enforcement is governed and decreed by the Convention and its 
implementation by execution is governed by domestic law (see Aron Broches, Awards Rendered Pursuant to 
the ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, Recognition, Enforcement, Execution, 318). 
540 ICSID Case No ARB/02/8. 




In Argentina’s opinion, the obligation under article 53 of the ICSID Convention to comply 
with the award was not isolated; instead, articles 53 and 54 complemented each other. 
Argentina further explained that article 54 established ‘the legal nature of the award in the 
domestic legal system of all contracting States’, under which contracting States should 
‘equate ICSID awards to a final judgment of a local court’.541 Consequently, domestic 
procedures must be initiated before the court that Argentina had designated for the purpose 
of enforcement pursuant to article 54(2). Argentina also referred to UK law, Chile’s 
Resolution ordering payment of award rendered against Chile in MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. 
and MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile and other practices, and argued that these law and practice 
were additional support for Argentina’s position.542
 
 
It is notable that the domestic enforcement approach is not uniquely invoked by Argentina 
as defense to enforcement of ICSID awards. Until recently, four cases involving decisions 
regarding judicial enforcement of ICSID awards have been identified, including two cases 
in France (S.A.R.L. Benvenuti & Bonfant v. Congo543 and Société Ouest Africaine des 
Bétons Industriels v. Senegal544), one in U.S. (Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation v. 
Liberia545) and one in England (AIG Capital Partners, Inc. and CJSC Tema Real Estate 
Company v. Kazakhstan 546
 
). These cases also leave open the possibility of applying 
domestic enforcement procedures to the judicial enforcement of ICSID awards.  
The obstacle derived from domestic enforcement procedures attracts a fair deal of 
attentions since Argentina’s interpretation of obligations under articles 53 and 54 of the 
                                                          
541 Ibid, Argentina’s Response to the Submission by the United States of America to the ad hoc Annulment 
Committee, 2 June 2008, paras 4-7. 
542 Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation (formerly Enron Corporation) and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Decision on the Claimants’ Second Request to Lift 
Provisional Stay of Enforcement of the Award, 20 May 2009, para 20. 
543 ICSID Case No ARB/77/2, Decision of Tribunal de grande instance, Paris, 13 January 1981; Decision of 
Cour d’appel, Paris, 26 June 1981; Decision of Cour de cassation, Paris, 21 Juy 1987; see 1 ICSID Rep 368-
76. 
544 ICSID Case No ARB/82/1; Decision of Cour d’appel, Paris, 5 December 1989; Decision of Cour de 
cassation, Paris, 11 Juy 1991; see 2 ICSID Rep 337-42. 
545 ICSID Case No ARB/83/2; Decision of the US District Court for the Southern District of New York on 5 
September 1986; Decision of the US District Court for the Southern District of New York on 12 December 
1986; Decision of the US District Court for the District of Columbia on 16 April 1987; see 2 ICSID Rep 383-
98. 
546 ICSID Case No ARB/01/6; Decision of England and Wales High Court (Comm Court) [2005] EWHC 
2239 (Comm). 




ICSID Convention has been considered to be a far-reaching step. 547  In fact, the 
enforcement mechanism provided under the ICSID Convention is automatic, and the 
rational for the intact ICSID system is anchored specifically in voluntary compliance. 
More precisely, based on its imposing obligation to abide by and comply with the terms of 
the award on the parties to the arbitration, article 53 reflects customary international law 
through reiterating the pacta sunt servanda and res judicata principles in the ICSID 
system.548 Accordingly, such obligation applies equally to both parties, automatically and 
without any condition,549 and shall be honoured immediately with no need for further 
domestic enforcement process. In other words, the obligation is independent of any 
procedural obstacle that may arise at the enforcement stage. Furthermore, while article 53 
is addressed at the disputing parties to the arbitration, article 54 provides all contracting 
States’ obligation to collaborate in enforcement of awards containing pecuniary obligations. 
Article 54, which could not be interpreted to diminish or decline the obligation under 
article 53 to abide by and comply with awards, comes into play only when article 53 is 
violated by the defeated party. Therefore, the obligation under article 53 is not predicated 
on the award creditor’s seeking enforcement proceedings before the host State’s authorities 
pursuant to article 54. Such viewpoint can be also read from the travaux préparatoires to 
the ICSID Convention that article 54 was primarily designed as a means to cope with 
potential default on the investor’s side. It was emphatically not the case that forcible 
execution against States should be provided by the Convention, considering that a direct 
obligation to carry out awards had been imposed under article 53 on States which were 
bound as signatories to the Convention to abide by the terms of the Convention;550
                                                          
547 Nigel Blackaby, et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 663. 
 rather, 
the focus should shift to default by investors who were not signatories, since there was no 
direct sanction under the Convention for investors’ failure to honour the award. Article 54 
was, hence, initially introduced in response to the imbalance of obligation between States 
and investors. Based on article 54, in the event that investors failed to abide by and comply 
548 Guido Santiago Tawil, ‘Binding Force and Enforcement of ICSID Awards: Untying Articles 53 and 54 of 
the ICSID Convention’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA 
International Arbitration Conference, 328-29. 
549 The only exception is the possibility of the award being stayed temporarily. 
550 ICSID, History of the ICSID Convention: Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the 
Convention (1968), vol II, pt I, 520. 




with awards, host States could seek forcible execution in any contracting State without 
running into the obstacles that frequently stood in the way of the enforcement of awards.551
 
 
The ad hoc committee in Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentina was 
the first tribunal that addressed in detail the distinction and interplay between articles 53 
and 54, and concluded that under a good faith interpretation article 53(1) imposed on 
Argentina an obligation under international law vis-à-vis U.S. to comply with the award, 
without the need for action on the part of award creditors under Argentine law to which 
article 54 referred.552 The decision was subsequently followed by ad hoc committees in 
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina, 553  
Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, 554  Continental Casualty Company v. 
Argentina555 and Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. The Republic of Georgia.556
 
 These cases have 
indicated that the obligation under article 53 to abide by and comply with ICSID awards is 
thoroughly independent of the domestic enforcement procedures set forth in article 54 and, 
more importantly, the foundation of the whole ICSID arbitration would eventually be 
undermined if domestic enforcement procedures are required prior to the obligation under 
article 53 to comply with the awards arises. 
Finally, it should be noted that though there is no basis for a supporting domestic 
enforcement procedure requirement, the focus of national courts’ approach towards 
compliance with ICSID awards may shift to the scrutiny of awards as a means of last resort. 
For example, the Tribunal de Grande Instance in S.A.R.L. Benvenuti & Bonfant v. Congo 
made an order for the enforcement of the award against Congo subject to the condition that 
an execution on assets located in France was only allowed if prior authorization was 
determined by the Court. The Court further incorporated review of public policy into its 
                                                          
551 Aron Broches, Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID and Other Subjects of Public and Private 
International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 198. 
552 ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for a Continued Stay of 
Enforcement of the Award, 7 October 2008, para 69. 
553 Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award (ICSID 
Rule 54) of 4 November 2008, para 36. 
554 Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award of Mar. 
05, 2009, para 52. 
555 Decision on Argentina’s Application for a Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 23 October 2009, para 12. 
556 Decision on Applicant's Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award, 12 November 2010, 
para 24. 




approach towards enforcement of the award.557 Public policy also arose for consideration 
in Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels v. Senegal. 558  Unlike procedural 
requirements, it appears that international law can provide justification for the national 
courts’ scrutiny of awards. Given that international law of treaties applies to both the 
interpretation of States’ obligations established by the ICSID Convention and the 
conditions regarding the suspension of those obligations, and that the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties requires that the interpretation of treaties should take into account 
‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’,559 
domestic courts might make use of ‘abuse of right’, ‘denial of justice’, ‘unfair and 
inequitable treatment’ or ‘good faith’ as bases to interpret States’ obligations under the 
article 54 of the Convention, thus narrowly construing their enforcement obligations.560
 
 
Though the application of these international law doctrines is arguably tentative, it can be 
seen that such an approach not only affects investors’ right in domestic enforcement 
proceedings, but also discourages, to a certain extent, the deference of ICSID awards.  
2.3 Sovereign Immunity 
 
The second obstacle partially caused by the distinction between enforcement and execution 
is sovereign immunity. The ICSID Convention preserves sovereign immunity from 
execution by providing that article 54 cannot be construed as derogating from laws in force 
concerning immunity of contracting States or of any foreign State from execution,561 thus 
simply leaving immunity to be dealt with under the applicable law of States before which 
execution is sought.562
                                                          
557 The court held that the ICSID award did not contain anything that was contrary to law and public order. 
See Aron Broches, ‘Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, 
Recognition, Enforcement, Execution’, 318-19). 
 Considering that the obligation of governments under article 53 to 
abide by and comply with awards remained unaffected by the limitation on their forcible 
558 According to the Decision of Cour d’appel, Paris, 5 December 1989, the execution of the award in France 
would be in conflict with public order because it would contravene sovereign immunity. See 2 ICSID Rep 
337-40 (1994). 
559 Art 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. 
560 Edward Baldwin, et al, ‘Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards’ (2006) 23 J Intl Arb 1, 18-20. 
561 Art 55 of the ICSID Convention. 
562 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Ad hoc 
Committee’s Decision on the Respondent’s Request for a Continued Stay of Execution of 1 June 2005, para 
31. 




execution,563 it appears that States that invoke the immunity defense will be in violation of 
their obligation under article 53.564
 
 In this regard, the distinction between enforcement and 
execution has the potential to provide a basis for the immunity defense.  
In practice the theories of restrictive immunity and a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction 
have been well-accepted by numerous States.565 However, a waiver of sovereign immunity 
for the purpose of jurisdiction does not encompass a waiver of immunity from execution of 
award. At the present time the attachment or injunction of a sovereign State’s non-
commercial property is still subject to absolute immunity. Accordingly, though most 
defeated respondent States have enforced awards against them, Congo, Senegal, Liberia 
and Kazakhstan have each failed to pay awards in the aforementioned four cases by 
successfully raising the sovereign immunity plea. Even if the prevailing investors collect 
awards wholly or in part, obstacles that they encounter in some cases566 can be enormous 
in view of the facts that the burden of proof that certain property does not serve non-
commercial government purposes is on investors, and that the nexus requirement, which 
demands a specific connection between the commercial property subjected to execution 
and the underlying investment claims, would drag investors into a frustrating situation.567
 
  
What may be found fascinating about the divergence between ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration is not the sovereign immunity defense as a characteristic trait of ICSID 
arbitration, but rather the potential risk that foreign investors have to take when seeking 
enforcement under the ICSID Convention. The immunity plea is also available in non-
ICSID arbitration; however, investors seeking enforcement under the New York 
Convention have argued, with a mixed degree of success, that the agreement in which 
                                                          
563 Aron Broches, Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, Recognition, 
Enforcement, Execution, 302. 
564 Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 1150. 
565 Dhisadee Chamlongrasdr, Foreign State Immunity and Arbitration (Cameron May, 2007) 69-77, 79-92. 
566 For example, the obstacles have been typically illustrated by the Sedelmayer enforcement saga where 
Sedelmayer has not recovered the whole amount of the award after having spent 14 years locating Russian 
assets that could not be protected by any immunity plea.  
567 Art 19(c) of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property sets up a much 
looser requirement of connection by permitting execution of ‘property that has a connection with the entity 
against which the proceeding was directed’. Nonetheless, though the essence of art 19 reflects current 
customary international law, it seems that art 19(3) is not consonant with custom, which merely carries with 
it the attempt at what the preamble to the Convention states as ‘the harmonization of practice in this area’. 
See Roger O’Keefe and Christian J. Tams (eds), The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property: A Commentary (OUP, 2013) 327. 




States give their consent to arbitration, irrespective of the form (either concession contract 
or investment treaty), encompasses an implied waiver of a claim of immunity from the 
jurisdiction of the courts before which enforcement is sought and from execution of any 
resulting award. 568
                                                          
568 Andrea K. Bjorklund, ‘Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral 
Awards: The Re-Politicization of International Investment Disputes’ (2010) 21 Am Rev Intl Arb 211, 220.  
 Theoretically, the defense of implied waiver of immunity from 
execution is possible in non-ICSID arbitration since no express reservation of immunity 
from execution akin to article 55 of the ICSID Convention is contained in the New York 
Convention. In practice such argument has been endorsed in some jurisdictions. For 
example, while Creighton sought to enforce the award rendered by an ICC tribunal in 
Creighton v. Qatar and seized bank accounts held in France by the Qatari Ministry of 
Agriculture and Domestic Affair, Qatar initiated challenge proceedings. As the Cour de 
Cassation determined, in agreeing to ICC arbitration, Qatar waived not only its immunity 
from jurisdiction but also immunity from execution. The decision based on article 24 of the 
then applicable ICC Rules which provided that by submitting disputes to tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, the parties should be ‘deemed to have undertaken to carry out the resulting 
award without delay and to have waived their right to any form of appeal in so far such 
In this regard, becoming a contracting State to the ICSID Convention and submitting dispute to ICSID 
arbitration may also constitute an implied waiver of sovereign immunity from enforcement. In Blue Ridge 
Invs., L.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina, CMS petitioned the Southern District of New York to enforce a 
favourable ICSID award rendered in CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina (ICSID 
Case No ARB/01/8). Blue Ridge purchased CMS’s interest in the ICSID award in 2008 and took over the 
lawsuit. As Argentina moved to dismiss Blue Ridge’ petition to confirm the ICSID award, one of its 
arguments was sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). FSIA allowed 
immunity for sovereign nations being sued in U.S. courts, but such immunity could be waived under 28 
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) and under arbitral award exception of § 1605(a)(6). In the present case, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Argentina had impliedly waived its sovereign immunity (i) by 
verifying the ICSID Convention under which contracting States had to recognize ICSID awards and enforce 
the pecuniary obligations imposed by the awards (the ground of this decision was that by joining the ICSID 
Convention, as the court observed, Argentina must have contemplated enforcement actions in other member 
States of the Convention), and (ii) by submitting dispute to ICSID tribunal since an ICSID award fell within 
the  arbitral award exception of the FSIA (see Docket No 12-4139-cv, 2d Cir. 2013). 
    It should be noted that the situation in this ICSID arbitration case is quite complicated. First, the obligation 
imposed on contracting States by the ICSID Convention is to enforce ICSID awards. However, the self-
contained nature of ICSID arbitration does not extend to the execution. Second, the execution of the award is 
governed by laws in States where execution is sought, ie, U.S. laws in this case. Nevertheless, the subtitle of 
28 U.S.C. § 1605 is ‘general exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign State’ which might have 
an indication that immunity from execution does not fall within the ambit of its application. Besides, as 
elaborated above, Congo, Senegal, Liberia, Kazakhstan have refused to execute ICSID awards by 
successfully invoking the sovereign immunity defense. 




waiver was validly made’.569 Given that similar provisions with respect to the waiver of 
rights are contained in a number of arbitration rules, 570
 
  the decision might set a positive 
example for national courts in other jurisdictions to find ways of circumventing the 
obstacle regarding defense of immunity from execution to the efficacy and integrity of 
arbitral process. The success of the argument of implied waiver of immunity from 
execution, however, relies primarily on domestic laws. More precisely, investors might be 
in a favourable position only if execution against assets of foreign sovereigns that do not 
serve non-commercial government purposes is allowed under the domestic laws. 
Insofar as sovereign immunity from execution is concerned, one might argue that the 
ICSID system has provided somehow necessary remedies, putting extraordinary political 
and economic pressures on the unfavourable respondent States. Above all, the home State 
of an investor has the rights to revive diplomatic protection as per articles 27 and 64 of the 
ICSID Convention because non-compliance by States constitutes a violation of their 
international obligations, despite the fact that sovereign immunity may well afford a legal 
defense to forcible execution. 571  Meanwhile, the leverage of the World Bank with 
borrowing member States involving expropriation or external debt disputes might be 
applied to secure execution of awards. 572  Indeed, it is reasonably possible that the 
diplomatic protection and assistance from the World Bank have a certain impact on 
member countries’ compliance with ICSID awards. However, exercising diplomatic 
protection that ranges from informal diplomatic acts to bringing cases before the ICJ 
entails a number of inherent difficulties. First, States are estopped under customary 
international law from invoking diplomatic protection relating to the rights contained in 
investment treaties to which they are signatories and on the basis of which States and 
investors express their mutual consent to ICSID arbitration. 573
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 Second, since neither 
investment treaties nor the ICSID Convention provide for ICJ jurisdiction, it would lead to 
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general ambiguity as to how the home State of the investor initiates a case before the ICJ 
on behalf of its investor without consent given by the host State. Finally, as to the 
assistance by the World Bank, though the World Bank regional vice president is able to 
decide not to make any new loans to a member country or to make loans with the 
guarantee of the country in the event that the country’s involvement in a dispute over 
default, expropriation or governmental breach of contract has attracted attention of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter ‘IBRD’) and the 
International Development Association (hereinafter ‘IDA’),574 it still needs to be made 
clear that an ICSID tribunal is not an arm of the World Bank, that an ICSID award 
rendered by an tribunal is not an obligation owing directly to the World Bank, and 
consequently that the World Bank Procedure does not address the scenario as regards the 
member country’s non-compliance with an ICSID award.575
 
 Therefore, the effect that the 
nexus between the World Bank and the ICSID weighs in favour of the member countries’ 
execution of ICSID awards cannot be exaggerated. 
3 Pro-enforcement Mechanisms in Non-ICSID Arbitration 
 
3.1 More Favourable Enforcement Regime 
 
As elucidated previously, enforcement of non-ICSID arbitral awards can be obtained 
relying on different instruments, and the relationship between different enforcement 
regimes indicates, in principle, a pro-enforcement bias. Article VII(1) of the New York 
Convention provides this pro-enforcement bias with a basis. According to the first part of 
article VII(1) which is deemed the ‘compatibility-provision’, the validity of the provisions 
on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in other multilateral or bilateral treaties 
is not affected by the New York Convention. As the so-called ‘more-favourable-right 
provision’, the second part of the article confers on parties rights to seek enforcement on 
the basis of domestic law or other treaties, instead of the New York Convention. 576
                                                          
574 BP 7.40 - Disputes over Defaults on External Debt, Expropriation, and Breach of Contract, World Bank 
Procedures (BPs), March 2012. 
 
Accordingly, it is acknowledged that a party can invoke a more favourable regime for the 
purpose of enforcement if a simpler and more effective measure of enforcement is 
575 Edward Baldwin, et al, Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards, 22. 
576 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation, 81. 




available. Apparently, this more-favourable-right provision is conducive to facilitating the 
enforcement of non-ICSID awards. 
 
The application of article VII(1), however, remains disputed. It is assumed that a more 
favourable regime should be applied in its entirety, which means that a party can make a 
choice between different regimes, but a combination of both (‘cherry picking’) is not 
allowed since a combination would contradict the interdependence of the New York 
Convention’ provisions which should be considered to constitute a whole.577 Conversely, 
some commentators assert that the reliance on a more favourable regime does not replace 
the New York Convention in toto and, hence, a party can rely on a more favourable 
provision when seeking enforcement under the New York Convention.578
 
  
While the first viewpoint is based principally on the unification of municipal law, which is 
absolutely the main concern of the drafters of the New York Convention, there are two 
arguments that support the second standpoint equally well. Above all, it should be noted 
that the pro-enforcement bias is also an essential object of the New York Convention. 
Moreover, replacement of the New York Convention in toto would lead the Convention to 
be static and allow no dynamic progress to be made.579 In this regard, article VII(1) can 
serve as a tool to accommodate the Convention in modern trends and, thus, a certain 
amount of ‘cherry picking’ should be permitted, especially given that the Convention 
should be deemed a dynamic instrument.580 In fact, even if ‘cherry picking’ by parties is 
prevented by the Convention, it is generally accepted that domestic courts can rely on its 
own initiative on a more favourable provision for the enforcement.581
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 In this way, it is also 
possible to take advantage of a more favourable basis for the enforcement under the New 
578 Domenico Di Pietro & Martin Platte, Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards: The New York 
Convention of 1958 (Cameron May, 2001) 172. 
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York Convention, though it depends on domestic courts’ discretionary authority. In 
practice, if treaties would be taken into account, the principle of maximum efficacy582 
comes into play as the most appropriate rule in determining the relationships between 
treaties and the New York Convention.583 In the case of domestic laws, though domestic 
courts have been inconsistent in giving effect to the more-favourable-right provision, it is 
still acknowledged that the Convention does not supersede more favourable domestic laws 
by allowing parties simply to avail themselves of whatever provisions are more favourable 
for the purpose of enforcement.584
 
 Thus, national courts constantly ensure that the most 
arbitration-friendly treaty or domestic law is applied as long as it favours and further 
promotes the enforcement of non-ICSID awards. 
3.2 Few Limits on Enforcement Forum 
 
It is commonly accepted that there is no limit under the New York Convention restricting 
the fora where a non-ICSID award might be sought to recognize and enforce. On a 
theoretical level, award creditors have the opportunity of selecting the enforcement forum 
and deciding how many fora in which they wish to recognize and enforce awards if award 
debtors have substantial assets in various States. In addition, two achievements of the New 
York Convention are significantly beneficial for award creditors to mitigate the difficulties 
of choosing enforcement forum. First, as elucidated above, the Convention imposes a 
general presumptive obligation on contracting States to recognize and enforce awards 
made in other States (or mere contracting States if reciprocity reservation is made), save 
where specifically identified, but limited, exceptions enumerated in article V apply. Second, 
the elimination of the ‘double exequatur’ dispenses with the burdensome requirement that 
award creditors have to obtain confirmation of awards from the courts in States of the 
arbitral situs under the 1927 Geneva Convention.585
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  In addition, the European Convention, 
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the Inter-American Convention and almost, if not all, bilateral treaties also leave award 
creditors entirely free to select any enforcement forum they deem appropriate. As a 
consequence, the New York Convention and other main conventions not only liberalize the 
enforcement procedures, but also facilitate the maximum international enforceability of 
awards in all potential fora where identifiable, unencumbered and accessible assets of 
award debtors are available.  
 
Considering that it is the lex fori that determines procedural requirements for the execution, 
national arbitration statutes have also to be taken into account when selecting an 
enforcement forum. In general, consistent with the New York Convention, national statutes 
impose no limit on an enforcement forum. Be that as it may, it still leaves open the 
possibility of applying national statutes over and above the basic conditions set forth in the 
Convention. Under private international law, national courts ordinarily count the 
connecting factors that link the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards to the State’s 
domestic statutes, and would not exercise jurisdiction if the award debtors or their assets 
have insufficient connections with the forum.586 One notable example is that U.S. courts 
have determined that actions to enforce foreign awards cannot proceed in the U.S. on 
account of the procedural non-jurisdictional and non-merits doctrine of forum non 
conveniens which allowed the disposal of enforcement actions under the provision of the 
New York Convention ‘when considerations of convenience, fairness, and judicial 
economy so warrant’. 587 However, the dismissal of enforcement actions based on the 
forum non conveniens doctrine has been criticized for contradicting article III of the New 
York Convention which only contemplates the exceptions set out in article V for resistance 
of enforcement, and for the substantive policies and discretionary judgments that are 
reflected in the forum non conveniens doctrine.588
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 To say the least, a key function of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine is to avoid forum shopping or multiplication of parallel, and 
possibly conflicting, enforcement proceedings initiated by award creditors in an attempt to 
harass award debtors or obtain award for use against award debtors elsewhere; nevertheless, 
such manoeuvre appears to be uncommon in international arbitration since award creditors 
regularly commence enforcement proceedings in appropriate jurisdictions in which they 
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awards. As the New York City Bar Association observes, any slight risk of forum shopping 
is, in any event, a tolerable consequence of furthering the New York Convention’s 
objective of facilitating the transnational enforceability of awards.589
 
 
3.3 Exhaustive Grounds for Refusal of Enforcement 
 
It appears at first sight that the enforcement of non-ICSID arbitral awards encounters more 
obstacles since the mandatory presumptive obligation of States to enforce arbitral awards 
under the New York Convention is subject to a limited number of exceptions. Nonetheless, 
it is axiomatic that the provisions of the New York Convention were drafted with a pro-
enforcement bias and merely set out a restrictive list of grounds on which enforcement 
could be dismissed. Most grounds set forth in the New York Convention are analogous to 
the annulment grounds under the later ICSID Convention and mainly refer to procedural 
issues, such as excess of authority, denial of the opportunity to present case, irregular 
procedural conduct of the arbitration, lack of independence, bias and misconduct of the 
arbitrators and fraud.590
 
 More importantly, combined with several rules that put up solid 
barriers shielding awards from resistance of enforcement, these exceptions ought to be 
applied narrowly and prudentially so as not to contradict the pro-enforcement policy of the 
New York Convention. 
First, it is arguably accepted that national courts have, in line with global practice, residual 
discretionary authorities to grant enforcement even where a defense in accordance with 
article V is valid. As elucidated in chapter III, article V provides that enforcement of 
awards ‘may’ be refused only if a specified exception exists. It is conspicuous that the term 
of permissive ‘may’, rather than ‘must’, ‘should’ or ‘shall’, is adopted in the English text 
of the Convention, which seems to confer discretionary authorities on national courts. 
Traditionally, this approach has been taken by Anglo-American courts, despite the 
existence of a valid defense. For instance, the decision made by the English Court of 
Appeal in Dallah Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. The Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, Government of Pakistan leaves open the possibility for discretionary authorities, 
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April 2005, 22. 
590 Art V of the New York Convention. 




though the judges expressed different views.591 However, the controversy arises in the light 
of the mandatory terms adopted in the French text of the Convention which can be 
construed to exclude any discretionary authority. The rationale of this approach is in 
accordance with the object of the New York Convention of standardization and 
harmonization of the application and interpretation of the grounds for refusal, given that 
national courts’ discretion varies, depending upon their own arbitration laws and legal 
traditions and thus results in unpredictability and uncertainty. In practice national courts in 
most jurisdictions have discretion to grant enforcement where the violation set forth in 
article V is de minimis. It is intriguing that in some jurisdictions (eg, France) where 
discretion is not allowed, national courts also reach the same results as Anglo-American 
courts through taking into account ‘whether defects of the award are immaterial or not 
causal for the rendition of the award’.592
 
 The discretion can reduce, to a certain degree, the 
non-enforcement of a number of non-ICSID awards. 
Second, the onus probandi of overcoming the presumptive enforceability of arbitral awards 
has been allocated to the award debtors as article V of the New York Convention provides 
that the recognition and enforcement of awards may be declined at the request of the 
parties resisting enforcement if they furnish to the national courts certain proof that one of 
exceptions exists. Given that the grounds for refusal of enforcement have to be construed 
narrowly and should be accepted in serious cases only, the degrees or quantum of proof are 
consistently determined under a clear, cogent and fairly strict standard which requires 
award debtors to substantiate their arguments regarding resistance of enforcement 
sufficiently.593
 
 It is noteworthy that the allocation of the burden of proof of grounds for 
non-enforcement plays an essential role in practice in that it can have a decisive impact on 
the final outcome of the whole enforcement proceedings. 
Third, notwithstanding the non-waivable nature of the grounds under article V(2) which 
shall be scrutinized by national courts ex officio, most grounds for refusal of enforcement 
                                                          
591 Based on their interpretation of s 103(2)(b) of the English Arbitration Act (1996), which was similar to art 
V1(a) of the New York Convention, Lord Justice Moore-Bick held that there was a restrictive notion of 
discretion expressing by the discretionary language of the Act. Lord Justice Rix, however, opined that the 
Act imposed a limitation on national courts’ power to dismiss enforcement rather than granting discretional 
authorities to enforce awards if a valid defense existed. [2009] EWCA Civ 755. 
592 Herbert Kronke, et al (eds), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global 
Commentary on the New York Convention (Kluwer Law International, 2010) 208-09. 
593 Ibid, 210. 




under article V(1) can be waived, either explicitly or implicitly.594 As far as explicit waiver 
is concerned, it is generally accepted that disputing parties are able to reach an agreement 
to waive the refusal grounds. Nonetheless, whether the grounds can be waived ex ante or 
after the award has been rendered remains controversial.595 Considering that it would be 
rare for award debtors to waive their defenses under article V(1), and that a more 
favourable enforcement regime is permissible under the Convention and thus parties may 
select the applicable enforcement laws,  it appears that a waiver granted prior to the award 
does not derogate from party autonomy and the fundamental principles of the Convention. 
Despite the small possibility of an explicit waiver, in practice refusal grounds are likely to 
be waived implicitly. More precisely, a party shall be deemed to have waived the right to 
object and will be precluded from complaining about irregularities at the later annulment 
and enforcement stages if he fails to raise a jurisdictional challenge, to object to a 
particular procedure or to raise promptly claims that one arbitrator lacks independence 
during the arbitral process. Such principle in which silence serves as a waiver derives from 
the more general principle of estoppel or venire contra factum proprium, and has been 
recognized in a number of institutional arbitration rules. 596  In fact, national courts 




3.4 Interim Relief 
 
                                                          
594 It is worth noting that a few defects in the arbitral proceedings, such as corruption or partiality, cannot be 
waived. 
595 Herbert Kronke, et al (eds.), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global 
Commentary on the New York Convention, 216. 
596 For example, art 32 of the UNCITRAL Rules, art 39 of the ICC Arbitration Rules and r 41 of the 2013 
ICDR Rules (Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (Including Procedures for Large, 
Complex Commercial Disputes)). 
597 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeal in Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan 
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara determined that Pertamina had failed to show the prejudice required to 
decline enforcement of the award on the ground of procedural irregularity because the arbitral tribunal stated 
that all parties had waived their respective requests for discovery at the conclusion of the hearing; in addition, 
an arbitral tribunal’s decision not to order a continuance of document did not constitute a denial of the 
opportunity to present a fair case. See 364 F.3d 274, 304 (5th Cir. 2004).  
    More recently, the Swedish Supreme Court upheld in 2013 a decision of the Svea Court of Appeal that the 
Russian company Technopromexport had waived its right to rely on the alleged erroneous jurisdiction for 
challenging a SCC award on the ground that the objection to erroneous jurisdiction must be raised during the 
arbitral proceedings. See Technopromexport v. Mir’s Limited, Judgment of the Swedish Supreme Court, 14 
June 2013, Case No Ö 2104-12. 




One of the potential virtues of enforcement of non-ICSID awards is the availability of 
interim relief from national courts. Though parties in ICSID arbitration can also seek 
interim relief from, and only from, arbitral tribunals, non-ICSID arbitration distinguishes 
itself in at least three respects. First, it may be necessary to obtain immediate relief prior to 
the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, but the long period of time from requesting 
arbitration to the commencement of an ICSID arbitral tribunal might lead to irretrievable 
dissipation of respondent’ assets or destruction of key evidence. In a worse case scenario, 
the ICSID tribunal even ruled that the claimant dissolved all attachments it had obtained 
and not sought any remedy in national courts. 598 Second, ICSID tribunals can merely 
‘recommend’ interim relief under article 47 of the Convention, and any interim relief 
issued by ICSID tribunals does not constitute a part of the final award, and would therefore 
not be recognized and enforced under the ICSID autonomous enforcement system. By 
comparison, interim relief ordered by national courts can be enforced by the courts, and 
auxiliary interim relief issued by arbitral tribunals can be enforced in Europe under article 
31 of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation.599
                                                          
598 For example, in Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Guinea, MINE was granted a 
favourable AAA arbitral award and tried to confirm the award in U.S. court, but Guinea sought to dismiss the 
motion on the ground that the arbitral tribunal had lacked jurisdiction. MINE then initiated an ICSID 
arbitration based their contract which contained an ICSID arbitration clause. In the meantime, based on the 
AAA award, MINE obtained attachments of Guinean assets from Swiss and Belgian courts. Guinea 
requested an order from the ICSID arbitral tribunal, in an ‘Emergency Request for Relief from Attachment of 
Its Assets by MINE’, to dissolve all pending attachments of its bank account and assets in Europe. MINE 
asserted that the actions were meant to enforce the AAA awards, and that they were not prejudgment 
attachments within the ICSID arbitration. The ICSID tribunal at first denied Guinea’s request as premature 
since it had not yet defended itself in the attachment proceedings. However, the tribunal later issued in a 
provisional measure that MINE’s legal actions to seek enforcement of the AAA award constituted an ‘other 
remedy’ under the art 26 of the ICSID Convention and also breached its submission to ICSID arbitration 
under the contract. The ICSID tribunal further recommended, based on art 47 of the Convention, that MINE 
immediately withdraw and permanently discontinue all pending litigation, and that MINE dissolve every 
existing attachment and commence no new action before national courts. In the event that MINE failed to 
comply with the recommendation, the ICSID tribunal would take this failure into account in the final award. 
See ICSID Case No ARB/84/4, Award of 6 January 1988, XIV YB Com Arb 82-92 (1989). 
 Third, extra-territorial interim relief can be ordered in 
support of foreign arbitration. More specifically, national courts (not at the arbitral situs) 
may recognize and enforce the request filed by parties to an arbitration seated in another 
jurisdiction and, accordingly, order interim relief in support of foreign arbitral 
599 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. See V.V. Veeder, ‘The Need for Cross-border 
Enforcement of Interim Measures Ordered by a State Court in Support of the International Arbitral Process’ 
in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), New Horizons in International Commercial Arbitration and beyond (Kluwer 
Law International, 2005) 242-71. 






 It is apparent that interim relief ordered and enforced by national courts in 
non-ICSID arbitration not only guarantees more effective arbitral proceedings, but also 
ensure, essentially and necessarily in some cases, the execution of final awards. 
Concluding Observations 
 
It is conceivable that the ICSID Convention provides for a more simplified and effective 
method of obtaining the enforcement of arbitral awards in contrast to the relatively onerous 
recognition and enforcement procedures under the New York Convention. As all sorts of 
recourse to national courts is not required under the ICSID Convention, ICSID awards can 
be enforced, in principle, in less time and at lower cost. Furthermore, national courts’ 
review of arbitral awards would not only incur extra expenses and fees in enforcement 
proceedings, but might also result in a higher rate of non-compliance with awards. In this 
context, the enforcement system under the ICSID Convention is more favourable than that 
under the New York Convention. 
 
These procedural virtues, however, do not necessarily entail a thoroughly and 
systematically superior enforcement mechanism as compared to the regime established 
under the New York Convention. In the first place, since the ICSID autonomous regime 
merely covers the recognition and enforcement of awards and does not extend to the 
execution of awards, the lack of deference of ICSID awards cannot therefore be avoided 
completely. First, in addition to a lapse of time caused by a stay of enforcement, imposing 
a stay request on conditions, though effective to discourage tactical manoeuvre, can serve 
as a deterrent against attempts that aim to annul the award in good faith and even cause the 
applicant’s economic hardship and conditionality. Second, while it is axiomatic that 
domestic enforcement procedures cannot be deployed as defenses for resistance of 
enforcement under the ICSID Convention, national courts’ scrutiny of awards, coupled 
with a number of international law doctrines, may be applied to narrowly construe States’ 
enforcement obligation. Finally, State immunity can sometimes play a pivotal role in 
                                                          
600 For example, the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance allows courts to award interim relief to support 
arbitral proceeding in other jurisdiction, including directing the inspection, preservation, custody, detention 
or sale of any relevant property, and directing sample to be taken from, observations to be made of, or 
experiments to be conducted on any relevant property in Hong Kong; however, the interim relief will only be 
ordered to arbitral proceedings that are capable of giving rise to an interim or final award that are enforceable 
in Hong Kong under Hong Kong’s statutes or the New York Convention. See s 60(1), (6) of the Arbitration 
Ordinance (Cap 609). 




resisting enforcing ICSID awards, and unlike non-ICSID arbitration in which an implied 
waiver argument might be understandable under the New York Convention, ICSID 
jurisprudence fails to indicate that an implied waiver leads to a general exclusion of the 
immunity from execution.  
 
In the second place, given the high rate of successful enforcement of non-ICSID awards in 
the investor-State arbitration context, there appears to be little evidence demonstrating an 
inferior enforcement mechanism in non-ICSID arbitration. In fact, a major attraction of 
non-ICSID arbitration is that the New York Convention avowedly establishes a pro-
enforcement approach towards foreign arbitral awards. Compared to the Geneva 
Convention, the New York Convention not only takes a more restrictive approach to the 
grounds for refusal of enforcement, but also requires that the exhaustive grounds be 
narrowly construed and subject to a number of conditions, such as national courts’ 
discretionary authorities, the onus probandi of resisting enforcement and the waiver of 
grounds, which are created so as to endorse the finality and integrity of non-ICSID 
arbitration and thus favour the enforcement of awards. In addition, a more favourable 
regime for enforcement, few limits on enforcement forum and the availability of relief 
remedies are also indubitably conducive to facilitating the enforcement of awards. Aside 
from the pro-enforcement mechanisms established under the New York Convention and 
domestic statutes, national courts, by and large, behave in support of enforcement of non-
ICSID awards. Despite the tedious and burdensome procedures required under domestic 
statutes on occasion, judicial assistance for recognition and enforcement of awards is 
ordinarily well-established, largely well-functioning and basically consistent with 
fundamental objective of the New York Convention of promoting the international 
enforceability of arbitral awards. 
 
 
Chapter V The Convergence of ICSID and Non-ICSID Arbitration 
 
 
Notwithstanding the intrinsic and cogent divergence, the recent decades have seen an 
emerging convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. Prior to embarking on an 
elaborate inquiry into the convergence, three underlying issues need to be examined. First, 
what is converging? In general, the convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration can 
take place in form and in essence. The convergence in form relates basically to the ever-
increasing ex parte influence601 or interactive impact602 in terms of procedural matters. The 
convergence in essence, however, looks into more substantially functional integration.603
 
 
Second, what is the convergence towards? The direction of convergence of ICSID and 
non-ICISD arbitration is less complicated since it can be accepted that the convergence 
moves or is directed, by and large, towards each other, towards neutral, efficient and more 
convenient mechanisms for resolution of investment dispute or towards jurisprudence 
constant.  
Third, how can the convergence be measured? It is of tremendous importance to specify 
the dimensions of convergence, without which research on convergence cannot be 
conducted. Nevertheless, in recent times there has been a scarcity of a general conceptual 
framework for the convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, which gives rise to an 
extremely ambiguous threshold of integration, interaction and resemblance which could be 
considered to form, indicate or at least promote the convergence. As a consequence, it is 
difficult to deduce precise standards to measure the convergence. The only certainty is that 
it is emphatically not the case that the simple similarities of ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration will be examined. In this thesis, the term ‘convergence’ is conceptualized as 
two processes converging ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. First, the convergence occurs 
in the form of increasingly similar characteristic traits of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. 
However, the convergence is more than the basic and simple resemblance of ICSID and 
non-ICSID arbitration such as similar time limitations to avoid unintended delays in the 
process of constitution of tribunals; instead, it examines more essential similarity of ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration that is able to advance the investment arbitration jurisprudence 
                                                          
601 For example, ICSID’s administrative and organizational support for non-ICSID arbitration cases. 
602 For example, the enforcement of ICISD’s non-pecuniary award under the New York Convention and the 
enforcement of non-ICISD award by virtue of ICSID arbitral proceedings. 
603 For example, the UNCITRAL’s new transparency rules perform a similar function as what has been 
provided in the ICSID arbitration. 




in the long run.604 Second, the convergence extends beyond the similar characteristic traits 
and reaches a higher level, focusing on the relationship, interplay and interaction between 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration.605
 
 
It should be also noted that strictly speaking, the term ‘convergence’ is not precisely the 
same as ‘unification’ or as ‘harmonization’. There is a slight difference between 
unification and harmonization. Unification contemplates the substitution of two or more 
legal systems with one single system, while harmonization seeks to coordinate different 
legal systems by eliminating major differences and creating minimum requirements or 
standards.606 Accordingly, harmonization can be deemed as a step towards unification and 
aims, in a way, towards unification.607 Apparently, convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration is not the same as unification since they originate from two stark disparate legal 
frameworks and it appears that they cannot be combined and replaced by a single system. 
Meanwhile, convergence is not totally the same as harmonization. The ‘convergence’ in 
this thesis has two sides.  One side of the convergence refers to the substantial similarities 
and resemblances between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. In this regard, convergence 
can be regarded the same as harmonization in view of the fact that harmonization is 
ordinarily associated via positive pursuit by implementing legislation.608 One example of 
harmonisation in international investment arbitration is that as many States adopts the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, there is a possibility 
that the grounds for setting aside non-ICSID arbitral awards in national laws are uniform, 
and parallel the grounds under the ICSID Convention. The other side of the convergence, 
however, is normally associated with a passive approach such as a natural convergence 
through custom and frequent use of harmonized principles.609
                                                          
604 For example, after ICSID arbitration introduces more transparency to its arbitral proceedings in 2006, the 
UNCITRAL arbitration also provides the Transparency Rules in late 2013. Such similarity is substantive, and 
can have significant impacts on the development of international investment arbitration. 
 In some cases, the interplay 
605 For example, the possibility of enforcing non-ICSID arbitral awards through ICSID arbitration, and 
enforcing ICSID non-pecuniary remedies under the New York Convention. 
606 K. L. Bhati, Textbook on Legal Language and Legal Writing (Universal Law Publishing Co., 2010), 243. 
607 As the UNICTIRAL observes, ‘harmonization’ of the law of international trade may conceptually be 
thought of as the process through which domestic laws may be modified to enhance predictability in cross-
border commercial transactions, while ‘unification’ may be seen as the adoption by States of a common legal 
standard governing particular aspects of international business transactions. See FAQ - Origin, Mandate and 
Composition of UNCITRAL, available at < http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin_faq.html>. 
608 K. L. Bhati, Textbook on Legal Language and Legal Writing, 244. 
609 Ibid. 




and interaction between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration are natural processes. For 
instance, in case of the enforcement of ICSID non-pecuniary awards under the New York 
Convention, it requires that ICSID tribunals render a non-pecuniary award and that the 
prevailing party choose to enforce the award under the New York Convention. Nonetheless, 
ICSID tribunals may be reluctant to make a non-pecuniary award, while the prevailing 
party can seek to obtain the award under national laws. 
 
Though the convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration remains largely unexplored, 
it has emerged in a number of regions in the realm of international investment. Presumably, 
a variety of trajectories are able to direct towards the convergence, but the following has 
increasingly come into the spotlight as compared to the divergence of ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration. 
 
1 The Emerging Convergence 
 
1.1 The Jurisdiction of Tribunals 
 
1.1.1 Expansion of the Ambit of Subject Matter 
 
The convergence in the realm of jurisdiction, both extant and emerging, is reflected 
outwardly in the form of subject matter and inwardly in the form of substantive criteria. 
Insofar as subject matter is concerned, as the last few decades have seen a expansionary 
trend in ICSID jurisdiction, coupled with an extraordinarily broad scope of jurisdiction in 
non-ICSID arbitration, adjudication of a variety of disputes gradually falls within the ambit 
of competence of tribunals in investor-State arbitration: First, disputes that used to be 
adjudicated under the world trade system, such as international protection of intellectual 
property rights which States have been traditionally engaged by virtue of negotiation, 
interpretation and performance of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, have emerged recently as qualified claims in investor-State 
arbitration. 610
                                                          
610 For example, claimants in Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia (UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No 2012-12) and Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada (NAFTA/UNCITRAL, 
Notice of Arbitration, 12 September 2013) attempted to protect rights concerning trademark and patents. 
 Second, as the historical antipathy from banks and other financial 
institutions towards international arbitration seems to be diminished due to the impact of 




financial crisis, the emphasis on dispute resolution in the financial world may shift from 
traditional litigation policy to international arbitration, leaving open the possibility of 
banking and finance disputes being accepted in investor-State arbitration. 611 Since 2011 
when the ICSID tribunal in Abaclat and others v. Argentine Republic rendered a milestone 
decision confirming its jurisdiction on the ground that sovereign debt was qualified as an 
investment,612 the European sovereign debt crisis has further reinforced the progressively 
vigorous role of investment arbitration in solving disputes related to sovereign debt 
restructuring. For example, the recent Cypriot banking crisis has led to an ICSID 
arbitration case brought by Greek investors against Cyprus,613 and the arbitration filed by 
Slovak and Cypriot investors against Greece is also underway in the aftermath of the Greek 
haircut of 2012. 614
 
 In the way of extending jurisdiction similarly and equally over 
emerging disputes on the basis of the complexity and uncertainty of the concept 
‘investment’, the discrepancy of jurisdiction requirements in ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration is somehow reducing, which can be deemed as a signal of the convergence in 
the long run. 
1.1.2 ‘Salini Test’ Applied in Non-ICSID Arbitration 
 
As compared to the convergence in form resulting from emerging subject matter, a more 
essential convergence is ascribed to the substantive criteria for determining the eligible 
investment in both ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. It is submitted that the UNCITRAL 
tribunal in Romak S.A. (Switzerland) v. The Republic of Uzbekistan brought, de facto, the 
gap between ratione materiae of the two different instruments - ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration. In this case, the claimant initially contended that the ‘Salini test’, which was 
developed from ICSID jurisprudence,615
                                                          
611 For example, Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5; Ceskoslovenska 
Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/97/4; Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/96/3. 
 should be inapplicable and irrelevant since the 
612 ICSID Case No ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 4 August 2011. 
613 For example, Marfin Investment Group Holdings S.A., Alexandros Bakatselos and others v. Republic of 
Cyprus, ICSID Case No ARB/13/27. 
614 For example, Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No 
ARB/13/8. 
615 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 16 July 2001, paras 52-58. 




present arbitration was conducted under the auspices of the UNCITRAL Rules. 616  
Furthermore, the claimant asserted that even though the ‘Salini test’ could be applied in the 
present UNCITRAL case, its contractual right also fulfilled the test.617 The submission of 
the claimant, however, was declined by the tribunal. In construing the notion of 
‘investment’, the tribunal found it necessary to interpret the ordinary meaning of 
‘investment’ under the Switzerland-Uzbekistan BIT (1993) on the basis of the context, 
object and purpose of the BIT.618 Nonetheless, such approach failed to achieve the goal of 
identifying the investment: (i) as to the context analysis, the tribunal determined that the 
BIT was not exhaustive, and the term ‘investment’ had an intrinsic meaning which was 
independent of the categories enumerated in the BIT.619 (ii) When denoting the object and 
purpose of the BIT, the tribunal referred to the ‘economic cooperation’ and ‘aim to foster 
the prosperity’ stated in the BIT, but concluded that the object and purpose left the term 
‘investment’ ambiguous or obscure.620
 
 
In its search for the contours of the notion of ‘investment’, the tribunal denied the 
claimant’s argument that the meaning of ‘investment’ might vary, depending on the 
investor’s selection between ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration. As the tribunal observed, 
the choice between a range of dispute resolution mechanisms offered by the investment 
treaty could not have an impact on the notion of investment, since it was absurd and 
unreasonable to maintain that the substantive protection provided by the investment treaty 
would be narrowed or widened merely by virtue of fora selection.621 The tribunal further 
realized that the conceptualist approach to identifying the existence of investment in ICSID 
jurisprudence helped to explain the reasoning of the present case, and the ‘Salini test’ was 
a typical example of a conceptualist approach.622 By trimming down the four requirements 
of the ‘Salini test’, the tribunal only considered three requirements, namely a contribution 
in money or other assets, duration and risk.623
                                                          
616 Romak S.A. (Switzerland) v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, PCA Case No AA280, Award, 26 November 
2009, para 107. 
 The adoption of a ‘slimmed down Salini test’ 
in construing the dispute in UNCITRAL arbitration made it clear that according to the 
617 Ibid, para 108. 
618 Ibid, para 176. 
619 Ibid, paras 180, 188. 
620 Ibid, para 189. 
621 Ibid, paras 193-94. 
622 Ibid, paras 197-98. 
623 Ibid, para 207. 




tribunal’s decision, the benchmark against which an investment was measured under the 
ICSID Convention should also be applied equally in UNCITRAL arbitration, provided that 
the right to opt for UNCITRAL arbitration derived from investment treaties. Under the 
circumstance, no matter how broad the definition of ‘commercial’ in UNCITRAL 
arbitration might be, the notion of ‘investment’ in UNCITRAL arbitration was still subject 
to the jurisdictional requirement under article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. In other 
words, the concept of ‘investment’ was the same in ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration. If 
the landmark decision was buttressed by subsequent cases, this can be the first sign of a 
jurisprudence constante beginning to form.624
 
 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that what an UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal produces is merely 
an ad hoc award with no stare decisis. The tribunal in the Romak case also acknowledged 
that it had not been entrusted with a mission to ensure the coherence or development of 
arbitral jurisprudence; instead, its mission was to resolve the present dispute in a reasoned 
and persuasive manner.625
                                                          
624 Laura Halonen, ‘Bridging the Gap in the Notion of ‘Investment’ between ICSID and UNCITRAL 
Arbitrations: Note on an Award Rendered under the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Switzerland and 
Uzbekistan (Romak SA v Uzbekistan)’ (2011) 29 ASA Bulletin 312, 324. 
 Furthermore, the reasoning for the tribunal’s conclusion that the 
term ‘investment’ entailed the same meaning in an investment treaty and the ICSID 
Convention is debatable. As analysed above, the tribunal maintained that the substantial 
protection obtainable in the investment treaty would not be narrowed or widened simply by 
a choice of different dispute settlement instruments provided by the investment treaty. This 
observation, however, runs counter to the separate jurisdictional requirements in different 
instruments. In reality, every instrument can specify its rules with respect to ratione 
personae, ratione materiae and ratione temporis. For instance, a claim for violation of a 
right under an investment treaty that does not arise directly out of an investment falls 
within the jurisdiction under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules and most mainstream 
non-ICSID arbitration rules, but such claim would never enter into the competence of 
ICSID tribunals. Accordingly, the notion of investment under an investment treaty may 
diverge from that under the ICSID Convention or non-ICSID arbitration rules. Be that as it 
may, there is still a possibility for the Romak decision to be quoted in future cases, given 
that the decision itself is generally eloquent and tenable. As the tribunal in the Romak case 
virtually took a fundamental stride in the direction of bringing the gap in the definition of 
investment applicable in ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration, it remains conceivable that 
625 Romak S.A. (Switzerland) v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, Award, 26 November 2009, para 171. 




the convergence of jurisdiction between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration towards 
jurisprudence constant may occur, or is occurring. 
 
1.2 The Role of Institutions 
 
1.2.1 ICSID’s Administrative Support for Non-ICSID Arbitration 
 
The convergence concerning the role of institutions, akin to the convergence of jurisdiction, 
is also reflected outwardly in form and inwardly in essence. At present, the convergence in 
form is ordinarily involved with the ex parte utilization of ICSID administrative functions 
in non-ICSID arbitration. To be more specific, the ICSID Secretariat provides a variety of 
organizational and administrative support for non-ICSID arbitration, including services 
ranging from assistance with the organization of hearings to numerous administrative 
services comparable to those accommodated in ICSID arbitration. 626 Furthermore, the 
ICSID Secretariat also acts as appointing authority in the event that an arbitrator is 
unsuccessfully appointed by the disputing parties, and decides proposals for 
disqualification of arbitrators.627 However, the ICSID Secretariat is not obliged to exercise 
its power of appointment in non-ICSID arbitration and in practice it does not agree to act 
as appointing authority for all cases. 628  Therefore, disputing parties must obtain the 
Secretariat’s consent in advance by submitting a designation request 629  if they are 
determined to utilize such facility. By the end of 2013, the ICSID Secretariat had provided 
organizational and administrative assistance in 78 non-ICSID cases since 2005, 67 of 
which were conducted under the aegis of the UNCITRAL Rules.630 In fact, many non-
ICSID arbitration institutions, such as the PCA, SCC, ICC and LCIA, also provide the 
services of organization of hearings for ad hoc arbitration. It is intriguing that as the only 
arbitration institution specified in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,631
                                                          
626 ICSID, ICSID Caseload - Statistics, 2014-1, 9. 
 the PCA acts as 
registry in 50 investor-State arbitration cases based on investment treaties or investment 
627 Ibid 
628 Lucy Reed, et al, Guide to ICSID Arbitration, 20. 
629 The ICSID Model Clause offers a sample of designation of the ICSID Secretariat as appointing authority. 
See clause 22 of the ICSID Model Clause. 
630 ICSID, ‘ICSID Caseload – Statistics’, 2014-1, 9. 
631 Arts 6, 7, 8 & 12 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010) refer to designating and appointing 
authorities, and challenge of arbitrators. 






 The comparison of the number of non-ICSID cases administered and registered 
respectively in ICSID and PCA arbitration, though not exhausted, is sufficient to indicate 
that ICSID is gradually playing an active role in supporting non-ICSID cases with 
organizational and administrative services, which constitutes, to some extent, the 
convergence between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. 
1.2.2 Incremental Transparency 
 
The far-reaching convergence between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration concerns the 
appropriate level of transparency in the investor-State dispute resolution mechanism. It is 
widely recognized that the ICSID Secretariat has long devoted a special proportion of its 
mission to promoting transparency. In particular, in 2005 the Secretariat finalized an 
overarching proposed amended text of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, attempting to 
adequately meet the requirements of ICSID’s users and to reflect current arbitration 
practices. The resulting amendment attached great importance to the transparency, 
establishing a number of processes making ICSID arbitration more streamlined and 
transparent which included, inter alia, public attendance and observation of hearings,633 
amicus curiae briefs and third-party participation,634 and publication of arbitral awards.635 
The amendment was applied for the first time in Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. 
United Republic of Tanzania where the tribunal considered that the third-parties had a 
sufficient interest in the proceedings, and that the participation of third-parties had the 
reasonable potential to discharge the tribunal’s mandate and secure wider confidence in the 
proceedings,636 thereby granting the third-parties the chance to file a written submission 
pursuant to Rule 37(2).637 However, the third-parties’ requests to have access to the key 
documents and to attend the oral hearings were dismissed on the grounds that there were 
specific reasons of procedural integrity638
                                                          
632 See the official website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration <
 leading the tribunal to impose certain limitation 
http://pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1029> accessed 15 May 2014. 
633 R 32 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
634 Ibid, r 37(2). 
635 R 48 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules and reg 22 of the ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulations. 
636 ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No 6, 25 April 2007, para 50. 
637 Ibid, para 55. 
638 The reasons set out in Procedural Order No 3, 29 September 2006. 




on disclosure,639 and that the tribunal had no power to permit the presence or participation 
of the third-parties at the hearing since the claimant objected to such petition.640
 
 In any 
event, by establishing the incremental transparency and public participation which reflect 
the current trend in investment arbitration, ICSID strives to deliver a more dynamic and 
vigorous system for investor-State dispute resolution. 
By contrast, investor-State non-ICSID arbitration, irrespective of ad hoc or institutional 
arbitration, generally inherits from international commercial arbitration the characteristic 
of confidentiality which is traditionally acknowledged as one of the essential advantages of 
arbitration, 641  in particular given that the same arbitration rules are applicable to the 
adjudication of both commercial and investment arbitration. As public interests in 
investment arbitration are broadly recognized, the harsh challenge of the presumption of 
confidentiality of the investor-State non-ICSID arbitral process has prompted arbitration 
institutions and other entities to mandate a degree of transparency throughout the 
investment arbitral process. ICC has intended to ensure transparency in dispute resolution 
processes, 642  especially those involving States and States entities. Nevertheless, third-
parties’ submission and publication of documents are absent in the ICC Arbitration Rules 
(2012). The ICC Commission Report on Arbitration Involving States and State Entities 
recommends that parties can modify the standard ICC Rules, and agree on greater 
transparency, for instance, by providing for submission and awards to be made public.643 
ICC arbitration therefore leaves the issues to disputing parties, subject to relevant 
applicable laws. The PCA Arbitration Rules (2012) also offer a small amount of 
transparency, including open hearings agreed by disputing parties644 and publication of 
awards with the consent of all parties or where disclosure is required of one party by legal 
duty to protect legal rights or relevant judicial proceedings.645
 
  
                                                          
639 Procedural Order No 6, 25 April 2007, para 66. 
640 Ibid, para 71. 
641 Nigel Blackaby, et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 136. 
642 As the booklet of ICC Arbitration and ADR Rules (2012) states, the rules ‘define a structured, 
institutional framework intended to ensure transparency, efficiency and fairness’ of arbitral process. 
643 The ICC Commission Report on Arbitration Involving States and State Entities under the ICC Rules of 
Arbitration, 2012, paras 15 & 22. 
644 Art 28(3) of the PCA Arbitration Rules. 
645 Ibid, art 34(5). 




The most recently notable initiative is taken by the UNCITRAL. Five years after officially 
acknowledging the implication of the public as a stakeholder in treaty-based investor-State 
arbitration, 646  and three years after embarking on developing standards to foster 
transparency,647 UNCITRAL eventually adopted in 2013 the Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration which constituted an innovative set of procedural 
rules ensuring the public’s accessibility to arbitration proceedings. The brand-new 
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules offer far wider openness of proceedings: first, a fairly 
wide set of documents, including information at the commencement of proceedings, 
written submission of parties and decisions of tribunals, should be published.648 Second, 
arbitral tribunals have their discretionary authority to accept submission from amicus 
curiae 649  and from non-disputing State parties to relevant treaties on issues of treaty 
interpretation.650 Third, hearings should be open.651 Though the Transparency Rules are 
subject to exceptions for confidential information protection, integrity of arbitral process 
protection 652  and logistical reasons for private hearing 653  to balance diverse interests 
relating to disclosure, the Rules go one step further on the whole than ICSID, ICC and 
PCA. For instance, the ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules do not require disputing 
parties’ pleadings and other information to be published, but they require disputing parties’ 
consent for third-parties’ attendance of hearing654 and for publication of decisions.655
 
 
The promotion of transparency in non-ICSID arbitration reflects global acknowledgment 
of investor-State arbitration’s connection with public interests and taxpayer funds, which is 
                                                          
646 The 41st session of UNCITRAL Commission instructed the Working Group II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation) to address transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitration as a matter of priority 
immediately after the completion of revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. See Report of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 41st session, 16 June-3 July 2008, para 314. 
647 Negotiation begun with the submission of comments from governments in the 2010 session of the 
Working Group II. 
648 Arts 2 &3 of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. 
649 Art 4 of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. The Rules only permit ‘written submissions’, which 
indicates that other forms of participation, such as statements at hearings, are not acknowledged. Nonetheless, 
other forms of participation in accordance with art 15 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules and art 17 of the 2010 
and 2013 UNCITRAL Rules might be allowed at the discretion of arbitral tribunals. 
650 Art 5 of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. 
651 Ibid, art 6. 
652 Ibid, art 7. 
653 Ibid, art 6. 
654 R 32(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
655 Art 48(5) of the ICSID Convention and r 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 




generally consistent with ICSID’s arbitration practice. In this sense, it has become 
moderately evident that ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is converging towards more 
neutral dispute resolution mechanisms in which the transparency is employed as a tool to 
ensure effective public participation, accountability, predictability and legitimacy that are 
essential to justice and fairness. Such convergence is, unambiguously, significant and 
substantial. 
 
1.3 Post-award Remedies 
 
It appears that convergence has not occurred in the field of post-award remedies due to the 
heterogeneous structures of annulment in ICSID arbitration and vacatur in non-ICSID 
arbitration. It is also unfeasible or impossible for the convergence to play a minor role in 
this part of investor-State arbitration in the future, since the divergence extends from 
different regulations contained in international or regional conventions656 to arbitration 
statutes in force in various States. Be that as it may, the current development of 
international arbitration might shed some light on how ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration 
move in the same direction to a tiny extent. First, the convergence in private international 
law has created harmonized rules in many ways,657
 
 which is likely to have an inkling of 
uniform or worldwide accepted grounds for setting aside non-ICSID awards paralleling 
those set out under the ICSID Convention. Second, the AAA’s 2013 Optional Appellate 
Arbitration Rules establish an appellate scheme under which arbitral decisions may be 
appealed to appeal tribunals comprised of arbitrators selected from panels maintained by 
the AAA or the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (hereinafter ‘ICDR’). The 
decisions of appeal tribunals, which can uphold or reverse the underlying arbitral decisions, 
are final and binding. Though ICSID ad hoc committees cannot act as appellate courts, the 
way that AAA appeal tribunals commence and their authority to review decisions are 
similar to those applicable in ICSID arbitration. Nevertheless, given that international 
arbitral awards shall be commonly final, conclusive and binding on the parties, the AAA 
practice is quite exceptional and thus cannot be considered a signal of a convergence of 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. 
                                                          
656 For example, the ICSID Convention and the European Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration. 
657 See, eg, Katharina Boele-Woelki, et al (eds), Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law - 
Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr (Eleven International Publishing, 2010). 




1.4 Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
 
1.4.1 Enforcement of ICSID Non-Pecuniary Remedies under the New York 
Convention 
 
Non-pecuniary remedies are not rare in the practice of international arbitration,658 and 
there are also a number of non-pecuniary obligations that investor-State arbitral tribunals 
may impose upon disputing parties. Such obligations include the compliance with 
performance requirements659 and the reinstatement of wrongfully discharged personnel 
which are applied to investors, and the restitution of seized property, the cessation of 
collecting unreasonable taxes, the permission to transfer currency and the discontinuance 
of disturbing investors’ personnel which are imposed on States.660 An intriguing question 
arises as the ICSID Convention creates a self-contained system for the purpose of 
enforcement, the system does not extend to the enforcement of non-pecuniary obligations 
arising from awards. 661  The travaux préparatoires of the Convention indicated that 
concerns about the unfeasibility of enforcement of non-pecuniary obligations led to the 
restriction of enforcement to pecuniary obligations. 662
                                                          
658 Michael E. Schneider, ‘Non-Monetary Relief in International Arbitration: Principles and Arbitration 
Practice’ in Michael E. Schneider, et al (eds), Performance as a Remedy: Non-Monetary Relief in 
International Arbitration (JurisNet, 2011) 15-26. 
 Thus, the enforcement of non-
pecuniary remedies included in ICSID awards has to rely on other instruments. It is 
conceivable that non-pecuniary remedies might be enforced under the national laws of 
States where the enforcement is sought or under the New York Convention. Obviously, the 
general ubiquity of enforcement and no comparable restriction to pecuniary obligations 
make the New York Convention a potential instrument to enforce non-pecuniary remedies 
659 The imposition of performance requirements to inward foreign direct investment may serve as a crucial 
policy tool in an attempt to strengthen the industrial base and gear industries towards host States’ economic 
development. The performance requirements can be ordinarily divided into three types: (i) the requirements 
that are prohibited by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (hereinafter ‘TRIMs’) 
such as local content requirements; (ii) the requirements that are normally prohibited, conditioned or 
discouraged by investment treaties, and (iii) all other requirements that are not subject to any investment 
treaties. The performance requirements relating to investor-State arbitration fall into the second type which 
mainly contains joint ventures or domestic equity, technology or other proprietary knowledge transfer and 
employment requirements.  
660 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration’ (2004) 20 Arb Intl 325, 332. 
661 Art 54 of the ICSID Convention. 
662 For example, the enforcement of an ICSID award which granted a specific performance may encounter a 
main hurdle if courts in the State where enforcement is sought have no authority to issue or order the specific 
performance. See Christoph H. Schreuer, et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 1136-37. 




granted in ICSID awards. Though ICSID tribunals have not ordered any non-pecuniary 
remedy, it is still possible that injunctions or specific performance are issued in future 
ICSID awards663
 
 and such non-pecuniary remedies would be enforced under the New York 
Convention. The enforcement of non-pecuniary remedies by virtue of traditional non-
ICSID arbitration enforcement mechanism therefore leaves open the possibility of future 
convergence between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration.  
It should further be noted that the convergence in regard to the enforcement of non-
pecuniary remedies, however, will be extraordinarily limited in the light of the nearly 
unrealistic circumstance where non-pecuniary remedies are ordered by ICSID tribunals. 
The scarcity of non-pecuniary remedies being issued in ICSID awards can be ascribed, in 
principle, to three factors. First, non-pecuniary remedies are not necessary in many claims, 
and even if they are applicable, in theory, they normally fail to correspond to investors’ 
expectation of seeking compensation. As a matter of fact, while investors may seek non-
pecuniary remedies as provisional relief before and during the arbitral proceedings, they 
ordinarily claim damages in monetary terms. Second, investment treaties usually focus 
merely on monetary compensation because only when the expropriation, regardless of 
overt or indirect forms, is accompanied by compensation that is prompt, adequate and 
effective,664
 
 will the States be able to successfully defend that the expropriation conducted 
under sovereign rights is legal. In any event, it seems that emphasis in most cases will 
always be on whether compensation was prompt, adequate and effective, rather than the 
restitutio in integrum (ie, restoration of investors’ rights to the contractual position). 
The third factor relates to the general reluctance of ICSID tribunals to order non-pecuniary 
remedies. Investors in a few cases had raised the non-pecuniary claims, but early practice 
showed that ICSID tribunals doubted their authority to issue non-pecuniary remedies. In 
Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia where Indonesia revoked a 
licence granted to Amco for the purpose of hotel construction and operation, the tribunal 
                                                          
663 For example, as elucidated previously, the claimants in Nusa Tenggara Partnership B.V. and PT Newmont 
Nusa Tenggara v. Republic of Indonesia (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/15) filed in July 2014 an arbitration 
request, seeking relief to resume export as the Indonesian government issued a mineral-export ban policy. 
664 The UNCTAD report had shown that an overwhelming majority of investment treaties include four 
requirements for a lawful expropriation: public purpose, non-discrimination, due process and payment of 
compensation. As to standard of compensation, most treaties have incorporated the Hull formula of prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation. See UNCTAD, ‘Expropriation’, UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements II, 2012, 27, 40. 




determined that it could not substitute itself for the Indonesian government to cancel the 
revocation and restore the licence since this kind of restituio in integrum could be ordered 
against a sovereign State.665 More than a decade later, the tribunal in Antoine Goetz and 
others v. Republic of Burundi deliberately bypassed the issue as to whether its authority 
extended to ordering non-pecuniary remedies; instead, the tribunal rendered an interim 
decision on liability in which Burundi must either pay effective and adequate indemnity for 
the termination of the licence or reinstate the licence.666 In other words, the restoration of 
investor’ right was one of the options and the final choice lay within the sovereign 
discretion of Burundi. Until the decision on jurisdiction was rendered in 2004 in Enron 
Creditors Recovery Corporation (formerly Enron Corporation) and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. 
v. Argentine Republic, the ICSID tribunal eventually affirmed its power to order measures 
involving performance or injunction of certain acts.667
in
 However, the tribunal only granted 
compensation  the form of pecuniary damages but did not order restitution due to the 
absence of an agreed form of restitution. As a consequence, non-pecuniary remedies still 
remain as de jure relief without being ordered by any ICSID tribunal. 
 
1.4.2 Enforcing Non-ICSID Awards Through ICSID Arbitration 
 
The convergence in recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is also reflected in a 
possible and feasible enforcement scheme in which non-compliance with non-ICSID 
awards can be a critical factor for ICSID tribunals to determine a violation of obligations 
under investment treaties. In Desert Line Projects LLC v. The Republic of Yemen, the 
Omani corporation initiated ad hoc arbitration in Yemen against the government of Yemen 
in the aftermath of the outstanding payments from a series of construction contracts, and 
obtained in 2004 a favourable arbitral award. However, the government of Yemen applied 
to the Yemeni courts in an attempt to set aside the arbitral award on the grounds of the 
invalidity of the arbitration agreement and the violation of its due process rights. Under the 
pressure of hostility and intimidation from the respondent and its national courts, Desert 
                                                          
665 ICSID Case No ARB/81/1, Award, 20 November 1984, para 202. 
666 ICSID Case No ARB/95/3, Award, 10 February 1999, para 135; English translation in 6 ICSID Rep 5, 45 
(2004). 
667 ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004, para 81. The tribunal examined the 
powers of international courts and tribunals to order non-pecuniary remedies by referring to awards rendered 
in Case Concerning the Rainbow Warrior Affair (New Zealand v. France) and  Antoine Goetz et consorts v. 
République du Burundi and Schreuer’ masterwork The ICSID Convention: A Commentary prior to making 
the conclusion (Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 79 & 80). 




Line Projects LLC signed an agreement proposed by the respondent offering the claimant a 
substantially lesser amount of compensation than that in the arbitral award as a final 
settlement of the dispute. After several efforts to challenge the validity of the settlement 
agreement were to no avail, Desert Line Projects LLC brought the case before an ICSID 
arbitral tribunal, contending that the government of Yemen had breached the Yemen-Oman 
BIT and/or international law.668
 
 
The ICSID tribunal found that the present arbitration case had three jurisdictional pillars, 
namely the undisputable article 25 of the ICSID Convention, the claimant’s request for 
arbitration and the controversial Yemen-Oman BIT under which the tribunal was alleged 
by the respondent lacking jurisdiction.669 As to the controversy concerning the Yemen-
Oman BIT, the tribunal was of the opinion that the dispute was a qualified investment 
under the BIT, 670 and that the Yemeni arbitration which was commenced pursuant to 
contracts was fundamentally distinct from the present ICSID arbitration which related to 
the BIT claim.671 Following the confirmation of jurisdiction over the dispute, the tribunal 
further denied the validity of the settlement agreement since the Yemeni arbitration had a 
final and binding character, precluding any negotiation aiming to reduce the amount of 
payment stated in the arbitral award.672
                                                          
668 ICSID Case No ARB/05/17, Award, 6 February 2008, paras 3-48. 
 Based on the findings regarding Yemen’s breach of 
BIT, the tribunal ultimately awarded compensation equivalent to the value of the Yemeni 
arbitral award. The rationale of this case rested principally on the different jurisdictional 
bases of non-ICSID and ICSID arbitration: the non-ICSID arbitration (Yemeni arbitration) 
was based on the violation of private rights under contracts, whereas the ICSID arbitration 
was commenced in view of the fact that the government of Yemen had breached 
substantial standards under the BIT. Accordingly, the ICSID tribunal exercised its 
jurisdiction over the disputes without running counter to the principle of res judicata. 
Strictly speaking, this case merely indicates that ICSID arbitration can take a part in 
remedying injustice that investors suffer from States’ non-implementation of their 
obligation to enforce non-ICSID arbitral awards under the New York Convention, rather 
than buttressing the direct enforcement of non-ICSID arbitral awards through ICSID 
arbitration. More precisely, what current jurisprudential rationale acknowledges is simply 
669 Ibid, paras 83-84. 
670 Ibid, para 122. 
671 Ibid, para 137. 
672 Ibid, para 177. 




the ICSID arbitration’s possible role in dealing with contract-based non-ICSID arbitral 
awards. 
 
A more unequivocal interaction between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration in the realm of 
enforcement focuses on more direct enforcement of non-ICSID arbitral awards through 
ICSID arbitration. In Saipem S. p. A. v. Bangladesh, the Italian investor Saipem first 
claimed compensation in an ICC arbitration case against Petrobangla (a State entity in 
Bangladesh) on the basis of the Petrobangla’s violation of contracts for the construction of 
a pipeline to carry condensate and gas in Bangladesh. During the arbitral process and after 
receiving an adverse award, Petrobangla took a variety of measures to disrupt the integrity 
of arbitration and applied to set aside the ICC award before the High Court Division of the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh. The High Court Division dismissed the application as it 
was misconceived and incompetent, since the High Court Division held that the ICC award 
was non-existent and devoid of any legal foundation.673 In 2004 Saipem initiated ICSID 
arbitration under the Italy-Bangladesh BIT, and one of the claims was that Bangladesh, in 
the form of its national courts, had extinguished Saipem’s right to acquire the payment 
awarded by the ICC award.674 In determining whether actions of (or actions attributable to) 
Bangladesh amounted to, or were tantamount to, expropriation, the ICSID tribunal in the 
first place emphasized that the substantial deprivation of Saipem’s right to enjoy the 
benefit of the ICC award was insufficient to draw a conclusion that the intervention of the 
High Court Division was tantamount to an expropriation since the vacatur of an award was 
within the ambit of sovereign rights and could not necessarily constitute a claim for 
expropriation.675 However, based on the findings that the Bangladeshi courts’ revocation 
of the ICC arbitral tribunal’s authority contradicted with the principle of prohibition of 
abuse of rights under international law676 and the right to arbitrate under article II of the 
New York Convention,677
                                                          
673 ICSID Case No ARB/05/7, Award, 30 June 2009, paras 6-50. 
 the ICSID tribunal further determined that the decision of the 
High Court Division was flawed under international law despite its plausible legitimacy 
under domestic law, in particular given that Petrobangla felt compelled to set aside the ICC 
award. As the ICSID tribunal observed, the High Court Division’s decision declaring the 
674 Saipem alleged that Petrobangla had colluded with Bangladesh courts to sabotage the ICC arbitration thus 
its investment had been expropriated under Italy-Bangladesh BIT. 
675 Ibid, para 133. 
676 Ibid, paras 156-161. 
677 Ibid, paras 165-170. 




ICC award non-existent indeed constituted the coup de grâce given to the arbitral process, 
therefore casting out all doubt about the effect of the intervention of the Bangladeshi 
courts.678 In conclusion, the tribunal considered that the amount of compensation the ICC 
had awarded corresponded to the evaluation of the compensation resulting from 
Bangladesh’s violation of the BIT.679
 
 
The case has demonstrated that the fact that Bangladesh, through its domestic courts, 
frustrated Saipem’s ability to obtain the benefit of the ICC award was a critical factor for 
the ICSID tribunal to uphold the claim of expropriation. In essence, the effect of the ICSID 
tribunal awarding the amount of compensation equating to the value of the underlying ICC 
award is somehow equivalent to the enforcement of the ICC award through ICSID arbitral 
proceedings. Though the ICC award is rendered in arbitral procedures only involving 
businessmen, it is slightly analogous to an investor-State award in the light of the status of 
Petrobangla as a State entity. In fact, as States have increasingly engaged in commercial 
activities over the past decades, the boundary between the public and private sectors is 
seemingly blurred.680
 
 More importantly, the reasoning that the intervention of Bangladeshi 
courts in relation to the enforcement of the ICC award was taken into account when 
determining Bangladesh’s violation of the BIT in ICSID arbitration may shed new light on 
the interaction between ICSID and non-ICSID investor-State arbitration. 
2 The Driving Force of Convergence  
 
2.1 Influence of Convergence on Related Areas 
 
2.1.1 Convergence of International Trade and Investor-State Arbitration 
 
The identical missions to promote investment protection and economic integration have 
shored up an emerging convergence of international trade and investor-State arbitration. 
The convergence appears increasingly in an interactive manner. First, one salient 
development signalling the convergence of international trade and investor-State 
                                                          
678 Ibid, para 173. 
679 Ibid, para 202. 
680 Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity 
in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law, 94. 




arbitration is the utilization of trade remedies to enforce investment arbitral awards. 
Considering that preferential trade benefits accorded by developed countries to developing 
countries are allowable under the WTO framework and that the conditions imposed upon 
beneficiary countries may include the recognition and enforcement of investment arbitral 
awards, a developed country may suspend, withdraw or cancel the preferential trade 
benefits if the beneficiary country fails to comply with investment arbitral awards in favour 
of investors of the developed country. In other words, in case of a particular country’s non-
compliance with investment arbitral awards, the suspension, withdrawal or cancellation of 
preferential trade benefits would nudge the country towards the enforcement of awards. 
Though controversy exists as to whether the withdrawn of preferential trade benefits is 
consistent with the WTO obligation,681
                                                          
681 In the light of the scarce WTO jurisprudence on the preferential trade benefits, it is still controversial as to 
whether imposing compliance with investment arbitral awards on beneficiary countries is consistent with 
WTO obligation. According to the enable clause, contracting parties may accord differential and more 
favourable treatment to developing and least developed countries, provided that such treatment (i) is 
accorded in a non-discriminatory manner among similarly-situated countries, and (ii) is designed or modified 
to respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of the developing and least developed 
countries (see Decision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1979 (L/4903)). 
 U.S. water services company Azurix Corp and 
    As to the first requirement, it is apparent that only the country that fails to comply with investment arbitral 
award would suffer the withdrawal of preferential trade benefits, and such withdrawal would have a disparate 
impact which would tantamount to denying the non-discriminatory basis. As to the second requirement, it is 
arguable that whether the recognition and enforcement of investment arbitral awards is actually related to the 
developing country’s development and trade needs.  
    In response to the query, some scholars present that in the first place there is no discrimination for all 
developing countries to apply to preferential trade benefits since developing countries are equally eligible to 
be accorded such benefits on the same terms which may include, inter alia, the recognition and enforcement 
of investment arbitral awards in good faith, and there is also no discrimination to withdraw a developing 
country’s eligibility since the same terms are applied equally to all developing countries. Therefore, in case 
of a violation of the terms, ie, failure to fulfil its obligation to comply with investment arbitral awards under 
relevant conventions or treaties, the country is aware of the risks of losing its preferential trade benefits 
eligibility. In the second place, strings attached to preferential trade benefits contain legion needs ranging 
from human rights to contractual compliance, which are mutually-beneficial to both developed and 
developing countries. Non-compliance with investment arbitral awards sends a signal to existing and 
prospective investors that the country is not a predictable and reliable trading partner. 
    In addition, art XX(d) of the GATT 1947 provides an exception that a measure is necessary to secure the 
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of GATT. Laws and 
regulations according preferential trade benefits to developing countries on conditions that investment 
arbitral awards should be honoured are not inconsistent with WTO obligation since they simply create a 
private right of action for claimants (investors). Some commentators assert that the common theme of art 
XX(d) is government regulations of activity undertaken by a variety of economic actors and refers to rules 
that form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO member; accordingly, laws and regulations requiring 
the compliance with investment arbitral awards are the kind of domestic economic regulations. In contrast, 
opponents contend that securing the compliance with investment arbitral awards does not fall within the 
scope of domestic economic regulations. Domestic economic regulations normally deal with customs 
enforcement and anti-competitive or deceptive trade practices, which are obvious within the ambit of art 




CMS Gas Transmission Company 682  have successfully campaigned to suspend 
Generalized System of Preferences conferred on Argentina because Argentina has not 
‘acted in good faith in enforcing arbitral awards in favour of United States citizens’.683 If 
the withdrawal of preferential trade benefits is not sufficient to pressure Argentina to 




Second, investor-State arbitration can also be employed as an instrument to enforce WTO 
commitments. More precisely, it is the broad umbrella clause contained in a number of 
BITs685 that can be adopted to vindicate international trade rights. In fact, many ICSID 
tribunals have taken a broad approach to construe the umbrella clause, granting foreign 
investors treaty rights concerning unilateral undertakings of host States contained in 
relevant contracts, national statutes or treaties.686
                                                                                                                                                                                
XX(d); but these customs enforcement and trade practice are not similar to the compliance with investment 
arbitral awards. See Roger P. Alford, ‘The Convergence of International Trade and Investment Arbitration’ 
(2014) 12 Santa Clara J Intl L 35, 50-60; Simon Lester, ‘More on GSP Withdrawal to Enforce Arbitration 
Awards’, International Economic Law and Policy Blog, 25 March 2014.  
 Relying on the broad umbrella clause, 
682 In Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No ARB/01/12), Azurix obtained a favourable 
award against Argentina but Argentina failed to enforce the award. Argentina also refused to enforce the 
award rendered in CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No 
ARB/01/8). 
683 Presidential Proclamation, To Modify Duty-free Treatment under the Generalized System of Preferences 
and for Other Purposes, No 8788, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,899 (26 March 2012). 
684 Azurix Corp filed a Section 301 case in 2011 to pressure Argentina to enforce the ICSID award rendered 
in Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No ARB/01/12). See U.S. Firm Readies Section 301 
Petition to Collect ICSID Award from Argentina, Inside U.S. Trade, 11 August 2011. 
685 Nowadays, a number of BITs extend international tribunals’ jurisdiction to ‘any dispute relating to 
investments’ (eg, art 8(1) of the France-Argentina BIT, see Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and 
Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, Award of 21 November 
2001, Appendix 1); other BITs create an international law obligation that States shall ‘observe any obligation 
it may have entered to with regard to investment’ (eg, art 3(4) of the Belize-Netherlands BIT (2004), 
available at: http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands_belize.pdf), ‘constantly guarantee the 
observance of the commitments it has entered into’ (eg, art 11 of the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT, see 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. The Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No ARB/07/29, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 February 2010, para 162), or ‘observe any obligation it has assumed’ (eg, 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No ARB/02/6, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, para 34). 
686 For example, ICSID tribunals have a broad interpretation of the umbrella clause in the followings cases: i) 
Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/96/3, Award, 9 March 1998; ii) SGS Société 
Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No ARB/02/6, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004; iii) Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I.- DIPENTA v. 
République algérienne démocratique et populaire, ICSID Case No ARB/03/08, Award, 10 January 2005; iv) 
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Award, 12 May 
2005; v) Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/01/11, Award, 12 October 2005; vi) 




investment commitments in trade agreements can be enforced by virtue of investor-State 
arbitration. For instance, while five cigar-producing countries had brought actions against 
Australia at the WTO to challenge Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Act for its 
establishing a barrier to trade and restricting intellectual property,687 Philip Morris turned 
to the private right of action by initiating investor-State arbitration on the basis of the 
Australia-Hong Kong BIT. 688  Aside from allegations relating to the expropriation of 
intellectual property, violation of fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security guarantee, Philip Morris also relied on the broad umbrella clause in the BIT 689 
and asserted that the wording of ‘Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may 
have entered into’ in article 2(2) of the BIT encompassed international obligations 
enshrined in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(hereinafter ‘TRIPs’), the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter ‘TBT Agreement’).690
 
 The case 
is still pending and it is quite uncertain whether such claim will be upheld by the 
UNCITRAL ad hoc tribunal. However, in spite of the assumption that disputes against 
States arising from international trade should be submitted to the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body, the broad umbrella clause in BITs may blaze a trail in enforcing WTO commitments 
through investor-State arbitration. 
The convergence of international trade and investor-State arbitration does not have a direct 
and considerable impact on the interaction between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration; 
instead, it affects these two genres of arbitration as an external cause. It has been indicated 
previously that the preferential trade benefits come ordinarily with strings attached. As the 
conditions imposed by preferential trade benefits have to promote particular development, 
financial or trade needs of developing countries, such needs normally encompass 
environmental sustainability, human rights and other legitimate objectives. These 
                                                                                                                                                                                
LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006. 
    In addition, an ad hoc tribunal also interpreted a broad umbrella clause in Eureko B.V. v. Republic 
of Poland, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial Award, 19 August 2005. 
687 Australia - Tobacco Plain Packaging (Ukraine), WT/DS434; Australia - Tobacco Plain Packaging 
(Honduras), WT/DS435; Australia - Tobacco Plain Packaging (Dominican Republic), WT/DS441; Australia 
- Tobacco Plain Packaging (Cuba), WT/DS458; Australia - Tobacco Plain Packaging (Indonesia), 
WT/DS467. 
688 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2012-12. 
689 Ibid, Notice of Arbitration, 21 November 2011, para 7.2. 
690 Ibid, paras 7.15-7.17. 




legitimate objectives are of great importance in international trade,691
 
 and they can turn 
into forces to be reckoned with during ICSID and non-ICSID arbitral proceedings if there 
is a possibility that awards resulting from the arbitral proceedings need to be enforced 
through trade remedies. More specifically, if an ICSID or non-ICSID arbitral award was 
rendered without sufficient and necessary trade objectives consideration, developing 
countries may use the lack of trade objectives consideration as a defense to object to the 
withdrawal of preferential trade benefits for their non-compliance with arbitral awards. 
Likewise, considering that the scarcity of human rights, environment protection and other 
trade objectives in investment arbitral awards is contrary to the requirement of conditions 
of preferential trade benefits, it also seems that no adequate grounds exist for developed 
countries to withdraw the preferential trade benefits. 
Consequently, both ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration should be configured, to a certain 
extent, so that they correspond with legitimate objectives of international trade as long as 
any objective indeed affects the underlying investment disputes and the outcome of 
adjudication. In this sense, using trade remedies to enforce investment arbitral awards is 
somehow directing ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration towards a similar end, namely a 
dispute resolution mechanism compatible with one or more fundamental trade objectives. 
Similarly, the utilization of investor-State arbitration aiming to enforce investment 
commitments under the international trade framework also configures ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration to some extent. Such configuration makes ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration more compatible with investment disputes that relate to international trade, and 
thereby ICSID and non-ICSID tribunals can exercise their jurisdictional authority over 
these disputes. The current Argentina enforcement kerfuffle and other States’ non-
compliance with investment arbitral awards might give rise to increasing recourses to trade 
remedies for the purpose of enforcement of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitral awards;692
                                                          
691 For example, trade liberalization may relocate goods and services to States with lax standards and bring 
about environmental degradation, labour redundancy, inequality exacerbation and other adverse 
consequences. In particular, States at the margins of the global market are also obliged under international 
law to fulfil commitments related to all these concerns. 
 
692 For example, following the suspension of Argentina’s Generalized System of Preferences, U.S. 
corporation Chevron (the claimant in Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The 
Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2009-23) petitioned the U.S. Trade Representative to 
suspend Ecuador’s preferential trade benefits under Andean Trade Preference Act/Andean Trade Promotion 
and Drug Eradication Act (see Sixth Report to the Congress on the Operation of the Andean Trade 
Preference Act as Amended, 30 June 2012, 36). The new EU Generalized System of Preferences scheme 
takes effect in 2014, and Argentina has been removed from the list of beneficiaries (see Peter D. Fox and 




accordingly, a convergence of international trade and investor-State arbitration will 
continue to play a part in a manner such that ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration converge 
towards considerations of more necessary human rights, environment protection and other 
trade objectives as long as any trade objective essentially affect the underlying investment 
disputes and the result of the arbitration case. Nonetheless, it should be noted that such 
impact of the convergence of international trade and investor-State arbitration on the 
convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is peripheral and relatively limited. 
 
2.1.2 Convergence of Private International Law 
 
The American choice-of-law revolution in which courts moved away from territory-based 
to consequence-based rules has led to the most fundamental divergence in private 
international law in the twentieth century. 693  In the meantime, the globalization and 
economic integration over the past decades have also promoted the progress of private 
international law in the direction of moderate convergence in response to the need for 
acceptable solutions of issues resulting from the growth in transnational flows of people 
and property. International arbitration is one of the significant parts among a variety of 
matters related to the convergence of private international law.694
                                                                                                                                                                                
Charles B. Rosenberg, ‘The Hidden Tool in a Foreign Investor’s Toolbox: The Trade Preference Program as 
a “Carrot and Stick” to Secure Compliance with International Law Obligations’ (2013) 34 Nw J Intl L & Bus 
53, 78). 
 It would be not absurd to 
conceive that the future convergence of private international law is able to foster greater 
convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. As one of the core aspects of the 
convergence of private international law is the harmonization and unification of national 
laws, the converging national laws on the vacatur and enforcement procedures have the 
potential to reconcile the gap between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. For example, the 
scrutiny by national courts of non-ICSID arbitral awards is conducted in accordance with 
generally accepted standards, and their authority to set aside non-ICSID awards is 
693 As compared to classical rules focusing on predictability and certainty, the American choice-of-law 
revolution abandoned the traditional selection of the jurisdiction where the relationship in question had 
connections, and adopted a selection of the rule that would be applied to the matter in question, thus paving 
the way for a number of new approaches favouring flexibility and material justice in an individual case. See 
Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution: Past, Present and Future (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) 365-418. 
694 See, eg, Tibor Várady, ‘Observation of Group Affiliation (or: Cohabitation with the Impossible) in 
International Commercial Arbitration’ in Katharina Boele-Woelki, et al (eds), Convergence and Divergence 
in Private International Law - Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr, 745-62. 




narrowly construed and restricted to exceptional cases where the exhaustive grounds for 
setting aside arbitral awards parallel those permitted under article 52 of the ICSID 
Convention.  
 
In fact, as the mandate of UNCITRAL is to further the progressive harmonization and 
unification of the law of international trade, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (1985, with amendments as adopted in 2006) has reflected 
worldwide consensus on key aspects of intentional arbitration practice. One of the aspects 
is the grounds for setting aside non-ICSID arbitral awards. Pursuant to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, the grounds for challenge of arbitral awards can be categorized into two 
classes, namely the grounds that claimants have to furnish proof (including the incapacity 
of disputing parties, the invalid arbitration agreement, the improper notice of arbitral 
proceedings, arbitral tribunals’ excess of power and the inappropriate composition of 
tribunals or procedures),695 and the grounds that national courts ex officio finds (such as the 
arbitrability of subject matter and the public policy of States).696 These grounds are taken 
from article V of the New York Convention,697 and they parallel some of the grounds for 
annulment set out under the ICSID Convention. For instance, applicants can request 
annulment of an ICSID award on the grounds (i) that arbitral tribunal was not properly 
constituted, (ii) that arbitral tribunals has manifestly exceeded its powers and (iii) that there 
has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.698 Currently, legislation 
based on the UNCITRAL Model Law has been adopted in 67 States in a total of 97 
jurisdictions.699
 
 As more States adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law, it can be expected a 
convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration in the field of challenge of arbitral 
awards.  
2.2 Confluence of Public and Private International Law 
 
Notwithstanding the stark distinction between public and private international law, it 
appears that the conceptual boundary between public and private international law has 
                                                          
695 Art 34(2)(a) of the UNICTRAL Model Law. 
696 Art 34(2)(b) of the UNICTRAL Model Law. 
697 Some linguistic changes were introduced in the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
698 Art 52(1)(a),(b) & (d) of the ICSID Convention. 
699 See the UNCITRAL website: 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html>. 




been obscured over the past decades since what public international law deals with is no 
longer limited to relations between States and international organization. Meanwhile, 
private international law is deemed a single international system that functions through 
national law rather than a series of discrete national rules. 700  Viewed from this 
international systemic perspective, on the one hand, the norms of public international law 
shape and give effect to private international law, 701  and on the other, as private 
international law reflects concepts of justice pluralism based on principles of ‘tolerance of 
difference’ and ‘mutual recognition’, 702  the operation of private international law 
constitutes ‘an international system of global regulatory ordering…a system of secondary 
legal norms for the allocation, the ‘mapping’, of regulatory authority’.703 Accordingly, the 
rules of private international law are not merely concerned with private justice or 
fairness,704 but with the implication of justice pluralism through providing a number of 
tools to coordinate the consequential diversity of rules of private international law and 
minimize the potential regulatory conflict.705
 
 
As international investment law possesses inherent ‘public-private’ dualities that may have 
created a dilemma for the law,706
                                                          
700 Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity 
in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law, 3. 
 the confluence of public and private international law 
implies a more active interaction between the public and private aspects of international 
investment law and is thus conducive to relieving the tension of the public and private 
701 For example, the norms regarding territoriality and personality in public international law have great 
impacts on the identification of connecting factors such as domicile, nationality, the places where transaction 
occur and where a court is sitting under private international law, thus enabling courts to determine the 
applicable law. 
702 Justice pluralism is the reflection in law of the concept of value pluralism in philosophy, under which the 
just outcome to a dispute depends on the context in which it occurs where the variety of legal cultures 
representing significant and distinct sets of norms should be independently valued. Private international law 
therefore embodies a principle of tolerance of difference in a sense of respect between equals. Meanwhile, 
the principle of mutual recognition demonstrates the obligations of respectful engagement between States. 
Apparently, the recognition of foreign laws is an acknowledgement of the value of both foreign States and 
their people, and an acceptance of the diversity of their values in international society. See Alex Mills, The 
Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the International 
Constitutional Ordering of Private Law, 5-6, 14-15. 
703 Ibid, 299-300. 
704 Though such concerns may arise in the question of whether jurisdiction will be exercised. 
705 Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity 
in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law, 300-301. 
706 Alex Mills, ‘Antinomies of Public and Private at the Foundations of International Investment Law and 
Arbitration’ (2011) 14(2) J Intl Econ L 469. 




interests or objectives of international investment law. In the field of investment arbitration, 
such confluence is able to have a significant effect on the convergence of ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration, especially when it comes to the enforcement of arbitral awards. The 
recent jurisprudence developed in Desert Line Projects LLC v. The Republic of Yemen and 
Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh has indicated that ICSID arbitration might take a part in 
remedying injustice which is, in essence, equivalent to the enforcement of non-ICSID 
arbitral awards. It is indubitable that such jurisprudence is fundamentally resting on the 
increasing influences of public international law on rights under private international law. 
More specifically, in the event that national courts or other authorities fail to implement 
their obligations to uphold the integrity of international arbitration, public international law 
is able to step in to protect private rights derived from articles II and V of the New York 
Convention. Given that non-compliance with the New York Convention is an issue 
concerning sovereign rights which shall not be subject to any appeal, in none of these two 
cases did the ICSID tribunals simply act as appellate bodies. In fact, the egregiousness of 
the States’ interference with investors’ rights in these cases amounted to the abuse of rights 
and the denial of justice and therefore constituted a breach of the relevant BIT. In other 
words, public international law can provide a tangible weapon in protecting non-ICSID 
arbitral awards from the interference of national courts, and such function will be enhanced 
as the confluence of public and private international law deepens further. 
 
2.3 Evolution in Investor-State Arbitration 
 
The convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is largely driven by the necessary 
evolution of investor-State arbitration. It appears less arguable that the emergence of new 
levels of complexity of procedural issues and the development of substantial investment 
treatments lead to an evolution in investment treaty law and arbitration. The status quo of 
international investment arbitration, as asserted by Sornarajah, is normlessness where the 
persistent conflict between arbitral tribunals’ neoliberal ideology and respondent States’ 
restriction on the expansive interpretation causes confusing conceptual chaos.707 While the 
investment arbitration system is in the process of tackling challenges to its legitimacy and 
uncertainty of its tenets,708
                                                          
707 M. Sornarajah, ‘Evolution or Revolution in International Investment Arbitration? The Descent into 
Normlessness’ in Chester Brown, et al (eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, 632-34. 
 the need to reconcile various interests and diverse conflicts 
708 Franklin Berman, ‘Evolution or Revolution?’ in Chester Brown, et al (eds), Evolution in Investment 
Treaty Law and Arbitration, 658-66. 




pushes forward the evolutionary process. The evolution reaches into several, if not large, 
areas in investor-State arbitration, encompassing clearer and uniform criteria of eligible 
investments, more effective and transparent arbitral proceedings and the promotion of the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, most of which virtually direct ICSID and 
non-ICSID arbitration to a discernible convergence.  
 
Such evolution, however, undergoes against the old and longstanding root of international 
investment arbitration in international law which possesses more traditional traits. The 
prospect of convergence is therefore subject to the breadth and depth of the evolution. As 
regards transparency, for example, it is apparent that most non-ICSID arbitration rules are 
emphatically silent on the issues relating to the transparency since these rules have been, in 
principle, crafted to apply to international commercial arbitration involving private parties 
on an equally legal basis. Transparency is not indispensable in the proceedings of solving 
business disputes and even contradictory to disputing parties’ desire of confidentiality in 
some cases. While these rules are being employed to adjudicate investor-State disputes, the 
presumption of confidentiality also serves to ensure the privacy of arbitral proceedings, 
thereby protecting confidential business information and sensitive government documents. 
Despite the worldwide acknowledgement of the fundamental role of public interests in 
investment arbitration as well as the ground-breaking works by UNCITRAL and other 
entities, the potential risks and increased arbitral costs caused by transparency cannot be 
ignored due to their significant impact on the whole arbitral process. The undesirable 
consequence generated by increased time and arbitral costs is noticeable,709
 
 in particular 
where small and medium-sized enterprises file a motion to initiate arbitration or where the 
respondents are developing States.  
More importantly, incremental transparency has the potential to revive the politicization of 
investor-State disputes through the abuse of transparency by both claimants and 
respondents. Investors can impose upon respondent States the burden of criticism on a 
diplomatic level and external pressure from international lenders, seeking nuisance value 
                                                          
709 For example, arbitral tribunals have to spend time on determining whether amicus curiae briefs are 
acceptable, if so, then analysing whether such amicus curiae briefs affect their decisions. Disputing parties 
also have to respond to amicus curiae briefs which incur more time and arbitral costs. Furthermore, public 
participation may reduce the opportunity of settlement since it would be complex to reconcile different 
conflicts and various interests.  




compensation by virtue of extensive publicity.710 By the same token, the possibility also 
exists that respondent State relies on transparency to politicize the disputes. In S.D. Myers, 
Inc. v. Government of Canada, Canada made certain material available to provincial and 
territorial governments, 711  but the UNCITRAL tribunal imposed restrictions on such 
practice on the grounds that Canada’s practice was a departure from the Procedural Order 
No 11 which applied a general principle of confidentiality in the present arbitral 
proceedings712 and that in the absence of parties’ otherwise agreement, article 25.4 of the 
UNICITRAL Arbitral Rules which required hearings to be held in camera should be 
applied. 713  A more notable example is Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United 
Republic of Tanzania in which Tanzania attempted unilaterally to disclose certain orders 
rendered by the tribunal to a third party and make them available on a website. Though the 
tribunal affirmed that there was a marked tendency towards transparency in investment 
arbitration714 and the position of ICSID concerning transparency had evolved from the old 
one to the 2006 Arbitration Rules,715 it determined that all parties should refrain from 
disclosing to third-parties a wide range of documents related to the arbitral proceedings.716 
As the tribunal observed, the disclosure that Tanzania proposed entailed risks to the 
integrity of arbitral proceedings and the danger of an aggravation or exacerbation of the 
dispute.717 Considering that the media campaign had already been fought on both sides of 
the present case, there indeed existed an adequate risk of harm, prejudice or aggravation to 
warrant a certain form of control of such disclosure.718
 
  
It can thus be identified that the evolution towards transparency is duly compromised but 
not self-evident, and that whether it moves towards common standards that permeate all 
genres of investor-State arbitration and whether the evolution is positive on a practical 
                                                          
710 Noah Rubins, ‘Investment Arbitration - “Transparency” in Investment Arbitration: A Call to Cost-Benefit 
Analysis’ (2010) Austrian YB Intl Arb 293, 299. 
711 Canada contended that such practice was based on a process known as ‘C-Trade’ mechanism and was 
necessary to enable Canada to fulfil its obligations under art 105 of the NAFTA. See Procedural Order No 16 
(concerning confidentiality in materials produced in the arbitration), 13 May 2000, paras 3 & 6. 
712 Ibid, para 18. 
713 Ibid, para 19. 
714 ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No 3, 29 September 2006, para 114. 
715 Ibid, para 121. 
716 Ibid, paras 148-63. 
717 Ibid, para 144. 
718 Ibid, para 146. 




level still remain uncertain. Though the assessment of an evolution is essentially 
determined by the perspective assessors take, a dynamic view of controversy within the 
parameters of a basic consensus is also possible. In general, in view of the facts that 
international hearings concerning States acting with ius imperii (sovereign authority) have 
been historically in the public domain719 and that investor-State dispute resolution not only 
deals with claimants and respondents’ interests at stake but also relates to pubic interests 
where human rights or environmental issues may be in play, transparency can be 
vigorously justified and finds its place in investor-State arbitration. Accordingly, what 
truly matters is no longer the existence of transparency, but rather the appropriate level of 
transparency in the dispute settlement mechanisms. Practice to date has revealed that the 
vast majority of, if not all, arbitration rules impose reasonable restrictions on the request of 
transparency in investor-State arbitration. Arbitral tribunals ordinarily remain discretionary 
authority to make determinations on the issue of transparency on a case-by-case basis, and 
disputing parties also retain their rights to oppose third-parties participation.720 In addition, 
a number of exceptions, such as procedural integrity which is stated in the Biwater Gauff 
case and confidential and privileged information protection, normally protect the arbitral 
process against publicity.721 The level of transparency varies depending on the forum that 
is selected for adjudicating investment disputes. So far, the highest level of transparency in 
investment arbitration is probably achieved by NAFTA. 722
 
 As compared to ICSID 
arbitration, the new UNCITRAL Transparency Rules ensure a higher level of transparency, 
but the impact of the Transparency Rules relies on political consideration since States can 
opt out of the Rules in further BITs or Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements 
(hereinafter ‘PTIAs’). The dissimilar level of transparency also has implications for 
investors, especially in assessing and determining the favourable forum based on the 
different levels of visibility of risks that investors would encounter in prospective arbitral 
proceedings. 
                                                          
719 See eg, the practice of ICJ, Mexico-United States Claim Commission and Iran-US Claims Tribunals. 
720 See eg, r 37 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
721 See, eg, art 7 of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules. 
722 Under chapter 11 of the NAFTA, memorials, orders, decisions and awards are made in the public domain 
on a routine basis (see arts 1127-29, 1133 & 1137(4)). The NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued in 2003 a 
Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation which aimed at ensuring more transparency by 
recommending guidelines for arbitral tribunals on the issue of amicus curiae briefs. 




2.4 The Homogeneity of Dispute Resolution 
 
The convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration has been driven not only by external 
factors but also by the relative homogeneity of investment dispute resolution. The 
homogeneity which contributes, internally and primarily, to the convergence of ICSID and 
non-ICSID arbitration reflects in at least three respects. First, the network of international 
investment arbitration professionals has a considerable influence on how the investment 
dispute resolution operates in a converging manner. Such influence can be elucidated in 
three circumstances. The first circumstance focuses on the background of arbitrators. It is 
noteworthy that a large number of decision-makers in investment arbitration come from 
Western Europe and North America who can be discerned demonstrating a cultural and 
legal homogeneity. For instance, up to 68 per cent of arbitrators, conciliators and ad hoc 
committee members appointed in ICSID cases are from Western Europe and North 
America,723 and arbitrators with nationalities of developing countries normally obtain at 
least a law degree in the UK, France or U.S. for developing a pedigree as international 
arbitrators.724 A combination of timing, the limited cognitive scope (or heuristic biases), 
risk aversion and a desire for predictable outcomes on the part of those who appoint 
arbitrators give rise to a core, close-knit and small network of international arbitration 
professionals. 725
 
 It can be maintained that arbitrators in the core network share relatively 
similar social interests, ideological observations and even political philosophy. Such 
coessential characteristics, qualifications and points of view can play a part in examining 
and determining issues with regard to arbitral proceedings (such as the degree of legitimate 
urgency for ordering interim relief and the potential effect of the order on the defendant) 
and further render similar decisions.  
The second circumstance relates to the role alteration of arbitrators. At present it is not 
uncommon for an arbitrator to sit on both ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration cases at 
different times.726
                                                          
723 ICSID, ‘ICSID Caseload – Statistics’, 2014-2, 18. 
 The alteration of roles in adjudicating ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration 
724 Sergio Puig, ‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market (2014) 25 Eur J Intl L 387, 405. 
725 Institutions and disputing parties tend to favour arbitrators with a track record of appointment due to their 
high moral characters and recognized competent, while parties are likely to avert the risks that a newcomer 
may bring because it will be difficult to forecast his/her behaves once appointed. See ibid. 
726 For example, Professor Gaillard sat on a number of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration cases as an 
arbitrator, including, inter alia, EuroGas Inc. and Belmont Resources Inc. v. Slovak Republic (ICSID Case 
No ARB/14/14), Lundin Tunisia B.V. v. Republic of Tunisia (ICSID Case No ARB/12/30), CEZ v. The 




cases may nudge decision-makers, to a certain extent, into filling the apparent procedural 
gap between what investor-State arbitration should be proceeded with under different 
arbitration rules and what it should be proceeded with in accordance with general 
international law.  
 
The third circumstance concerns the issue conflicts which are prevalent in investor-State 
arbitration. Issue conflicts arise when an arbitrator has taken, or gives the appearance of 
having taken, a stance on a recurring issue, including the scenarios where an ICSID 
arbitrator previously acted, or is currently acting, as counsel or expert in a non-ICSID 
arbitration case in which similar legal issues were raised.727 Issue conflicts have been 
questioned for the problematic relationships that can cause doubt about the independence, 
impartiality and neutrality of the arbitrator, 728  and, more specifically, they may even 
contradict the maxim nemo iudex in causa sua.729 In practice issue conflicts have also been 
raised in a few arbitration cases.730
                                                                                                                                                                                
Republic of Albania (UNCITRAL) and Canfor Corporation v. United States of America; Terminal Forest 
Products Ltd. v. United States of America (UNCITRAL/NAFTA). 
 Be that as it may, issue conflicts will continue to exist 
727 Nassib G. Ziadé, ‘How Many Hats Can a Player Wear: Arbitrator, Counsel and Expert?’ (2009) 24(1) 
ICSID Rev-Foreign Investment LJ 49, 49-58. 
728 Roberto Dañino (the ICSID Secretary-General) had expressed that the roles as arbitrator and counsel in 
different cases might lead to the challenge for potential conflicts (see Roberto Dañino, Opening Remarks, 
Symposium on Making the Most of International Investment Agreements: A Common Agenda, 12 December 
2005, <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/36053800.pdf> accessed 28 
September 2014). ICJ Judge Thomas Buergenthal had long believed that the practice of allowing arbitrator to 
serve as counsel and counsel to serve as arbitrator raised the issue of due process of law, and arbitrator and 
counsel should be required to decide to be one or the other, at least for a specific period of time (see Thomas 
Buergenthal, ‘The Proliferation of Disputes, Dispute Settlement Procedures and Respect for the Rule of Law’ 
(2006) 21(1) ICSID Rev-Foreign Investment LJ 126, 129). 
729 As alluded in chapter II, though there is no doctrine of stare decisis under international investment law, 
many ICSID tribunals tend to rely on decisions rendered by other tribunals, thus developing a coherent case 
law or jurisprudence. Wälde had presented that modern system of international investment law grew more 
out of the emerging case law but not the treaties (see Thomas W. Wälde, ‘The Special Nature of Investment 
Arbitration - Report of the Director of Studies of the English-Speaking Section of the Centre’ in Philippe 
Kahn & Thomas W. Wälde (eds), New Aspects of International Investment Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) 66). 
As a consequence, the reversible personality of arbitrator will give rise to two roles that the same person 
serves, ie, rule-maker (arbitrator) and rule-user (counsel or expert) and he may get benefits of a rule that he 
made (see Sam Luttrell, Bias Challenges in International Commercial Arbitration: The Need for a “Real 
Danger” Test (Kluwer Law International, 2009) 240). 
730 For example, Professor Gaillard was challenged as an arbitrator in Telekom Malaysia Berhad v. The 
Republic of Ghana (UNCITRAL Case No HA/RK 2004, 788) by Ghana on the grounds that as a counsel in 
Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco (ICSID Case No ARB/00/6) he provided legal advice for the 
annulment of an award on which Ghana was relying in the present UNCITRAL case (see Decision in Respect 
of the Written Challenge Pursuant to Article 1035 (2) Code of Civil Procedure, Challenge No13/2004, 
Petition No HA/RK 2004.667, District Court of The Hague, 18 October 2004). In Eureko B.V. v. Republic 




in investor-State arbitration in view of the core and small network of international 
arbitration professionals. In addition, issue conflicts are perceived to be better self-
regulating.731
 
 Despite the controversy, it is apparent that the combined roles of arbitrator, 
counsel and expert in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration promote the consistency of ICSID 
and non-ICSID in many ways not only relating to arbitral procedures but also concerning 
the substantive issues, thus converging ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration towards a more 
coherent investment dispute settlement system. 
Second, disputing parties and the cause of action in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration are 
somehow homogeneous. In most cases the resolution of investment disputes deals with the 
compensation for nationalization or expropriation, concentrating commonly on the 
interpretation of most-favoured-nation treatment, national treatment and standard for fair 
and equitable treatment. No matter what agreement disputing parties reach regarding the 
choice between ICSID or non-ICSID arbitration, the interest of foreign investors is 
consistently protected by vindicating their rights under investment treaties (or sometimes 
contracts) in international arbitral proceedings, while the interest of host States is 
safeguarded by defending their regulatory measures that would be legitimate. Therefore, 
the deviation of different forms of procedural protection provided by ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration cannot be too absurd.   
 
Third, regardless of the forum that was selected, the applicable laws for a specific claim 
are more or less cognate, in particular considering that investment treaties and other 
relevant laws would be applied equally in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. Though 
arbitrators are entitled to discretionary authority in interpreting the applicable laws, it is 
conceivable that the applicable BITs, national statutes and rules guarantee a certain amount 
of regularity and even predictability that would lead the arbitral proceedings to an 
                                                                                                                                                                                
of Poland, Poland served a notice of recusal on Judge Stephen Schwebel as an arbitrator since he was co-
counsel in an unrelated case (Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/97/3) where Judge Schwebel had cited the award of Eureko case as authority 
for certain arguments he was making on behalf of his client; additionally, in both of the two cases the 
interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment was necessary (see Damon Vis-Dunbar and Luke Eric 
Peterson, Belgian Appeals Court Rejects Poland’s Challenge to Arbitrator in Eureko Case, Investment Treaty 
News, 17 January 2007). 
731 Roberto Dañino, Opening Remarks, Symposium on Making the Most of International Investment 
Agreements: A Common Agenda. 




established track in a manner such that the departure from procedural justice will be 
eliminated, avoided or reduced to the maximum extent possible.  
 
Besides, it appears that while ICSID tribunals at times make reference to the case law of 
other international judicial bodies which may include non-ICSID case law, non-ICSID 
arbitration also make reference to decisions rendered by ICSID tribunals. In the first place, 
it is acknowledged that ICSID tribunals are explicitly allowed to make references to ICJ 
decisions for the identification of substantive rules of international law.732 In construing 
the scope of protection under the most-favoured-nation treatment, the ICSID tribunal in 
Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain relied heavily upon the ICJ case law and the 
award of a Commission of Arbitration. 733  The ICSID tribunals in Tokios Tokelės v. 
Ukraine734 and Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria735 also made reference 
to the ICJ or even PCIJ case law. In the second place, as non-ICSID arbitration rules 
contain no substantive rules of law and accordingly and ordinarily confer, subject to 
mandatory national laws, on tribunals discretionary rights in determining substantive laws, 
the possibility also exists that non-ICSID arbitral tribunals make reference to ICSID 
decisions. In dealing with the sensitive issue as to whether ‘claims to money’ should be 
deemed as an eligible investment, the SCC tribunal in Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz 
Republic made specific reference to three ICSID decisions. 736
                                                          
732 According to the Report of the Executive Directors, the reference to international law pursuant to art 42(1) 
of the ICSID Convention should be understood in the sense given by art 38 of the Statute of the ICJ (see 
Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States, para 40). 
 On balance, it can be 
asserted that the practice that ICSID tribunals rely on non-ICSID decisions as applicable 
rules and non-ICSID tribunals make reference to ICSID case law demonstrates, to some 
extent, a convergence between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. 
733 The ICSID tribunal made reference to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case (Jurisdiction), Case concerning 
the rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Ambatielos Case (merits: obligation to 
arbitrate) and the Ambatielos case before a Commission of Arbitration. See ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, 
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000, paras 43-50. 
734 The tribunal made reference to the ICJ decision in the Barcelona Traction case when interpreting the 
equitable doctrine of the piercing of the corporate veil. See ICSID Case No ARB/02/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004, para 54. 
735 The tribunal made reference to the PCIJ decision in Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Greece v. 
United Kingdom in dealing with the burden of proof on the issue of jurisdiction. See ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005, para 118. 
736 These three cases are Fedax N.V. v. the Republic of Venezuela, Salini Costruttori and Italstrade v. 
Morocco and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. See SCC Case 
No 126/2003, Arbitral Award, 29 March 2005, 72-73. 





2.5 Competition and Cooperation of Arbitration Institutions 
 
The long-term outlook for the global economy seems to be far from certain due to 
worldwide or regional financial and economic crisis as well as the prolonged economic 
recession, which unavoidably give rise to an increasing number of investment disputes 
between host States and foreign investors and, subsequently, create a global market for 
investor-State arbitration. It is not difficult to assume that a variety of arbitration 
institutions have to compete for the same resources to increase or at least keep their market 
share of dispute resolution.  
 
Although the existence of competition does not necessarily entail a mutual exclusion since 
the coexistence of investment arbitration in diverse forms has been well acknowledged by 
numerous BITs 737 and Conventions, 738 the implication of Gause’s law of competitive 
exclusion in ecology also has an indication that when one genre of arbitration has several 
advantages or edges over another, then the arbitration with advantages will possibly 
dominate in the long run. Accordingly, aside from the perceived competition, arbitration 
institutions are normally coerced (under the pressure to vie for world market share) or 
voluntary learn from one another, and even cooperate on a proper scale if they have 
something in common qua interests or goals. A remarkable example is that following the 
2006 revision of the ICSID Rules in which greater transparency could be considered as an 
advantage for investment dispute resolution, the UNCITRAL Working Group II negotiated 
over the past three years and worked out its own transparency rules in 2013. In the 
meantime, cooperation is not only reflected in ICSID’s administrative support for non-
ICSID arbitration, but also in academic exchanges where arbitration institutions can share 
their insights about their experience in administering investor-State arbitration and present 
their observations on current trends and future directions of investor-State arbitration.739
                                                          
737 For example, BITs ordinarily provides for ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration. 
 
There are even business collaborations between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration 
738 For example, arbitration under the auspices of the ICSID Rules, ICSID Additional Facility Rules, 
UNCITRAL Rules and ICC Rules are applicable for contracting parties of the ECT. 
739 For example, ICSID and SCC recently organized a seminar on the role played by investor-State dispute 
settlement in international investment protection in May 2014. ICSID, SCC and ECT launched a conference 
to discuss and reflect on the implementation of the ECT and to contemplate future developments under the 
ECT in March 2014 to mark the 20 year anniversary of the signing of the ECT. See ICSID News Release, 16, 
May and 7 April 2014. 






 Healthy competition and appropriate cooperation can provide, 
unambiguously, a suitable environment for the convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration. 
3 The Prospect of Convergence 
 
3.1 Converging towards Fairer and More Efficient Dispute Resolution 
 
The recent jurisprudence has revealed a conspicuous convergence of ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration, and such convergence is supposed to be continued in the future in view 
of the symbiotic relationship between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. The symbiotic 
relationship is not only embodied in the fact that ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration are 
ordinarily embedded in the same BIT or convention, but also in the similar objectives that 
they promote. Such relationship may imply a system of complementarity. Currently, the 
constitution of a system of complementarity is largely attributable to the possibilities of 
enforcing ICSID non-pecuniary remedies under the New York Convention and enforcing 
non-ICSID awards through ICSID arbitration. If a system of complementarity is 
established, it would be one of underlying foundations for the convergence of ICSID and 
non-ICSID arbitration. Furthermore, as stated previously, there are also a number of 
internal engines associated with external forces building up and fostering the convergence 
of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration in practice.  
 
In addition, the convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID is conducive to promoting and 
advancing the development of international investment arbitration, which is a crucial factor 
affecting the prospect of convergence. The convergence can be seen as a consequential 
evolution towards fairer and more efficient dispute resolution. First, the convergence in the 
field of the role of institutions has pushed for greater efficiency and fairness in investor-
State disputes. As ICISD is the world’s leading institution having extensive experience in 
international investment dispute settlement, ICSID’s administrative support for non-ICSID 
arbitration would ensure ad hoc arbitral proceedings to be operated in a more efficient way. 
Furthermore, incremental transparency in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration strives to 
                                                          
740 For example, ICSID and the Lagos Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration signed an 
update collaboration agreement in November, 2013 with the purpose of further encouraging cooperation and 
knowledge sharing between the two institutions. See ICSID News Release, 20 November 2013. 




balance the public interest and the interest of disputing parties in an efficient resolution of 
their disputes. Since investment arbitration acknowledges the essential role of the public as 
a stakeholder, it becomes fairer to third-parties and the public if they have legitimate 
interests in investor-State disputes. 
 
Second, the convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration can lead to certainty and 
predictability, thus reducing the possibility of contradictory outcomes where parallel 
proceedings take place. As stated previously, based on similar circumstances, ICSID 
tribunals rendered five decisions with contradictory outcomes as to whether Argentina 
violated treaties obligations. In a worse situation, international tribunals had come to 
opposite results in situations where the same investment dispute was brought before 
different arbitral tribunals by a subsidiary company and its parent company. Two 
simultaneous arbitral proceedings were brought before two UNCITRAL tribunals against 
the action of the Czech Media Council. However, while the tribunal in Ronald S. Lauder v. 
The Czech Republic determine that Czech Republic’ minor breach of treaty did not lead to 
the liability of compensation,741 the tribunal in CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech 
Republic held that Czech Republic breached various BIT standards and hence must pay 
damages.742
 
 Since the convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration has been driven by 
the legal and cultural homogeneity of investment dispute resolution, it can be seen that the 
network of international investment arbitration professionals, the cause of action, the 
cognate applicable law and the reference to case law are able to promote the commonly 
accepted standards for the interpretation of applicable law that would apply to both ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration, and therefore create certainty in international investment 
arbitration. 
Third, the convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration can enhance the function and 
value of international investment arbitration, thereby ensuring the integrity of international 
investment arbitration as a whole. The raison d’être of the ICSID is to provide facilities for 
resolution of investment disputes and further promote the enforcement of awards. It is 
obvious that an ICSID non-pecuniary award cannot be enforced under the ICSID 
Convention. If the enforcement scheme in non-ICSID arbitration cannot step in and play a 
supporting role, the prevailing party may question the function and value of the ICSID and 
                                                          
741 Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 3 September 2001. 
742 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 14 March 2003. 




even challenge the whole international investment arbitration. Accordingly, the 
convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration maintains the integrity of the whole 
international investment arbitration. 
 
3.2 Limitation of Convergence 
 
It is too early to conclude that greater convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration 
will be seen and that, on the whole, the convergence represents the future development of 
invest-State arbitration. In fact, the prospect of convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration is essentially shaped by a number of limitations. In the first place, one of the 
unavoidable parts of the convergence is its relatively small scale. For instance, specific 
performance or other non-pecuniary remedies are rarely awarded by ICSID arbitral 
tribunals since it is more possible, feasible and even desirable to order provisional 
measures pending the resolution of disputes than ordering a specific performance in the 
award. As a consequence, it appears that the convergence would not commonly occur in 
the realm of enforcement with regard to the New York Convention’s role in enforcing 
ICSID non-pecuniary remedies.  
 
In the second place, the convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration, though 
significant, is controversial in some respects. At the very least, it still remains uncertain 
whether the ‘Salini test’ developed in ICSID jurisprudence shall be applied to non-ICSID 
arbitration, especially given that it would render meaningless the choice provided by 
investment treaties to foreign investors between diverse avenues of recourse. The 
UNCITRAL tribunal in Romak S.A. (Switzerland) v. The Republic of Uzbekistan also 
denied the role of the Romak award in developing jurisprudence constant, stating that it 
was merely tasked with a mission that was more mundane but no less important. The 
mission was to resolve the present dispute between disputing parties in a reasoned and 
persuasive manner, irrespective of the unintended consequences that the tribunal’s analysis 
might have on future disputes in general.743
 
 
In the third place, the divergence and convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration are 
two opposing trends, and the divergence is perceptibly more powerful. The divergence of 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is intrinsic since ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration are 
                                                          
743 PCA Case No AA280, Award, 26 November 2009, para 171. 




different in nature. ICSID arbitration distinguishes itself from non-ICSID arbitration not 
only because of its public characteristic which is indubitably of consequence for settlement 
of disputes arising out of States’ action to regulate investment activities, but also in view of 
the self-contained system which eliminates any potential exterior interference. The 
endogenous and exogenous effect of the systemic divergence of a general nature has 
significantly affected the evolution of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. Moreover, 
maintaining certain divergences within an overarching system of investor-State arbitration 
is beneficial for the further development of investment arbitration. The prospect of 
convergence is in part contingent upon arbitration institutions’ endeavours to reconcile the 
gap between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. While galvanizing collective efforts to 
promote the convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration at the national and 
international levels, arbitration institutions shall also account for the diversity of arbitration 
which provides with unique and inspirational perspectives in facilitating dispute resolution 
and bringing about outcomes that are more suitable to the claimant, respondent, third 
parties or all of them in a particular case. For example, in order to protect confidential, 
sensitive or legally privileged information, foreign investors would opt for a dispute 
resolution mechanism that emphasizes less transparency. As stated previously, becoming a 
respondent before an international arbitral tribunal would have a detrimental impact on 
State’s investment environment reputation. Accordingly, there is a possibility that States 
also favour a more confidential dispute resolution process for a specific case where the 




It has become quite conspicuous at the present time that a level of convergence of ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration has occurred and such occurrence will be expected to continue 
to a much greater extent in some areas of investor-State arbitration. In fact, ICSID and 
non-ICSID arbitration are precisely that in spite of singularity, which is appeared in 
numerous respects, they are also a jumbled together mechanism on the whole known as 
investor-State arbitration. The symbiosis of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration creates and 
maintains a relatively stable environment for the convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration, in which a number of factors act as engines for promoting the convergence. 
However, as compared to the inherent and apparent divergences between ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration, the convergence is somehow limited at present and is likely to maintain 











1 Delivering Justice in a Fair, Efficient, Accountable and Legitimate Way 
 
It is widely acknowledged that ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration are the primary and 
divergent mechanisms of global justice that seek to uphold rights and obligations arising 
out of investment between foreign investors and sovereign States. More important than 
singling out their characteristic traits in a straightforward manner is to evaluate them in the 
light of their ends. In general terms, the very premise of the evaluation of ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration, or the benchmark for evaluating the divergence of ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration to be precise, is anything but univocal, lying mainly in traditional 
fairness and efficiency. While fairness, which can be identified in at least three dimensions, 
namely fairness as an end (substantive justice), a process (procedural integrity) and 
legitimate power, is unequivocally an a priori criterion, it can also readily discern the 
current zeitgeist that demonstrates an aspiration towards greater efficiency in international 
arbitration, aiming to foster the optimum administration of justice.  
 
Furthermore, in view of its sui generis characteristics, the multi-faceted investor-State 
arbitration not only underpins the eclectically fair and efficient delivery of justice in the 
traditional sense, but also concentrates on the legitimacy of the dispute resolution method 
which has decisive effects on the accountability, stability, vitality and long-term viability 
of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. In particular, the impact of investor-State arbitration 
on sovereign States is far more than the amount of compensation (which is obviously of 
considerable consequence for its draining public treasuries), and further extends 
dynamically to States’ future policy-making and regulation-making since investor-State 
arbitration exhibits traits that characterize adjudication that is virtually tantamount to the 
exercise of public authority over issues relating to public interests. In fact, investor-State 
arbitration is perceived to be interplay of a variety of actors in which the divergence of 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration takes a crucial part in pulling the arbitral processes in 
discrepant directions, namely delivering fair, efficient, accountable and legitimate justice 
to a different extent. The endogenous and exogenous effect of the systemic divergence of a 
general nature, coupled with specific divergence derived from the disparate nature and 
architectural design, lies within variable and somewhat broad parameters. In fact, the 





investment regime can be extraordinarily profound, ranging not only from the procedural 
efficiency to the substantial outcome of cases but also from the traditional pursuit of 
fairness to the enhancement of legitimacy through reconciling investors’ interests and 
comparable political, economic and social concerns of States, arbitration institutions, third-
parties and the public.  
 
First, insofar as State sovereignty is concerned, it is conspicuous that States have to 
transfer, by and large, more alienable sovereign rights in ICSID arbitration due mainly to 
its self-contained system which excludes any relief and supervision from national courts. 
The difference as to how far these sovereignty transfers can go becomes essential when 
States consider joining or withdrawing from the ICSID Convention. Ordinarily, developing 
countries enter into BITs at the expense of surrendering judicial sovereignty because they 
rely on the assumption that BITs’ commitment of providing foreign investors with access 
to investor-State arbitration is directly correlated with FDI inflows, which, however, 
remains controversial. As developing countries concede sovereignty by coercively 
subjecting themselves to investor-State arbitration only in the belief that they would benefit 
from the global capital market, they would abandon investment arbitration and resume 
their regulatory rights if such expected commitment could not be achieved. In fact, one of 
the primary reasons why several Latin American countries denunciated the ICSID 
Convention but accepted UNCITRAL arbitration is precisely that the ICSID Convention, 
as they asserted, was an infringement of national sovereignty. In recent years developed 
countries have also paid more attention to the relinquishment of sovereignty since their 
governmental measures have been challenged in investor-State arbitration by investors 
from both developing and developed countries. Hence, in what ways and to what extent 
would States consider transferring their sovereign rights to international tribunals are of 
principal importance in their pursuit of economic development or overseas investment 
protection. 
 
Second, the proposition of the divergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is anchored 
firmly and directly in the protection of investors on the international plane since in real 
practice it is normally the investors who select the dispute resolution method and initiate 
arbitral proceedings. Investors’ choice between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is not a 
philosophical or theoretical question but an intensely practical and delicate matter which 





austere in extraordinary times when financial crises sweep across the globe. Furthermore, 
as international arbitration is evolving into a veritable industry led by entrepreneurial 
counsels advising potential clients about options for resolving disputes between investors 
and States through investor-State arbitration, the integral impulse of counsels, coupled with 
incentive of third-party funding, can be asserted having measurable influence on the 
selection of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. 
 
Third, notwithstanding the current ascendancy of ICSID arbitration, the past decade has 
seen an increasing number of investment cases adjudicated under the auspices of non-
ICSID arbitration rules. Accordingly, it is tenable to conceive that there will be more 
competition among different investment fora in the future, especially given that the vast 
majority of investment treaties do not provide for a hierarchy of fora. While arbitration 
institutions have to engage in aggressive marketing campaigns and compete for their world 
market share of disputes, an assessment of the divergence between ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration is by no means negligible. Meanwhile, despite the competition, both ICSID and 
non-ICSID arbitration face the challenge against their legitimacy as an international 
dispute resolution mechanism. It is generally submitted that much of the so-called backlash 
against investor-State arbitration has been directed at ICSID arbitration. It might be an 
exaggeration to speak of an acute legitimacy crisis or a backlash. However, it should be 
noted that the challenge of legitimacy ought to be taken seriously by arbitration institutions, 
and the reaction and response by arbitration institutions would influence their public 
acceptance and further affect their functioning and viability in the future arbitration 
community. 
 
Fourth, as investment disputes are more often than not claimed against actions of public 
service sections in host States, public interest issues, in particular those related to 
sustainable development, have been brought before investor-State arbitral tribunals and 
make two primary enquiries into the potential protection in ICSID and non-ICSID 
arbitration. The first enquiry concerns the procedural protection in which the ambivalence 
between public participation and sensitive information protection leads to different 
approaches to amicus curiae in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. The second enquiry 
focuses on the substantive protection. Though the observations that investor-State 
arbitration is not intrinsically biased towards sustainable development or investment 





are axiomatic, the rules on treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties have provided tribunals with potential to reconcile sustainable development and 
investment protection concerns. Moreover, without prejudice to their independence, 
neutrality and impartiality, ICSID arbitral tribunals are supposed to be intensely thoughtful 
of economic development (one of indispensable components of sustainable development) 
since the promotion of economic development is one of the fundamental objectives of the 
ICSID Convention. In contrast, non-ICSID arbitral tribunals may simply be charged with a 
commission to resolve particular claims without contemplating the wider implication on 
the economic and even sustainable development due to the scarcity of sustainable 
development clause in non-ICSID arbitration rules. The evaluation of bringing sustainable 
development issues before investor-State arbitral tribunals and balanced approaches to 
examining the relationship between sustainable development and investment protection are 
not yet sufficiently developed, but diverse extents of public participation in ICSID and 
non-ICSID arbitration and the possibility of ICSID tribunals considering sustainable 
development issues would have significant implications for the sovereign choice between 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration in the course of investment treaties negotiations. 
 
Overall, investor-State arbitration is hybrid in character, inherently associating with the 
tension between the public regulatory powers of sovereign States on the one hand and the 
essentially contractual nature of the private investment on the other, and with the non-
equilibrium function in pursuit of justice through resolving particular disputes inter partes 
(which is directly mandated by investors and respondent States) and of, additionally, the 
public interests at stake (that should be potentially guarded for the purpose of the general 
interest of development). Given the distinctive origins of ICSID (which is specially 
designed for settlement of investment disputes) and non-ICSID arbitration (that is 
originally crafted to apply to commercial disputes), the divergence of ICSID and non-
ICSID arbitration in dealing with investment disputes alludes indubitably to different 
impacts on foreign investors and their counsels, sovereign States, arbitration institutions, 
third-parties and the public. However, the evaluation of the divergence of ICSID and non-
ICSID cannot be achieved by a tally of points on the basis of a one-dimensional caricature 
of each alternative; rather, it not only needs a critical weighing of pros and cons of ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration, but also requires further inspection to examine the interplay 
and interaction between the two mechanisms and to scrutinize, accordingly, fair, efficient, 





realm of international investment, especially considering that the present landscape of 
investor-State arbitration is distinctly different from what it was nearly 50 years ago when 
the ICSID Convention was concluded. 
 
2 The Divergence of ICSID and Non-ICSID Arbitration 
 
2.1 Two General Divergences 
 
The first divergence in nature is the public characteristic of ICSID arbitration as compared 
to the relatively private characteristic of non-ICSID arbitration. Although investor-State 
arbitration is hybrid in character primarily in the light of its adjudication of disputes that 
relate to private investment and States’ regulatory rights, each genre of arbitration 
intrinsically has a public or private nature which reflects most of its characteristics, 
whether broadly or narrowly defined. As a multi-faceted dispute settlement mechanism, 
ICSID is situated at the intersection of laws, politics and economics, and the intersection 
typically implicates issues of international magnitude that have essential impacts on 
various interests. The public characteristic of ICSID arbitration is reflected in its 
inheritance to the notion of arbitration as a means of resolving inter-State disputes, the 
crucial impacts on sovereign States’ future investment policy-making and regulation-
making, and the designation of arbitrators by sovereign States. By comparison, though 
non-ICSID arbitration has enormous public significance in some cases, it is still apparent 
that the private characteristic is an orthodox and indispensable part of non-ICSID 
arbitration since UNCITRAL, SCC and other non-ICSID arbitration rules are originally 
and principally created for use in international commercial disputes between private 
businessmen. Such perception of private characteristic has caused scepticism about non-
ICSID arbitration’s unduly weighting on the preferences and interests of capital-exporting 
countries. 
 
The second divergence of a general nature relates to the legal framework of ICSID and 
non-ICSID arbitration. The ICSID Convention provides a self-contained system of 
resolving investment disputes in which the ICSID Convention, complemented by a set of 
its institutional rules, is the only source of regulation of all aspects of arbitral proceedings, 
thus being thoroughly autonomous and explicitly independent of any legal system. On the 





of international and national laws. Insofar as lex arbitri is concerned, non-ICSID 
adjudicatory proceedings are subject to various procedural rules, depending on the 
applicable legal system at the arbitral situs. The application of lex arbitri also extends to 
the post-award remedies and the enforcement procedure where national courts at the 
arbitral situs are entitled with authority to review arbitral awards in accordance with 
national statues, while national courts before which the enforcement is sought are 
conferred on broad discretionary powers under national statutes or conventions to resist the 
enforcement of awards.  
 
ICSID Arbitration, which is primarily identified in terms of its public characteristic and the 
innovative self-contained legal framework in specially providing resolution for investment 
disputes, is ordinarily viewed as an immense virtue, whereas non-ICSID arbitration (with 
the exception of ICSID additional facility arbitration) that is allegedly perceived to be 
inherited a private characteristic from traditional commercial arbitration and relied on lex 
arbitri as complement seems to be slightly detrimental to the maintenance of integrity and 
all-inclusiveness of investor-State arbitration, and hence viewed as a relative outsider and 
newcomer as a form of resolution for solving investment disputes between foreign 
investors and sovereign States. The disparate natures and discrepant legal frameworks are 
not merely conceptual distinctions; instead, they bring about a number of specific 
procedural and substantial divergences between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration.  
 
2.2 Four Specific Divergences 
 
2.2.1 Front End of Divergence: Jurisdiction 
 
It is recognized that more sovereign rights have to be transferred to ICSID arbitral tribunals 
than to non-ICSID arbitral tribunal. In evaluating in what way and to what degree foreign 
investors can rely on investor-State arbitration, States have to consider three divergences 
regarding jurisdiction in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration so as to strike a balance 
between State sovereignty and foreign investors’ interests. First, it is conspicuous that the 
scope of subject matter eligible for both treaty-based and contract-based non-ICISD 
arbitration is broader than that in ICSID arbitration. Notwithstanding its condition on 
arbitrability, the subject matter covered in non-ICSID arbitration contains a broad set of 





settled within a proper single instrument and thereby enhancing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of dispute settlement. As compared to the party-centric subject matter in non-
ICSID arbitration, the subject matter in ICSID arbitration is restricted to those that passed 
the ‘dual test’. Nevertheless, while the current trend in international investment treaties 
appears to move in the direction where the wide-ranging subject matter is increasingly 
covered in ICSID arbitration, ICSID tribunals also contribute to the emerging trend 
through constantly ruling in favour of jurisdiction and investment protection, which signals 
to foreign investors that their rights would be actually and ultimately protected under the 
ICSID Convention and relevant investment treaties. The expansion of ICSID jurisdiction, 
however, gives birth to the Gordian knot which has caused and continues to cause 
confusion in ICSID arbitration. In order to reduce, or at least mitigate, the risks and 
damages caused by the Gordian knot, it is recommended that States should consider 
including in investment treaties a narrower definition of investment if they intend to adopt 
a restrictive method when being respondents in arbitral proceedings. In addition, article 25 
of the ICSID Convention could not be construed by ICSID tribunals restrictively, nor 
liberally, but in good faith. 
 
Second, non-ICSID arbitration is more compatible with other dispute resolution procedures, 
which can be identified in two aspects. In the first place, the tacit waiver rule on exhaustion 
of local remedies distinguishes ICSID from non-ICSID arbitration, and the explicit waiver 
requirement under the ICSID Convention seems to be a derogation of State sovereignty in 
that States normally lose their chance to protect sovereignty through involving domestic 
procedures due to the common negligence of the different waiver requirements between 
customary international law and the ICSID Convention. Nevertheless, the ICSID’s explicit 
waiver requirement and the fork-in-the-road clause in BITs facilitate to some extent the 
access for foreign investors to the international remedies, and tricky investors can even 
enjoy a double benefit from both domestic instrument and international arbitration. In the 
second place, while conciliation is excluded from ICSID arbitral proceedings, the 
complementary use of conciliation in non-ICSID arbitration is able to reduce, if not 
entirely avoid, both extra time and cost consequences which can occur in ICSID arbitration. 
If the complementary use of conciliation is desirable, the drawback of ICSID’s 
incompatibility can be solved by revising the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Moreover, the 
incompatibility has been buffered in some cases where BITs provide a waiting-period 





and negotiations between the parties to the dispute. However, given that conciliation can 
be conducted under private and confidential conditions, the confidentiality of the 
proceedings not only fails to be accord with ICSID’s general need for transparency, but 
also undermines the interests of various stakeholders. 
 
Third, as compared to the exclusion of any remedy from national courts due to the 
depoliticization and delocalization of ICSID arbitration, the support from national courts is 
not only available in non-ICSID arbitration but also takes an extraordinarily essential part 
in some cases where a request for interim relief prior to the constitution of tribunal and the 
judicial enforcement of interim relief are urgent. While the role of national courts can be 
played in an appropriate manner that provide necessary assistances without detracting the 
effect of arbitration on the one hand, it also has a potential to cause a tension between 
jurisdiction of national courts and arbitral tribunals and further invokes its potential to 
bring about interference in arbitral proceedings which would unequivocally diminish 
crucial functions of the arbitral process on the other. In general, the abusive intervention of 
national courts may be not only identified as a delay tactic because it is ordinarily 
exercised in bad faith, but also deemed as a breach of obligation under investment treaties 
since it fails to comply with the rule of law and universally accepted principles of 
international arbitration.  
 
2.2.2 Middle End of Divergence: The Role of Institutions 
 
Arbitration institutions have a unique position at the fulcrum of investor-State dispute 
resolution mechanism, and the involvement of institutions is particularly constructive in 
reducing the risks of procedural breakdowns and further essentially promotes the 
development of investor-State arbitration. A premise of the role of institutions lies in the 
independence of institutions in view of the fact the raison d’être of investment arbitration is 
primarily the neutral fora delivering justice independent of exterior political, administrative 
and judicial interference. Admittedly, ICSID’s present ‘independence’ as an arbitration 
institution is insufficient since it is administratively and financially associated with or 
attached to the World Bank which might be a stakeholder in ICSID arbitration cases. In 
contrast, except ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, mainstream non-ICSID 





institutions, thus effectively avoiding institutions’ inappropriate or illegitimate interference 
towards arbitral tribunals. 
 
The role of institutions takes two main forms. The first form concerns the substantive case-
related functions of the Secretariat. While ad hoc arbitration without a Secretariat is 
arguably more flexible and some sovereign States appear reluctant to have recourse to the 
authority of any institution, regardless of its standing, the Secretariat in institutional 
arbitration entails a more predictable character of international arbitration, ensuring, to a 
large extent, the continued integrity and efficiency of the investment dispute settlement 
facilities. As compared to the Secretariat in non-ICSID institutional arbitration, the ICSID 
Secretariat performs two distinctive functions, ie, the screening power and the appointing 
authority which increase the efficiency of arbitral proceedings and guarantee the bona fide 
use of the Centre’s facility. 
 
The second form concentrates on the functions that would have profound impacts on the 
investor-State arbitral jurisprudence and the coherent development of investment dispute 
settlement mechanism, in particular the vital functions that arbitration institutions perform 
in controlling arbitral costs and fostering the consistency of investment arbitration. Arising 
out of a number of interconnected causes, the arbitral cost conundrum reveals two sensitive 
issues, namely the spiralling arbitral costs and the apportionment of arbitral costs. Many 
non-ICSID arbitration institutions are increasingly sensitive to the discontentment of the 
skyrocketed costs and time expenditure, and accordingly a variety of initiatives have been 
launched, attempting to avoid an expensive, lengthy and cumbersome process by virtue of 
a range of techniques which include measures that enable disputing parties to dispense 
with procedural formalities and tailor arbitral proceedings to their particular claims. 
Though the initiatives may bring with them several problems leading to unintended 
consequences, they set a generally positive example in directing disputing parties and 
tribunals to take steps to promote the cost-efficiency. In the meantime, rationalizing the 
cost apportionment and probably adopting the English rule would indubitably promote the 
clarity and determinacy of decisions and thus enhance the efficacy and efficiency of 
investor-State arbitration. As to the consistency, though inconsistency may ultimately 
imperil the legitimacy of investment arbitration, it appears extremely difficult to foster a 
harmonized non-ICSID case law due to the generally less transparent proceedings and a 





foster consistency and further promote a coherent development of investment arbitration 
jurisprudence. 
 
2.2.3 Back End of Divergence: Challenge and Enforcement of Awards 
 
The back end of the arbitral process, ie, the post-award remedies and the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards, demonstrates the most dramatic divergence between ICSID 
and non-ICSID arbitration. As an extraordinary post-award remedy, the annulment in 
ICSID arbitration is an internal and centralized mechanism in which ad hoc committees are 
entitled with powers for reviewing awards on the basis of a rather limited number of 
specific grounds. Conversely, non-ICSID arbitral awards are subject to the judicial review 
by national courts at the arbitral situs where applicable standards of setting aside awards 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The relatively decentralized framework indicates 
various standards of review and such disparity found in national statutes entails, prima 
facie, a remarkable degree of uncertainty. However, it is insufficient to infer that different 
approaches provided in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration are inherited with superiority or 
inferiority from the perspective of challenging the finality of arbitral awards. In fact, it 
would be imprudent to conclude that non-ICSID arbitration necessarily brings about a 
higher likelihood of vacatur. For one thing, it appears that national courts display, by and 
large, great deference to international arbitral awards and the experience of vacatur before 
national courts can even generate a coherent and stable jurisprudence. For another, despite 
the restricted grounds for annulment, it is not uncommon that ad hoc committees exceed 
the role vested in them by the ICSID Convention and go too far into the merit of the cases, 
resulting in unpredictable proceedings in real practice. 
 
The fate of vacated non-ICSID arbitral awards also exhibits a radical divergence between 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. Unlike the nullity effect of annulment in ICSID 
arbitration, a decision on vacatur of a non-ICSID arbitral award can be appealed to higher 
national courts, or national courts can remand the case to the arbitral tribunals for 
reconsideration. More importantly, a vacated non-ICSID award may even be enforced in 
jurisdictions other than the arbitral situs, which is not only buttressed by scholars’ 
standpoint that international arbitration is entirely detached from any legal system, but also 
justified under the New York Convention and the European Convention. On the one end of 





inconsistency and unpredictability in the light of diverse court rulings in different 
jurisdictions. However, it may be at the opposite end of the spectrum since the effect of 
enforcement of vacated awards is in accord with investors’ expectation, especially 
considering that respondent States can seek for setting aside unfavourable awards by 
imposing political pressure on national courts at the arbitral situs and that national courts at 
the arbitral situs can take into account the public policy of respondent States when vacating 
non-ICSID arbitral awards. 
 
In addition to annulment, the self-contained ICSID system further contains an autonomous 
regime, imposing a presumptive obligation not only on disputing parties to abide by and 
comply with awards but also on all contracting States to enforce the pecuniary obligation 
imposed by awards. By comparison, the presumptive obligation to enforce non-ICSID 
arbitral awards is specified in different instruments under which the enforcement of arbitral 
awards may suffer from more onerous procedures, including the separate procedure of the 
recognition and enforcement and the reservations under the New York Convention. 
Furthermore, there is a possibility that non-ICSID arbitral awards are subject to substantive 
review by national courts on the merit of the awards. Accordingly, it is conceivable that the 
ICSID Convention provides a simplified and effective architectural design for obtaining 
enforcement and further ensures to a large extent the pursuit of enforcement of ICSID 
awards against sovereign States in less time and with less cost. 
 
Similar to the evaluation of post-award remedies, ICSID’s procedural virtues, however, are 
not sufficient to implicate a systematically superior enforcement mechanism. In fact, the 
ICSID’s voluntary enforcement scheme has encountered a number of obstacles in Latin 
America where the compliance with awards was challenged on the grounds of a variety of 
defenses within and outside the ICSID Convention. The challenge of enforcement of 
ICSID arbitral awards not only reflects in the procedural tactical manoeuvre that 
unfavourable parties deploy before national courts in an attempt to delay or resist 
enforcement, but also extends to the sovereign immunity from execution which can take a 
pivotal role in refusing the enforcement of awards. Though sovereign immunity is also a 
potential risk in non-ICSID arbitration, it is noteworthy that there is no express reservation 
of immunity from execution akin to article 55 of the ICSID Convention containing in the 
New York Convention. In practice, investors seeking enforcement under the New York 





implied waiver of a claim of immunity from execution. Moreover, as compared to the 
limits to enforcement of ICSID awards, a range of system designs in non-ICSID arbitration, 
such as a more favourable enforcement regime, few restrictions on enforcement fora, 
exhaustive grounds for refusal of enforcement and the availability of interim relief, are 
constructive in facilitating transnational enforcement of non-ICSID arbitral awards. 
 
On balance, the divergences between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration are manifold, 
reflecting in a significant number of procedural and substantive matters that range from the 
threshold of jurisdiction to the final execution of awards. As ICSID is specially created for 
investor-State arbitration, its effective and more adaptive architectural design has led to the 
relative ascendancy in the contemporary investment arbitration. Nonetheless, the foremost 
virtue of ICSID arbitration is not in itself a prevalent hallmark of superiority of an 
investment dispute resolution over non-ICSID arbitration. In fact, it has been an 
acknowledgement that non-ICSID arbitration, though original for settlement of 
international commercial disputes (except the ICSID additional facility arbitration), is also 
suitable for solving investment disputes. More importantly, several non-ICSID arbitration 
rules are dynamically adapting themselves, to various degrees, to prove their raison d’être 
in the context of investor-State arbitration. Accordingly, the perception of the divergence 
of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is by far more complex than simplistic sketch in 
which the divergence is merely considered as a matter of choice rather than of hierarchy. It 
is conspicuous that ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration have different and substantial 
impacts on legitimate interests of diverse actors in investor-State arbitration, but they also 
serve similar ends of delivering justice in a fair, efficient, accountable and legitimate way. 
In a broader context, ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration even construct complementary 
mechanisms of a global justice system, in particular given the emerging convergence of 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. 
 
3 The Convergence 
 
Notwithstanding the inherent divergence, it appears that ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration 
are overstepping or have overstepped, to a certain extent, the formerly existing boundaries 
that underscore the characteristic traits of diverse avenues of recourse to investor-State 
arbitration, thereby leaving the door open for the convergence between ICSID and non-





distinctive relationship and interaction between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration that 
might be attributed with characteristics ranging from an array of divergences which are 
obviously understandable on the one hand, to a noteworthy convergence that can be 
perceived as a new-fangled evolvement on the other. It has become evident by now that the 
convergence, both extant and emerging, reflects in a number of regions in the realm of 
international investment. Such convergence is promoted not only indirectly by the 
influence of convergence on international trade and investor-State arbitration and on 
private international law and the confluence of public and private international law, but 
also directly by the evolution in investor-State arbitration, the legal and cultural 
homogeneity of dispute resolution and the competition and cooperation of arbitration 
institutions. Nevertheless, while the imperative of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is to 
maintain the procedural and substantive fairness, efficiency and legitimacy applied equally, 
if not more so, to all actors in investor-State arbitration pursuant to protection standards 
enshrined in investment treaties or other applicable statutes, it is quite unequivocal that 
investment treaties or other applicable laws normally provide distinct recourses to 
remedies of the violation of protection standards. The need for diverse dispute resolution 
mechanisms, the parochial scale and the ambiguousness of the application of several rules 
make the convergence of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration run through the centre of 
controversies. At the present time it is perceptible that the convergence of ICSID and non-
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